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Preface
This dissertation consists of four self-contained empirical essays that analyze the hetero-
geneity of firms’ expectations and the effects of uncertainty shocks and oil price hikes on
economic activity. Although each essay covers a different topic, the four can be classified
into two broad categories.
The first part of the thesis (Chapters 1 and 2) analyzes two causes that affect the fac-
tor reallocation process of firms. To assess the importance of factor reallocation for an
economy, it is crucial to understand that changes in aggregate productivity can have two
causes: changes in technical efficiency and changes in the reallocation of production factors.1
Typically, the first type of change is used to explain total factor productivity shocks in dy-
namic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. However, Foster et al. (2001, 2006)
show that factor reallocation, including firm entry and exit, accounts for 90 percent of retail
and 50 percent of manufacturing productivity growth. In a more recent study, Petrin et
al. (2011) state that factor reallocation explains a much larger share of U.S. manufacturing
productivity growth than do changes in technical efficiency. In short, reallocation plays a
dominant role in explaining aggregate productivity growth.2 Therefore, it is important to
discover what factors affect factor reallocation.
Heightened firm-level uncertainty is one circumstance that prevents production factors
from moving from low productivity firms to high productivity firms. In his seminal work,
Bloom (2009) shows that large second-moment shocks trigger a sudden halt in factor move-
ments under non-convex adjustment costs in capital and labor.3 Put differently, an increase
in uncertainty leads to a so-called “wait-and-see”-effect. The idea behind this effect is intu-
itive: if firms suddenly find themselves in a more uncertain environment, they stop investing
1 Baily et al. (1992) provide a detailed decomposition equation of aggregate productivity growth.
2In a different context, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) show that the long-run level of manufacturing output
in China and India would be 67 percent and 153 percent higher if these countries faced the same level of
reallocation frictions as U.S. manufacturing.
3The existence of non-convex or kinked adjustment costs is well-established in the literature (see Davis
and Haltiwanger, 1992, as well as Doms and Dunne, 1998).
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and hiring and the economy slips into a recession. When uncertainty lessens, economic ac-
tivity will eventually experience a revival and even overshoot its initial production level due
to pent-up factor demand. Bloom et al. (2010) and Alexopoulos and Cohen (2009) claim
that uncertainty shocks explain a sizeable proportion of business cycle fluctuations. Taking
this finding as its inspiration, Chapter 1 analyzes the impact of time-varying business un-
certainty on economic activity.4 Of note is that the “wait-and-see”-effect needs only three
years to play out, making it a high-frequency effect. In our study we address this point by
using monthly business survey data from the United States and Germany to investigate the
relationship between uncertainty and economic activity within a structural vector autore-
gression framework. Using business survey data has the advantage of capturing a subjective
element of decision-maker uncertainty as opposed to that of outside experts. Specifically,
these business survey data allow the construction of two complementary proxies of true ex
ante uncertainty: ex ante disagreement and ex post forecast error variance. After incorpo-
rating these uncertainty measures into our empirical framework, we find little evidence of
the high-frequency “wait-and-see”-effect, i.e. a large decline in economic activity after an
uncertainty shock, followed by a quick rebound. To the contrary, our analysis provides evi-
dence that increased business uncertainty leads to a slow and protracted decline in economic
activity. Or, in other words, sudden increases in uncertainty have negative long-run, rather
than short-run, effects on economic activity. In addition, adverse long-run “supply” shocks
lead to increases in measured uncertainty. Our results are consistent with two economic
environments: uncertainty shocks cause very low-frequency negative effects on activity; or
high uncertainty events are merely a by-product of bad economic times: recessions breed
uncertainty.
Unlike uncertainty shocks, oil price hikes do explain periods of high factor reallocation.
Davis and Haltiwanger (2001) find that oil price shocks trigger an enormous labor reallocation
process within the U.S. economy. Bresnahan and Ramey (1993), Lee and Ni (2002) and
Ramey and Vine (2010) show that this is especially true for the U.S. automobile sector.
In the early 1970s and 1980s, this sector was mainly specialized in producing large and
fuel-inefficient cars. As a consequence, this sector was especially hard hit by the oil-price-
hike-caused shifts in demand toward smaller cars. Due to the existence of large adjustment
costs these shifts in demand triggered large and costly reallocation processes that ultimately
contributed to a large extent to the U.S. recessions in the early 1970s and 1980s. As is the
4This chapter is based on joint work with Rüdiger Bachmann and Eric Sims. It is based on our paper
“Uncertainty and Business Activity: Evidence From Business Survey Data,” Working Paper 16143, National
Bureau of Economic Research, 2010.
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case in the United States, the automobile sector is very important to the German economy
and, thus, the consequences of the oil price hike in 2007/08 on the German economy are
worthy of study and, indeed, are the subject covered in Chapter 2.5 To gauge the economic
consequences of the 2007/08 oil price for Germany, it is crucial to understand that the oil
price is not determined exogenously. As noted by Kilian (2009), the oil price responds to
structural oil demand and supply shocks that, in turn, have different consequences for the
German economy. The oil price hike of 2007/08 was almost entirely driven by increasing
world demand (see Hamilton, 2009, Hicks and Kilian, 2011, and Kilian, 2009). This fact is
especially important in the case of Germany, for which, as an export economy, the positive
indirect effects on domestic production of a booming world economy can far overcompensate
for the negative direct effects of an oil price increase. To address this issue, in Chapter 2, we
implement the structural vector autoregression framework proposed by Kilian (2009) that
distinguishes between supply shock driven and demand shock driven oil price changes. Our
results show that supply shock driven and demand shock driven oil price hikes have different
impacts on the German economy. We find that consumption always reacts negatively to any
kind of shock, but that the impact on exports and gross investment depends on the type of oil
price shock. In the cases of the oil demand shocks, favorable international price movements
and shifts in global demand toward German export goods initially outweigh the negative
effects on consumer’ expenditures and, therefore, lead to an increase in GDP. Even though
strong oil price surges do not burden German manufacturing, which primarily produces
investment and export goods, we find that their effects on domestic demand become rather
negative over time. Concerning the economic consequences of the 2007/08 oil price hike
we find that the sustained sequence of positive world demand shocks, that triggered the oil
price hike, led to a 2.3 percent reduction in German GDP in the year 2009. We thus provide
evidence that this particular oil price hike made a notable contribution to the subsequent
recession in Germany.
The second half of the thesis (Chapters 3 and 4) focuses on heterogeneity in firms’
expectations. Zimmermann and Kawasaki (1986), Nerlove (1983) and Souleles (2004) provide
the motivation for both chapters. Specifically, we use survey micro data from the IFO
Business Climate Survey (IFO-BCS) to analyze firms’ expectation errors. One problem
that typically arises when using survey data is how to deal with the qualitative nature
of these data. While useful, in that more firms are inclined to participate in a survey
5This chapter is based on joint work with Kai Carstensen and Georg Paula. It is based on our paper
“How Strongly Did the 2007/08 Oil Price Hike Contribute to the Subsequent Recession,” mimeo, 2011. This
is a revised version of our working paper that circulated under CESifo-WP 3357.
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when the information demands are low, qualitative information has limits, particularly when
forecasting errors need to be aggregated over time so as to measure the long-run average
forecasting errors of firms and possible biases therein. However, under certain assumptions,
we can combine the qualitative three-month ahead production outlook from the monthly
survey with the quantitative change in percentage capacity utilization from the quarterly
supplement to compute idiosyncratic quarterly, one-quarter-ahead production expectation
errors. We do this for the manufacturing part of the IFO-BCS from 1980 onward and thus
construct a panel of quarterly production expectation errors for a period of 30 years. This
data set is then used to answer two questions raised in Chapters 3 and 4.
In Chapter 3, we take a look at whether firms suffer from expectational bias.6 If the
answer is yes (and it is), we then determine the extent of welfare losses stemming from those
expectational biases. Firms’ expectations are unbiased if their subjective probabilities with
respect to future economic states are not distorted. This implies that their long-run average
expectation errors are not significantly different from zero. Therefore, we identify expecta-
tional biases by testing for each firm whether its average expectation error is significantly
different from zero. If this is the case, we conclude that this firm has an expectational bias.
Using this procedure, we find that, depending on the exact definition of our quantitative
production expectation error, at least 6 percent and at most 34 percent of firms consistently
over- or underpredict their one-quarter-ahead upcoming production. In a further step, we
investigate the implications of these expectational biases by performing a simple welfare
calculation. We use a frictionless heterogeneous firm model where firms decide about their
factor demands before they know their idiosyncratic productivity levels. We calibrate the
fractions of optimistic and pessimistic firms and the extent of their expectational biases to the
distributional properties of production expectation errors in the IFO-BCS. Overoptimistic
firms hire too many workers and build up capital stocks that are too high. Overpessimistic
firms do not demand enough inputs. We then compare the welfare in an economy populated
by firms with a distribution of production expectation errors that approximates the one in
the data to a world populated only by firms with zero long-run expectation errors. We ro-
bustly find that the welfare losses from expectational errors are small, probably smaller even
than conventional estimates of the welfare costs of business cycles.
The final chapter of the thesis contains a more detailed analysis of the heterogeneity of
expectations and expectation errors. Weale and Pesaran (2006) point out that expectation
heterogeneity arises due to differences in subjective probability densities (belief disparity)
6This chapter is based on joint work with Rüdiger Bachmann. It is based on our paper “Firms’ Optimism
and Pessimism: Evidence From the IFO Survey,” mimeo, 2011.
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and differences in individual-specific information sets (information disparity). This study is
motivated by the idea that firms may differ with respect to their beliefs and with respect to
their ability to process information. Specifically, I am interested in discovering how many
firms have rational expectations in a traditional sense, i.e. their expectations are unbiased
and they use all available information efficiently. In my conservative estimate of expectation
errors, I find that about two thirds of all the firms in my sample have rational expecta-
tions, i.e. their expectations are unbiased and they use all available information efficiently.
However, under a broader definition, this number decreases substantially to slightly more
than 30 percent. Thus, there is evidence that heterogeneous firms form their expectations
in heterogeneous ways, i.e. a large proportion of firms differ with respect to their beliefs and
their ability to process information.
xiv Preface
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Chapter 1
Uncertainty and Business Activity:
Evidence From Business Survey Data
Abstract1
What is the impact of time-varying business uncertainty on economic activity? We construct
empirical measures of uncertainty based on business survey data from the U.S. and Germany.
We show that measured uncertainty is robustly negatively correlated with economic activity
far into the future. In particular, adverse “supply” shocks lead to large increases in mea-
sured uncertainty. In contrast, innovations in measured uncertainty uncorrelated with shocks
identified as having a permanent impact on production have quantitatively small impacts on
economic activity. Our results are consistent with two economic environments: uncertainty
shocks cause rather low-frequency negative effects on activity, or high uncertainty events are
mainly a by-product of bad economic times – recessions breed uncertainty.
1This chapter is based on joint work with Rüdiger Bachmann and Eric Sims. It is based on our paper
“Uncertainty and Business Activity: Evidence From Business Survey Data,” Working Paper 16143, National
Bureau of Economic Research, 2010.
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2 Chapter 1. Uncertainty and Business Activity
1.1 Introduction
What is the impact of time-varying business uncertainty on economic activity? The seminal
contribution in Bloom (2009) has renewed interest in the aggregate effects of time-varying
uncertainty and influenced a growing literature in macroeconomics, which we will discuss
in detail below. In this paper we use (partly confidential) data from business surveys to
investigate the relationship between uncertainty and economic activity within a structural
vector autoregressions (SVAR) framework.
These business surveys contain, on a monthly basis, qualitative information on the cur-
rent state of, and expectations regarding, firms’ business situations. In particular, we use
disagreement in business expectations for the Third Federal Reserve District Business Out-
look Survey (BOS) to measure business uncertainty. Using dispersion of expectations as a
measure of uncertainty has a long tradition in the literature: Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987)
show with the NBER-ASA expert forecasts of output growth and inflation that disagreement
and intrapersonal uncertainty are positively correlated.2 While we do not have probabilistic
forecasts of individual business situations, the confidential micro data of the German IFO
Business Climate Survey (IFO-BCS) allow us to compare the disagreement-based measure
of uncertainty with a qualitative index of the forecast error variance of production expec-
tations. We find that the two uncertainty measures are positively correlated and that their
impact on economic activity is qualitatively and quantitatively similar and statistically often
indistinguishable.
High-frequency business survey data from narrowly defined segments of the economy are
well-suited to measure the impact of uncertainty on economic decision-making for several
reasons. First, business survey data capture a subjective element of uncertainty for actual
decision makers, as opposed to outside experts. Second, we will show that our business un-
certainty measure explains a higher fraction of the total forecast error variance of economic
activity variables than volatility measures based on stock market returns. Third, the recent
literature (Bloom, 2009, and Bloom et al., 2010) has highlighted the so-called “wait-and-
see”-effect of uncertainty: if firms find themselves in a more uncertain environment, they
stop hiring and the economy slips into a recession. Positive shocks to uncertainty can thus
lead to short run fluctuations, starting with a rapid decline in economic activity, then a
rebound phase and prolonged overshoot after approximately six months. As discussed more
in Section 1.2, “wait-and-see”-dynamics are thus rather short-run and rely on adjustment
frictions, which render high-frequency data the best candidate to detect these dynamics.
2Other examples in the literature that either find significant positive correlations between these two
measures or use disagreement as a proxy for uncertainty are: Federer (1993), Bomberger (1996), Giordano
and Soederlind (2003), Bond and Cummins (2004), Fuss and Vermeulen (2008), Clements (2008), Popescu
and Smets (2010) and Bloom et al. (2010).
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Readily available at a monthly frequency, business survey data have an advantage over bal-
ance sheet data, which are only available at lower frequencies. Fourth, our use of dispersion
in survey responses to proxy for uncertainty rests on the assumption that respondents draw
their idiosyncratic shocks from similar distributions, so that fluctuations in dispersion are
the result of fluctuations in uncertainty and not merely compositional changes in the cross-
section. Using data from narrowly defined segments of the economy makes this assumption
more likely to hold. Finally, the confidential micro data allow us to compare expectations
and realizations of economic variables and thus to construct two complementary proxies for
uncertainty: ex ante disagreement and ex post forecast error variance.
We begin by estimating low-dimensional SVARs featuring the survey-based uncertainty
indices and measures of economic activity within a sector. We order uncertainty first, so
that innovations to uncertainty can affect economic activity immediately. We find that pos-
itive innovations to uncertainty have protracted negative effects on economic activity. The
effect on impact and at high frequencies is small. This is a robust result across specifi-
cations and surveys. While they do not appear to be consistent with the aforementioned
high-frequency “wait-and-see”-effect, “wait-and-see”-dynamics could be combined with an
endogenous growth mechanism – R&D investment, for example – to generate the observed
protracted negative implications for economic activity. In addition, we also suggest a new in-
terpretation: the “by-product”-hypothesis. In this view, high uncertainty events are merely
reflective of bad economic times, rather than their cause.
To investigate further, we then impose more structure and change the identification
strategy. In systems featuring uncertainty, a measure of sectoral economic activity, and a
measure of the aggregate unemployment rate, we identify three structural shocks. In the
spirit of Shapiro and Watson (1988), Blanchard and Quah (1989), and Gali (1999), we use a
long-run restriction to identify a shock which affects the level of sectoral economic activity
in the long-run from the other two shocks, which can only have a transitory effect on out-
put. We identify the uncertainty shock from the other “demand” shock by imposing that
our measure of uncertainty not respond within period to the other shock. This identifica-
tion “shuts down” the long-run influence of uncertainty in the hope of making its short-run
impact shine through, while at the same time allowing uncertainty to have a strong tem-
porary, short-lived effect on activity. In point of fact, however, shocks to uncertainty so
identified have small effects on production and unemployment. Rather, consistent with the
“by-product”-hypothesis, empirical measures of uncertainty appear to be largely driven by
the long-run shock. Shocks which permanently lower economic activity give rise to signif-
icantly higher measured uncertainty on impact. This is true for survey-based uncertainty
measures, as well as uncertainty measures based on the corporate bond spread over treasuries
and uncertainty measures based on stock market volatility.
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This conclusion is consistent with a general view of recessions as times of destroyed
business practices and relationships, the reestablishment of which generates uncertainty. It
accords with empirical work by Hamilton and Lin (1996), who find that high stock market
volatility is driven mainly by bad economic times. It is also consistent with the theoretical
models of Bachmann and Moscarini (2011) as well as Fostel and Geanakoplos (2011), who
argue that bad economic times incentivize risky behavior – in the former through price ex-
perimentation, in the latter through increased leverage – and therefore endogenously lead to
increased uncertainty.
Related Literature
There is a growing literature that studies the effects of uncertainty shocks in fully specified
dynamic general equilibrium models. Bachmann and Bayer (2011), exploring data from a
German firm-level panel, argue that the effects in Bloom (2009) and Bloom et al. (2010) are
small and do not substantially alter unconditional business cycle dynamics. Chugh (2011),
who explains the dynamics of leverage with shocks to micro-level uncertainty, also finds only
a small business cycle impact of uncertainty shocks. Using a model with financial frictions,
Gilchrist et al. (2010) argue that increases in uncertainty lead to an increase in bond premia
and the cost of capital which, in turn, triggers a decline in investment activity. Arellano
et al. (2011) show that firms downsize investment projects to avoid default when faced with
higher uncertainty. Schaal (2010) uses a directed search model with uncertainty shocks to
understand the recent labor market behavior. Basu and Bundick (2011) study uncertainty
shocks in a sticky price environment. Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011) argue that pos-
itive shocks to interest rate volatility depress economic activity in several Latin American
economies.
There is another literature that, like this paper, estimates the impacts of various un-
certainty proxies on economic activity. Leahy and Whited (1996) is one of the first papers
to document empirically a negative relationship between uncertainty and firms’ investment.
Bond and Cummins (2004) use data on publicly traded U.S. companies to show that various
measures of uncertainty predict prolonged declines of firms’ investment activities. Gilchrist
et al. (2009) find a similar result for increases in the dispersion of firms’ sales growth. Chris-
tiano et al. (2010), in a large-scale DSGE context, also find a strong low-frequency impact
of the identified risk shock. Alexopoulos and Cohen (2009) use a narrative approach in a
structural VAR framework (the incidence of the words “uncertainty” and “economy” in New
York Times articles) and find high-frequency decline-rebound-overshoot dynamics. Popescu
and Smets (2010) show, again with structural vector autoregressions and for German expert
survey data, that it is shocks to risk aversion rather than innovations to uncertainty that
explain roughly 10%-15% of output fluctuations.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the
“wait-and-see”-mechanism and delivers a benchmark against which we compare our empirical
results. The third section describes the business survey data we use. The fourth section
presents the main results and interprets them. Details and additional results are relegated
to various appendices.
1.2 Uncertainty and Activity: “Wait-and-See”
In this section we give a brief overview of the “wait-and-see”-mechanism that might give rise
to uncertainty-driven short-run fluctuations. In addition to providing a benchmark against
which we can compare our empirical results, this exercise will also serve to motivate the use
of high-frequency data in examining the impact of uncertainty on economic activity.
Figure 1.1: Replication of Wait-and-See in Bloom (2009)
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Notes: This graph is a replication of the simulated model IRF of output to an uncertainty shock, see Figure
12 in Bloom (2009).
Time-varying uncertainty at the firm level may have economic consequences when there
is a degree of irreversibility to firm actions (see Bernanke, 1983, as well as Dixit and Pindyck,
1994). For a concrete example, suppose that a firm faces fixed costs to adjusting the size
of its labor force and/or physical capital stock. Suppose further that there is a mean-
6 Chapter 1. Uncertainty and Business Activity
preserving spread on the distribution of future demand for the firm’s product. With fixed
adjustments costs, higher uncertainty over future demand makes new hiring and investment
less attractive. If a large fixed cost must be paid to adjust the firm’s labor or capital, then
there is reason to minimize the number of times this cost must be paid. If the future is very
uncertain (in the sense that demand could be either very high or very low relative to the
present), then it makes sense to wait until the uncertainty is resolved to undertake new hiring
and investment. Why pay a large fixed cost now when a highly uncertain future means that
one will likely have to pay the fixed cost again?
An increase in uncertainty thus makes inaction relatively more attractive. Given a re-
duction in hiring, employment, and hence output, will fall through exogenous separations.
As the future begins to unfold, demand or productivity conditions are, in expectation, un-
changed. There will be pent up demand for labor and capital. Inaction today moves firms
closer to their adjustment triggers in subsequent periods, leading to expected increases in
hiring, investment and a general rebound and even overshoot in economic activity, followed
by a return to steady state. Figure 1.1 provides an example of an impulse response of output
to an increase in uncertainty, replicated from the model in Bloom (2009).
This theoretical impulse response highlights an important aspect as pertains to our em-
pirical work. The economic implications of uncertainty shocks in a model with “wait-and-
see”-effects are decidedly high-frequency in nature. Thus, an empirical study of uncertainty
that wants to detect “wait-and-see”-effects should make use of high-frequency data, which
is one of the reasons why we use monthly surveys in this paper.
1.3 Measuring Business Uncertainty
We construct uncertainty measures from the Third FED District Business Outlook Survey
(BOS) and the German IFO Business Climate Survey (IFO-BCS). In the next subsection
we briefly describe the characteristics of each and list the main survey questions we use to
measure business uncertainty. We then define the variables used in the empirical analysis,
followed by a subsection on the cyclical properties of these variables.
1.3.1 Data Description
BOS
The Business Outlook Survey is a monthly survey conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia since 1968. The survey design has essentially been unaltered since its inception.
It is sent to large manufacturing firms in the Third FED District, which comprises the state
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of Delaware, the southern half of New Jersey, and the eastern two thirds of Pennsylvania.
The survey questionnaire is of the “box check” variety. It asks about firms’ general business
expectations as well as their expectations and actual realizations for various firm-specific
variables such as shipments, workforce and work hours. Respondents indicate whether the
value of each economic indicator has increased, decreased, or stayed the same over the
past month. They are also asked about their expectations for each indicator over the next
six months. Whenever possible, the survey is sent to the same individual each month,
typically the chief executive, a financial officer or other person “in the know”. Participation
is voluntary. The group of participating firms is periodically replenished as firms drop out or
a need arises to make the panel more representative of the industrial mix of the region. Each
month 100-125 firms respond. As noted by Trebing (1998), occasional telephone interviews
are used to verify the accuracy of the survey responses.
The advantages of the BOS are its long time horizon, its focus on one consistent, eco-
nomically relatively homogenous class of entities – large manufacturing firms in one region
–, an unparalleled number of questions that are useful for our research question and the fact
that for each question there is a “current change” and an “expectation” version. Its main
drawback is the relatively small number of respondents. Nevertheless, given its advantages,
we use the BOS for our baseline results.3 We focus on the following two questions (the other
questions we use from the BOS are documented in Appendix A2.1):
Q 1 “General Business Conditions: What is your evaluation of the level of general business
activity six months from now vs. [CURRENT MONTH]: decrease, no change, increase?”
Q 2 “General Business Conditions: What is your evaluation of the level of general business
activity [LAST MONTH] vs. [CURRENT MONTH]: decrease, no change, increase?”
Both questions are phrased, somewhat ambiguously, about general business conditions.
Trebing (1998) notes, however, that answers to these questions are highly correlated with
responses to the shipments question, which is phrased as explicitly company specific. He
concludes that both series are essentially indicators of firm-specific business conditions.
In addition, in order to construct an employment turnover indicator, we use the following
question:
Q 3 “Company Business Indicators: Number of Employees [LAST MONTH] vs.
[CURRENT MONTH]: decrease, no change, increase?”
3Appendix A4 supplements the baseline results with an analysis of the U.S. Small Business Economic
Trends Survey (SBETS). There is a concern that if adjustment costs grow less than proportionally with
firm size the firms in the BOS may be sufficiently large that adjustment costs do not matter for them, and
therefore “wait-and-see”cannot be detected in the BOS. The SBETS also has larger cross-sections of firms
compared to the BOS. We find essentially the same results.
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IFO-BCS
The German IFO Business Climate Survey is one of the oldest and broadest monthly business
confidence surveys available (see Becker and Wohlrabe, 2008, for more detailed information).
However, due to longitudinal consistency problems and availability of micro data in a pro-
cessable form only since 1980, we limit our analysis to the manufacturing sector from 1980
until the present. From 1991 on, the sample includes East-German firms as well.
One of the IFO-BCS’s main advantages is the high number of survey participants. The av-
erage number of respondents at the beginning of our sample is approximately 5,000; towards
the end the number is about half that at 2,500.4 Participation in the survey is voluntary and
there is some fraction of firms that are only one-time participants. However, conditional on
staying two months in the survey, most firms continue on and this allows us to construct a
measure of ex post forecast error uncertainty. Our final sample of continuing firms comprises
roughly 4,000 respondents at the beginning and 2,000 towards the end of the sample. In
terms of firm size, the IFO-BCS contains all categories. In the survey for January 2009, for
example, about 12% of respondents had less than 20 employees, roughly 39% had more than
20 but less than 100 employees, 43% of the participants employed between 100 and 1000
people and less than 7% had a workforce of more than 1000 people.
The two main questions that allow us to construct a qualitative index of ex-post forecast
errors are:5
Q 4 “Expectations for the next three months: Our domestic production activities with respect
to product XY will (without taking into account differences in the length of months or seasonal
fluctuations) increase, roughly stay the same, decrease.”
Q 5 “Trends in the last month: Our domestic production activities with respect to prod-
uct XY have (without taking into account differences in the length of months or seasonal
fluctuations) increased, roughly stayed the same, decreased.”
1.3.2 Variable Definitions
Survey answers fall into three main categories, Increase, Decrease, and a neutral category.
We use these categories to define our expectation-based index of uncertainty and one index of
current economic activity. Define Frac+t as the fraction of “increase”-responses to a survey
4The IFO-BCS is a survey at the product level, so that these numbers do not exactly correspond to firms.
5Here we provide a translation, for the German original see Appendix A3.1.
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question at time t; Frac−t is defined analogously. We start with the uncertainty index,
constructed for questions like Q 1 and Q 4:
Uncertaintyt ≡ sqrt
Frac+t + Frac−t − (Frac+t − Frac−t )2
)
.
Notice that Uncertaintyt so defined is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the survey
responses, if the Increase-category is quantified by +1 and the Decrease-category by −1
and the residual categories by 0. This is a standard quantification method for qualitative
survey data. Next, we define a current index of economic activity for questions like Q 2
and Q 5. Summing up variables that essentially measure changes is intended to capture a
qualitative measure of the level of economic activity:
Activityt ≡
t∑
τ=1
(Frac+τ − Frac−τ ).
1.3.3 Is Cross-sectional Dispersion a Good Proxy for Uncertainty?
Measuring the (subjective) uncertainty of decision makers is inherently difficult. Ideally, one
would like to elicit a subjective probability distribution over future events from managers,
as has been done in Guiso and Parigi (1999) for Italian firms. With this probability dis-
tribution it is straightforward to compute a measure of intrapersonal uncertainty for firms’
decision makers. However, to the best of our knowledge such probability distributions are
not available repeatedly and over long time horizons.6 Researchers have to rely on proxies
instead. Although frequently done in the literature, using the cross-sectional dispersion of
firms’ expectations as a proxy for firms’ uncertainty is not without potential problems. First,
time-varying cross-sectional dispersion in firms’ survey responses might be due to different
firms reacting differently to aggregate shocks even with constant uncertainty. Notice that
for relatively homogenous samples such as the BOS this is likely to be less of a problem.
Secondly, time variation in the dispersion of expectations might be the result of time varia-
tion in the heterogeneity of said expectations, without these expectations reflecting a higher
degree of uncertainty on the part of the business managers.
We address the first concern – different firms having different factor loadings to aggre-
gate shocks – by a variance decomposition of the IFO-based (based on Q 4, to be specific)
uncertainty measure, (UncertaintyIFOt )2, into the average within-variance and the between-
variance of the 13 manufacturing subsectors contained in the IFO-BCS (see Appendix A3.2
6 Bontempi et al. (2010), using the same Italian data sets as Guiso and Parigi (1999), construct eight
years of annual uncertainty measures from the max-min range of firms’ one-year ahead sales forecasts.
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for details). The idea behind this decomposition is that such differences in factor loadings to
aggregate shocks might be due to industry-specific production and adjustment technologies.
Figure A9 in Appendix A3.2, however, shows that the time series of (UncertaintyIFOt )2 is
not explained by the between-variance of the manufacturing subsectors. This means it is not
explained by the manufacturing subsectors getting more or less different over the business
cycle.
To address the second concern – the relationship between (time-varying) dispersion, un-
certainty and cross-sectional shock variance – we present in Appendix A1 a simple and highly
stylized two-period model where firms receive signals about their uncertain future business
situations. We show for this model that if signals are neither perfectly informative nor per-
fectly uninformative, under Bayesian updating both the dispersion of firms’ expectations and
the average subjective uncertainty in the cross-section increase in response to an increase in
the cross-sectional variance of firms’ future business situations.
Furthermore, the confidential micro data in the IFO-BCS and its panel structure allow
us to construct a qualitative index of the ex post forecast error standard deviation, which
by construction excludes heterogeneous, but certain, changes in expectations.7 The ba-
sic idea is that we can compare firms’ answers about their production expectations, Q 4,
with their answers on past production realizations, Q 5, and thus construct a measure of
firm-specific production expectation errors. The cross-sectional standard deviation of these
expectation errors, Uncertaintyfet
IFO
, is a dispersion index for the ex post forecast errors.
In Appendix A3.3 we describe the construction of Uncertaintyfet
IFO
in detail.
The advantage of Uncertaintyfet
IFO
over UncertaintyIFOt is that it is based on ac-
tual “uncertain-at-time-t” innovations, as opposed to potentially heterogeneous expectations
about the future, which could be certain. However, the raw correlation coefficient between
Uncertaintyfet
IFO
and UncertaintyIFOt is reasonably high for monthly data, 0.73, and when
we aggregate both series up to the quarterly level the correlation is 0.77. The fact that both
conceptually different proxies for uncertainty are reasonably close to each other lends some
support to the widespread practice of proxying uncertainty with survey disagreement. Most
importantly, the impulse responses on economic activity look qualitatively and quantitatively
similar and are statistically often indistinguishable (see Section 1.4.2).
1.3.4 Cyclicality of Business Survey Variables
In this subsection, we report basic cyclical properties of the survey-based variables introduced
in Sections 1.3.2 and 1.3.3: Uncertaintyt, Uncertaintyfet and Activityt. They have been
7Whereas the aggregate survey responses, Frac+t and Frac
−
t , are publicly available for both the BOS and
the IFO-BCS, individual firm responses are not. In the case of the IFO-BCS they are available to researchers
on-site.
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seasonally adjusted with the SAS X12 procedure, an adaptation of the U.S. Bureau of the
Census X-12-ARIMA seasonal adjustment method. Table 1.1 displays the contemporaneous
correlations of the various survey-based monthly uncertainty measures with, respectively,
manufacturing industrial production and the corresponding survey-based activity measures.
The uncertainty indices are all countercyclical. This confirms previous findings by Bloom
(2009), Bloom et al. (2010), Chugh (2011) and Bachmann and Bayer (2011), who find, using
different data sources, that stock market volatility and balance-sheet-based cross-sectional
measures of uncertainty are all countercyclical.8 The correlation is even more negative when
we aggregate up to the quarterly frequency.
Table 1.1: Cyclical Properties of Uncertaintyt and Uncertaintyfet
Monthly Quarterly
Correlation with Correlation with
Uncertainty Measure IPt Activityt IPt Activityt
General Conditions-UncertaintyBOSt -0.28 -0.47 -0.33 -0.51
Shipments-UncertaintyBOSt -0.27 -0.29 -0.31 -0.32
Production-UncertaintyIFOt -0.10 -0.61 -0.23 -0.62
Production-Uncertaintyfet
IFO
-0.05 -0.54 -0.24 -0.59
Notes: This table displays the unconditional contemporaneous correlations between the survey-based un-
certainty variables in the rows and the month-over-month/quarter-over-quarter differences of two different
activity measures in the columns. Industrial production (IP) measures are logged. The General Conditions-
UncertaintyBOSt measure, based on Q 1, is paired with the corresponding difference of the (seasonally
adjusted) manufacturing industrial production index from the OECD main economic indicators and the
General Conditions-ActivityBOSt measure based on Q 2. The Shipments-UncertaintyBOSt measure, based
on Q 6 (see Appendix A2.1), is paired with the corresponding difference of the (seasonally adjusted) manufac-
turing industrial production index from the OECD main economic indicators and the Shipments-ActivityBOSt
measure based on Q 9 (see Appendix A2.1). The Production-UncertaintyIF Ot measure, based on Q 4, is
paired with the corresponding difference of the (seasonally adjusted) manufacturing industrial production
index from the German Federal Statistical Agency and the ActivityIF Ot -measure based on Q 5. Production-
Uncertaintyfet
IF O
is paired with the same activity measures as the Production-UncertaintyIF Ot measure.
Table 1.2 displays the contemporaneous correlations of the survey-based (differenced)
activity measures we constructed in Section 1.3.2 with manufacturing industrial production.
These activity measures are, not surprisingly, procyclical.
8We also find that both uncertainty measures from the IFO-BCS, UncertaintyIF Ot and Uncertainty
fe
t
IF O
,
are countercyclical, separately for each of the 13 manufacturing subsectors. This excludes composition effects
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Table 1.2: Cyclical Properties of Activityt
Monthly Quarterly
Activity Measure / Correlation with IPt IPt
General Conditions-ActivityBOSt 0.55 0.79
Shipments-ActivityBOSt 0.46 0.70
Production-ActivityIFOt 0.25 0.53
Notes: This table displays the unconditional contemporaneous correlations between the differenced survey-
based variables in the rows and the month-over-month/quarter-over-quarter differences of industrial produc-
tion indices. Industrial production (IP) measures are logged. The General Conditions-ActivityBOSt measure,
based on Q 2, is paired with the corresponding difference of the manufacturing industrial production index
from the OECD main economic indicators. The Shipments-ActivityBOSt measure, based on Q 9 (see Ap-
pendix A2.1), is paired with the corresponding difference of the manufacturing industrial production index
from the OECD main economic indicators. The Production-ActivityIF Ot measure, based on Q 5, is paired
with the corresponding difference of the manufacturing industrial production index from the German Federal
Statistical Agency.
1.4 Results
In this section we present and discuss our main empirical results. In Choleski-identified
SVARs with uncertainty ordered before economic activity variables, we robustly find that
innovations to business uncertainty are associated with initally small, but slowly-building
reductions in economic activity. Imposing the restriction that uncertainty shocks have no
long-run effects on activity renders the responses of economic activity to uncertainty sta-
tistically and economically insignificant. Both findings are difficult to reconcile with an
important “wait-and-see”-channel from uncertainty to aggregate dynamics. Rather, we find
that shocks adversely impacting the economy are important drivers of various empirical
uncertainty measures, suggesting that uncertainty is a consequence of bad shocks.
1.4.1 Third FED District Business Outlook Survey
We begin the analysis with the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Third District Busi-
ness Outlook Survey and low-dimensional Choleski-identified SVARs containing the General
Conditions-UncertaintyBOSt index and various economic activity variables. We order the un-
as an explanation for the countercyclicality of the overall uncertainty measure. The numbers are available
on request.
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certainty index first. This gives uncertainty its “best shot” of being quantitatively important
for economic activity dynamics. Figure 1.2 shows impulse responses for U.S. manufacturing
industrial production (upper panel) and General Conditions-ActivityBOSt (based on Q 2;
lower panel) to an innovation in business uncertainty.9 Both variables enter the system in
levels and we include 12 lags.10
Figure 1.2: Uncertainty Innovations on Manufacturing Activity
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Notes: Both IRFs are based on General Conditions-UncertaintyBOSt , which derives from Q 1 in the BOS.
The upper panel shows the response of manufacturing production to a positive uncertainty innovation in a
two-variable SVAR with Uncertainty ordered first. Manufacturing production is the natural logarithm of
the (seasonally adjusted) monthly manufacturing production index from the OECD main economic indica-
tors. The lower panel shows the response of General Conditions-ActivityBOSt (based on Q 2) to a positive
uncertainty innovation in a two-variable SVAR with Uncertainty ordered first. All VARs are run with 12
lags, the confidence bands are at the 95% significance level using Kilian’s (1998) bias-corrected bootstrap.
The impulse response of manufacturing production to an innovation in business uncer-
tainty is slightly negative on impact with effects that build over time. The peak decline
is at about 1 percent, occurring about two years after impact, with no tendency to revert.
The lower panel of Figure 1.2 provides corroborating evidence with a different measure of
9One might be worried that uncertainty should not affect economic activity on impact because of various
information or decision lags. For instance, one might assume that companies learn the uncertainty of their
business environment only through the published surveys themselves, when they see a lot of disagreement
there. Figure A3 in Appendix A2.3 presents the impulse response with economic activity ordered first. It is
clear that the Choleski ordering does not drive our results.
10Our results are robust to alternative assumptions about how the variables enter the VAR (i.e. levels vs.
differences) as well as to alternative assumptions about lag length.
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sectoral economic activity. The BOS in Q 2 asks about current business conditions relative
to the recent past. The impulse response of General Conditions-ActivityBOSt is strikingly
similar to that using overall manufacturing production as the activity measure. This is par-
ticularly important, as we do not have monthly industrial production data disaggregated
at the regional and sectoral level that would allow us to construct a quantitative activity
measure that corresponds exactly to the BOS. The fact that the results are nearly identical
across two related, but different activity measures lends credence to our finding: neither im-
pulse response function seems to be consistent with the “wait-and-see”-dynamics as shown
in Figure 1.1.11
Figure 1.3: Uncertainty Innovations on Manufacturing Employment
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Notes: see notes to Figure 1.2. Uncertainty is ordered first. The employment measures are seasonally
adjusted and logged and are taken from the BLS-CES data base.
In Figure 1.3 we show impulse responses from bivariate SVARs featuring our BOS baseline
uncertainty measure and various manufacturing employment measures. The responses shown
11In Table A2 in Appendix A2.2 we display contemporaneous correlations of various BOS activity mea-
sures with the monthly Third FED district BLS manufacturing employment data available from 1990 on.
Running the same two-variable SVAR with this employment measure as the activity variable on data from
1990 onwards results in very similar point estimates for the impulse response functions. We also compare
the monthly BOS activity measures with the monthly coincident index from the Philadelphia FED, which
measures overall economic, not merely manufacturing activity for the Third FED district. Using this index
as the activity variable in the two-variable SVAR would yield identical results. Finally, we compare yearly
averages of the BOS activity measures with the yearly NIPA manufacturing production index for the Third
FED district. The BOS activity measures are positively correlated with all these other imperfect activity
measures from official statistics, which shows that the BOS depicts the dynamics of real economic activity
in the manufacturing sector of the Third FED district reasonably accurately.
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are that of employment to uncertainty, with uncertainty ordered first. The “wait-and-see”-
theory of the transmission from uncertainty shocks to business cycles emphasizes hiring and
firing frictions. With these we should observe a large reduction in employment followed by
a quick recovery in response to an uncertainty shock, similarly to the output response in
Figure 1.1 in Section 1.2. However, the response of manufacturing employment is rather
consistent with our results for production: it moves little on impact, followed by a period
of sustained reductions, with no obvious tendency for reversion, even at very long horizons.
Production and non-production workers, who might be subject to different adjustment costs,
are affected similarly.
Another direct and related prediction of the “wait-and-see”-theory is that job turnover –
defined as the sum of job creation and job destruction – should decline following an increase
in uncertainty: wait and do nothing. Yet again, the survey data do not seem to support
this prediction. Figure 1.4 shows the response of the extensive margin of job turnover to an
innovation in uncertainty. The point estimate on and near impact is positive and insignificant
from zero, turning more significant at horizons well beyond one year.
Figure 1.4: Uncertainty Innovation on BOS Job Turnover Index
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Notes: see notes to Figure 1.2. Turnovert ≡ Frac+t + Frac
−
t . Turnovert is based on Q 3.
For a comparison of our results with the SVAR evidence in Bloom (2009), we esti-
mate exactly the same high-dimensional system, but replace the high uncertainty dummy
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variable based on stock market volatility with our General Conditions-UncertaintyBOSt in-
dex. The VAR otherwise includes the S&P500 stock market index, the Federal Funds
Rate, average hourly earnings, the consumer price index, hours, employment and indus-
trial production. Uncertainty is ordered second in a recursive identification. Figure 1.5
shows the impulse response of production and employment to an innovation in General
Conditions-UncertaintyBOSt . Although with reduced statistical significance, the pattern re-
mains: slowly-building declines and slow recoveries of economic activity variables.
Figure 1.5: Uncertainty Innovations in the Bloom (2009) SVAR
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Notes: see notes to Figure 1.2. The S&P500 stock market index has been logged and is ordered first.
Then follows the General Conditions-UncertaintyBOSt index. Hourly Earnings, the CPI, employment and
industrial production have been logged.
We also conduct a forecast error variance decomposition in this high-dimensional SVAR
with uncertainty based on the BOS and compare it to the forecast error variance decomposi-
tion in the SVAR with uncertainty based on stock market volatility. On impact, the variation
in production that is explained by either proxy for uncertainty is almost zero. Interestingly,
the forecast error variance in production that is explained by our survey-based General
Conditions-UncertaintyBOSt index rises steadily to 8% at the one-year horizon, 16% at the
two-year horizon and 20% at the five-year horizon. Similarly, the forecast error variance
in employment that is explained by our survey-based General Conditions-UncertaintyBOSt
index rises steadily to 4% at the one-year horizon, 11% at the two-year horizon and 12%
at the five-year horizon. In contrast, the uncertainty innovation from the high-uncertainty
dummy based on stock market volatility explains never more than 3% of the forecast error
variance in production at any horizon, and at most 3% of the forecast error variance in
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employment. These numbers are even lower when the actual volatility series is used instead
of the dummy. We take this as evidence that our uncertainty measure has more explanatory
power for economic activity than uncertainty measures based on stock market volatility.
We conduct many more robustness checks to our result that in Choleski-identified SVARs
uncertainty innovations trigger prolonged declines in economic activity. For example, we vary
the economic activity variable used in the baseline SVAR, while keeping
General Conditions-UncertaintyBOSt (based on Q 1) as the uncertainty measure: the BOS
shipments, employment and “work hours” based activity indices and overall labor productiv-
ity in manufacturing. We also vary the uncertainty measure: an indicator variable for high
uncertainty to capture uncertainty spikes as opposed to general uncertainty fluctuations, an
uncertainty measure based on entropy, and uncertainty measures derived from other expec-
tation questions in the BOS. The results are depicted in Appendix A2.3, Figures A4 to A8.
The basic qualitative patterns of these impulse responses are the same as in our benchmark
systems.
There are two main results from our analysis thus far – one negative and one positive.
The negative result is that there is little evidence supporting the high-frequency “wait-and-
see”-mechanism with a rebound, described in Section 1.2. On the positive side we have that
innovations to uncertainty contain significant predictive information for the future path of
sectoral economic activity.
This, in turn, leaves open two interpretations: for one, autonomous shocks to uncertainty
have long-run or even permanent effects. This would be consistent with a “wait-and-see”-
story where the R&D-sector is particularly heavily hit, so that persistent, but transitory
uncertainty shocks could lead to permanent effects on economic activity.12 In this case,
it could well be that the high-frequency “wait-and-see”-dynamics are simply swamped by
low-frequency effects, and we need to attempt to “control” for the latter.
In any event, another interpretation opens up: uncertainty could itself be generated by
bad news about the future. Under this interpretation, uncertainty events are merely a by-
product of bad economic times. Figure 1.6 shows results from the Choleski-identified baseline
SVAR, augmented by a measure of business confidence, ordered first. We define business
confidence as the difference between the fraction of positive responses and the negative
responses in the business survey. As in Figure 1.2, the two upper panels use manufacturing
production as the activity variable, and the two lower panels use the survey-based activity
measure General Conditions-ActivityBOSt . The two left panels show the impulse response
of the uncertainty index to a negative innovation in business confidence. They are strongly
12The increase of measured uncertainty to an uncertainty innovation lasts about 12 months in our baseline
SVAR displayed in Figure 1.2 and then dies out.
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and significantly positive. Bad news increase uncertainty. On the right hand side, we see
the impulse responses of economic activity to a positive innovation in business uncertainty,
orthogonalized to business confidence innovations. The impulse responses from Figure 1.2
are also depicted for comparison. While the impulse responses remain small on impact
and protracted over time, albeit much less so, their permanence vanishes once uncertainty
innovations are orthogonalized to confidence innovations and the responses are quantitatively
much smaller.
Figure 1.6: Uncertainty Innovations Orthogonalized to Confidence Innovations
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Notes: see notes to Figure 1.2. The two upper panels feature results from an SVAR with (in this ordering)
General Conditions-ConfidenceBOSt , General Conditions-UncertaintyBOSt and manufacturing production.
General Conditions-ConfidenceBOSt is a business confidence indicator, defined as Confidencet ≡ Frac+t −
Frac−t . It is based on Q 1. In the lower panels General Conditions-ActivityBOSt index replaces manufacturing
production as the activity variable. The two left panels show the impulse responses of the uncertainty index
to a negative innovation in business confidence. The two right panels show impulse responses of economic
activity to a positive innovation in business uncertainty. The dashed lines reproduce the impulse responses
of activity from Figure 1.2.
To explore the “by-product”-hypothesis further, as well as to give uncertainty a bet-
ter chance of leading to high-frequency “wait-and-see”-type dynamics, we now attempt to
“control” for any information about long-run economic activity contained in the uncertainty
measures. We do so by adopting an identification approach in the spirit of Shapiro and
Watson (1988) as well as Blanchard and Quah (1989) in a three-variable VAR with Gen-
eral Conditions-UncertaintyBOSt , manufacturing production as a sectoral activity measure
and the aggregate unemployment rate. We identify three structural shocks – one which can
have a long-run effect on production and two which cannot. Notice that the corresponding
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long-run shock in our case, unlike in Blanchard and Quah (1989) who use aggregate and
not sectoral production, need not literally be a productivity shock. Rather, it is any shock
that permanently affects sectoral output. We identify the uncertainty shock as a shock that
does not impact activity in the long-run, but can influence uncertainty and unemployment.
The long-run impact of uncertainty is shut down by construction to let short-run effects of
uncertainty shine through. Third, we identify a more conventional aggregate demand shock
separately from the short-run uncertainty shock, where we assume that the conventional
demand shock does not affect uncertainty on impact.13
Figure 1.7: A Three-Variable Blanchard-Quah-Type SVAR
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Notes: see notes to Figure 1.2. We use manufacturing production as the activity measure, and the General
Conditions-UncertaintyBOSt index as the uncertainty measure. The unemployment rate is the (seasonally
adjusted) monthly civilian unemployment rate from the BLS. The uncertainty innovation and the conven-
tional short-run shock are identified as shocks that do not impact manufacturing production in the long-run.
The conventional short-run shock is identified as the shock that does not affect the uncertainty index on
impact. The long-run shock and the conventional short-run shock have a negative sign.
Figure 1.7 shows the impulse responses in such a three-variable SVAR, and Table 1.3 the
corresponding forecast error variance decomposition for horizons ranging from one month
13We also tried an alternative specification which identifies the uncertainty shock as the shock leading to
no long-run impact on output which maximally explains variation in our uncertainty measure over various
horizons (as opposed to just on impact, which is what the recursive assumption does). The results are very
similar.
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to five years. Two results are important: first, once the long-run impact of uncertainty
is “controlled” for, there is little significant impact of uncertainty on output or unemploy-
ment left. The forecast error variance for activity is mainly driven by the long-run and the
conventional short-run shock, whereas the contribution of the uncertainty shock after three
months drops below 10 percent. The contribution of the uncertainty shock to the fluctua-
tions of the unemployment rate is even smaller. Secondly, a shock which permanently lowers
sectoral production is associated with an increase in uncertainty. This is consistent with
the Choleski-identified results in Figure 1.6 and precisely what our “by-product”-hypothesis
with respect to uncertainty implies. The forecast error variance decomposition shows that
the long-run shock accounts for a significant fraction of the fluctuations in the uncertainty
index, particularly in the first six months.
Table 1.3: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition - BOS
Shock 1M 3M 6M 1Y 2Y 5Y
Long-run 62% 55% 52% 53% 64% 77%
Activity Uncertainty 19% 10% 6% 3% 1% 1%
Short-run 20% 34% 42% 44% 34% 22%
Long-run 39% 48% 47% 28% 21% 21%
Uncertainty Uncertainty 61% 52% 51% 43% 29% 27%
Short-run 0% 0% 2% 30% 51% 52%
Long-run 0% 6% 11% 15% 21% 23%
Unemployment Rate Uncertainty 1% 1% 0% 0% 1% 2%
Short-run 99% 93% 89% 85% 77% 75%
Notes: see notes to Figure 1.7.
1.4.2 IFO Business Climate Survey
We now turn to results using the IFO Business Climate Survey, which gives us the advan-
tage of being able to compare uncertainty measures based on ex-ante disagreement with
uncertainty measures based on ex-post forecast error variance. Figure 1.8 shows the ac-
tivity responses for the Choleski-identified baseline SVAR to the innovations in the two
types of uncertainty we are considering: uncertainty based on the ex post forecast error
standard deviation – Uncertaintyfet
IFO
– and uncertainty based on ex ante disagreement –
UncertaintyIFOt . The activity variable is based on Q 5, the IFO current production question.
The SVARs here include a dummy variable from 1991 on to account for structural breaks
associated with the German reunification, though our results are insensitive to alternative
ways of dealing with that event. There are two important results: first, the responses of
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activity to the two different measures of uncertainty are quite similar to each other, in fact
statistically indistinguishable. This serves as support for our use of a disagreement measure
as an uncertainty proxy. Second, the results are also similar to those from the BOS, with
somewhat more evidence of reversion at longer horizons when Uncertaintyfet
IFO
is used.
The impact effects on activity are small, with the trough of the negative response occurring
roughly two years subsequent to the shock. This provides corroboration of the results from
U.S. data in another country.
Figure 1.8: Uncertainty Innovations on Production-ActivityIFOt
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Notes: Uncertaintyt is based on Q 4. Uncertaintyfet is based on Q 4 and Q 5. The activity variable is based
on Q 5. Uncertainty is ordered first. We include a dummy variable from 1991 to account for the German
reunification. We run the VARs with 12 lags. All confidence bands are at the 95% significance level using
Kilian’s (1998) bias-corrected bootstrap.
We conclude by also confirming the BOS results from the three-variable Blanchard-Quah-
type SVAR with Production-ActivityIFOt , Uncertaintyt and Uncertainty
fe
t , and the unem-
ployment rate in Figure 1.9 and Table 1.4 (for the sake of readabililty, we leave out the
confidence bands). We find that uncertainty measured either way has a lower impact on sec-
toral economic activity than in the BOS and somewhat more impact on the unemployment
rate, especially for the disagreement measure Uncertaintyt. The impulse response to either
uncertainty measure does not look like high-frequency “wait-and-see”-dynamics. We again
find that a negative long-run shock has a sizeable positive impact on the uncertainty index.
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The similarity between the BOS and IFO-BCS results suggests that the negative findings in
Popescu and Smets (2010) as well as Bachmann and Bayer (2011) with regards to the role of
uncertainty shocks as a major driving force of short-run fluctuations are not driven by their
use of German data.
Figure 1.9: A Three-Variable Blanchard-Quah-Type SVAR - IFO-BCS
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Notes: see notes to Figure 1.8. The unemployment rate is the (seasonally adjusted) monthly unemployment
rate from the Bundesanstalt für Arbeit. The uncertainty shock and the conventional short-run shock are
identified as shocks that do not impact manufacturing production in the long-run. The conventional short-
run shock is identified as the shock that does not affect the uncertainty index on impact.
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Table 1.4: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition - IFO-BCS
Shock 1M 3M 6M 1Y 2Y 5Y
Uncertaintyfet
Long-run 22% 22% 32% 51% 74% 87%
Activity Uncertainty 5% 1% 2% 6% 10% 7%
Short-run 73% 77% 66% 43% 16% 6%
Long-run 28% 31% 36% 40% 45% 44%
Uncertainty Uncertainty 72% 67% 63% 59% 53% 51%
Short-run 0% 2% 2% 2% 2% 5%
Long-run 37% 35% 31% 23% 17% 33%
Unemployment Rate Uncertainty 19% 19% 21% 25% 37% 39%
Short-run 45% 45% 48% 52% 46% 28%
Uncertaintyt
Long-run 8% 8% 13% 21% 40% 73%
Activity Uncertainty 1% 5% 8% 6% 2% 1%
Short-run 91% 87% 80% 73% 58% 27%
Long-run 41% 39% 41% 52% 62% 44%
Uncertainty Uncertainty 59% 60% 49% 36% 25% 17%
Short-run 0% 1% 10% 13% 13% 39%
Long-run 44% 40% 38% 28% 14% 23%
Unemployment Rate Uncertainty 44% 45% 41% 40% 30% 23%
Short-run 12% 15% 20% 32% 56% 55%
Notes: see notes to Figure 1.9.
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1.4.3 Discussion
In Choleski-identified SVARs with sectoral business uncertainty and sectoral economic ac-
tivity variables we find protracted negative impulse responses of activity to uncertainty
innovations. Job turnover reacts positively to the same shocks. A different SVAR identifi-
cation identifies uncertainty shocks as having no long-run effect on production, but affecting
production and unemployment on impact. An uncertainty shock so identified has little sig-
nificant effect on economic activity. In contrast, a shock identified as having a permanent
effect on activity is associated with significant increases in uncertainty.
Figures 1.10 and 1.11 show both these results from survey based uncertainty measures in
a condensed form and compare them to results based on other uncertainty proxies used in
the literature. To do so, we replace General Conditions-UncertaintyBOSt with, respectively,
the corporate bond spread as in Gilchrist et al. (2009), and stock market volatility as in
Bloom (2009), in the three-variable Blanchard-Quah-type SVAR that leads to Figure 1.7.
Figure 1.10: Uncertainty Shock on Activity
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Notes: see notes to Figure 1.7. The first panel is simply a replication of the ‘Activity to Uncertainty’
impulse response from Figure 1.7. The second panel displays the ‘Activity to Uncertainty’ response of a
three-variable Blanchard-Quah-type SVAR with ‘Corporate Bond Spread’ as the uncertainty measure, total
industrial production as the activity measure and the civilian unemployment rate. ‘Corporate Bond Spread’
refers to the spread of the 30 year Baa corporate bond index over the 30 year treasury bond. Where the
30 year treasury bond was missing we used the 20 year bond. Data source for the bond data is the Federal
Reserve Board. The third panel displays the ‘Activity to Uncertainty’ response of the same SVAR with
the stock market volatility dummy from Bloom (2009) as the uncertainty measure. The Choleski-identified
impulse response (dashed line) from Bloom (2009) is included for comparison.
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Figure 1.10 compares the effects of surprise movements in various uncertainty proxies
on production. The leftmost panel is simply a replication of the result in Figure 1.7, i.e.
where we use the survey-based General Conditions-UncertaintyBOSt -index as the uncertainty
measure. The middle panel uses the corporate bond spread and the rightmost panel the
“high stock market volatility”-dummy from Bloom (2009). Note that the high-frequency
“wait-and-see”-dynamics with a fast rebound more or less survive the long-run idenfication
strategy, as far as the point estimate is concerned. This is not too surprising given that the
Choleski-identified impulse response is essentially zero in the long-run. But Figure 1.10 also
shows that any high-frequency impact of surprise movements in uncertainty, regardless of
how it is measured, is likely to be small – much less than half a percent of production – and
statistically indistinguishable from each other as well as from zero.
Figure 1.11 compares the reaction of various uncertainty indices to an adverse long-
run shock. The leftmost panel is again a replication of the result in Figure 1.7. The
point estimates for all three uncertainty measures are positive, signficantly so for General
Conditions-UncertaintyBOSt and the corporate bond spread, which is at least suggestive of
the “by-product”-hypothesis.
Figure 1.11: Long-Run Shock on Uncertainty
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Notes: see notes to Figures 1.7 and 1.10. The first is a replication of the ‘Uncertainty to Long-Run’
impulse response from Figure 1.7. The second panel displays the ‘Uncertainty to Long-Run’ response of a
three-variable Blanchard-Quah-type SVAR with ‘Corporate Bond Spread’ as the uncertainty measure, total
industrial production as the activity measure and the civilian unemployment rate. The third panel displays
the ‘Uncertainty to Long-Run’ response of the same SVAR with stock market volatility from Bloom (2009)
as the uncertainty measure. Until 1986 this is realized monthly stock return volatility, and thereafter an
implied volatility index.
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As has been mentioned before our results leave open two interpretations for the role
of uncertainty in economic fluctuations. The first interpretation is that uncertainty is an
autonomous source of such fluctuations but has mainly long-run effects. In this case our
SVARs show that structural models need a mechanism that transmits rather transitory un-
certainty shocks into very persistent or even permanent output and employment declines.
Alternatively, uncertainty can be viewed as an epiphenomenon that accompanies bad eco-
nomic times. While we cannot strictly rule out the former, we believe that the data points
in the latter direction: bad times breed uncertainty.
Table 1.5: Relation Between NBER Recessions and High Uncertainty Dates
Uncertainty Measure High Uncertainty High Uncertainty
In Recessions Outside of Recessions
UncertaintyBOS 7 out of 7 8.5%
Corporate Bond Spread 6 out of 8 11.2%
Stock Market Volatility 7 out of 7 8.3%
Notes: UncertaintyBOS refers to the BOS uncertainty measure, based on Q 1. For ‘Corporate Bond Spread’
see notes to Figure 1.10. For ‘Stock Market Volatility’ see notes to Figure 1.11. For each uncertainty proxy
we construct a high uncertainty dummy, setting it unity, when the value exceeds the time series average by
one standard deviation. In the first column we report how many post 1960 recessions coincide with high
uncertainty events. We do not have BOS or stock market volatility data available for the 1961 recession.
There are no high corporate bond spread-uncertainty events during the 1961 and the 1991 recessions. In
the second column we report the fraction of months where high uncertainty events occur outside of NBER
recessions.
Table 1.5 shows that almost all NBER-dated recessions were periods of high uncertainty
– whether it is measured as cross-sectional forecast dispersion from business survey data,
the corporate bond spread or stock market volatility. We define high uncertainty events as
months when either uncertainty measure was one standard deviation above its time series
average. That almost all US recessions have been times of high uncertainty is consistent
with causality running in either direction – from uncertainty to economic activity or from
activity to uncertainty. It is therefore interesting to note that there is a considerable fraction
of months – close to 10 percent – where uncertainty spikes but the economy was not in a
recession, nor did a period of economic distress soon follow. This is particularly true in the
mid-late 1980s (around the time of the 1987 stock market crash) and the mid-late 1990s,
well before the downturn of 2001. That such large increases in uncertainty did not lead to
economic contractions is at least suggestive evidence that uncertainty is a concomitant factor
of bad economic times rather than a causal factor for them.
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It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully specify a model of intrinsic uncertainty as an
endogenous result of bad first moment shocks. Bachmann and Moscarini (2011) do so using
price experimentation as a mechanism; Fostel and Geanakoplos (2011) point to leverage.
More generally, we think of recessions as times of severed business and customer relationships
and of failing business models. Business and customer relationships have to be reestablished
and business models altered when the economy is at trough. This generates uncertainty. In
booms, in contrast, businesses have little incentive (or opportunity) to substantially change
their operating practices. Customers stay with their preferred business.
As a highly stylized example, suppose there are three businesses in an economy each
producing the same product, with total demand equal to 2 units of the product. Suppose
initially that all three businesses have an equal share of two-thirds. In a boom demand
becomes 2.5. With costs to establishing new business relationships, the customers of each
business stick around and demand more. There is no uncertainty. In a recession demand
becomes 2x, where x<1. Assume that one of the businesses goes under and business relations
are severed. The existing customers at the two remaining businesses now demand 23x each.
What happens to the customers whose business partner vanished? Let us assume there is
some uncertainty over where they are going to go, as in a location model where businesses
do not know the spatial distribution of customers. On the one extreme, the allocation might
be
[
4
3x,
2
3x
]
, i.e. one business gets all the free customers, on the other extreme it might be an
equal split: [x,x]. It is obvious that there exists a range for x, namely
(
1
2 ,
2
3
)
, where even in
the most equal distribution both businesses are worse off than before, but with an unequal
split one business might even come out better than before in this recession. The important
point is this: there is an intrinsic uncertainty due to recessions, because business structures
and practices have to be re-arranged.
1.5 Final Remarks
Using two different measures of business uncertainty from high-frequency, sectoral business
surveys in Choleski-identified structural vector autoregressions we find that positive inno-
vations to business uncertainty have protracted negative implications for sectoral economic
activity. This appears to be inconsistent with a high-frequency “wait-and-see”-channel being
the dominant effect of suprise movements in business uncertainty. This contrasts with the
results in the literature for suprise movements in stock market volatility, which trigger short-
run collapses of activity and quick rebounds. We confirm this result from Bloom (2009) also
in a long-run identification strategy.
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This can mean two things, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive. On the one
hand, perhaps stock market volatility really measures a different type of uncertainty than
survey-based uncertainty and the corporate bond spread – say aggregate uncertainty ver-
sus idiosyncratic uncertainty – and these types of uncertainty have different impacts on
businesses’ behavior. The second possibility is that the low-frequency impact of the survey-
based uncertainty measures swamps the high-frequency “wait-and-see”-dynamics. However,
we show in this paper that any high-frequency impact of surprise movements in uncertainty
is likely to be small, regardless of how uncertainty is measured and how its high-frequency
impact is identified. This leaves open the possibility that “wait-and-see”-dynamics can be
combined with an endogenous growth mechanism – R&D investment or embodied tech-
nological change – to generate the observed protracted negative implications for economic
activity in Choleski-identified structural vector autoregressions. Finally, structural vector
autoregression studies, by their very nature, can only make statements about the average
effect of uncertainty shocks, which leaves open the possibility that high uncertainty events
in certain episodes may have severely adverse high-frequency consequences.
But this paper also opens up another possibility, the “by-product”-hypothesis, for which
we find evidence both in Choleski-identified as well as Blanchard-Quah-type structural vector
autoregressions. Under this interpretation negative long-run shocks lead to high uncertainty
events. Uncertainty is a concomitant phenomenon of negative first moment events in the
economy. Bad times breed uncertainty. Of course, this leaves open the possibility that un-
certainty and the resulting “wait-and-see” are an important propagation and amplification
mechanism for other shocks. Businesses may invest and hire less when the outlook is bleak,
but they may even be more reluctant to invest and hire when, in addition, the outlook is
uncertain.
Our results suggest that research in the following three areas may prove fruitful: “wait-
and-see”-mechanisms in endogenous growth environments; fully specified mechanisms that
endogenously generate uncertainty in bad economic times; and the role of uncertainty as a
propagation and amplification mechanism.
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Appendix
A1 A Simple Model
To illustrate the relationship between concepts such as disagreement, uncertainty and cross-
sectional variance, we use the following simple two-period model: tomorrow’s business situ-
ation of firms is unknown today. It can move into three directions. Business situations can
improve (+1), stay the same (0) or deteriorate (−1). For each firm, nature draws the change
in business situation from the following probability distribution: [0.5∗ (1−p),p,0.5∗ (1−p)],
which is assumed to be known to the firms. The cross-sectional variance of the future busi-
ness situation is obviously (1− p), a decreasing function of p. Furthermore, we assume that
businesses receive a signal about the change in their business situation, with a structure
illustrated in Table A1. For instance, if tomorrow’s true state is +1, the signal can be +1
(with probability q) and 0 with probability (1− q). q thus measures the informativeness of
the signal.
Table A1: A Simple Two-Period Model of Firms’ Business Situations
State Tomorrow
0.5 ∗ (1− p) ↙ ↓ p ↘ (1− p) ∗ 0.5
+1 0 -1
q ↙ ↘ (1− q) 0.5 ∗ (1− q) ↙ q ↓ ↘ (1− q) ∗ 0.5 (1− q) ↙ ↘ q
+1 0 +1 0 -1 0 -1
Signal
Using Bayes’ Law we can compute the probabilities of the true state, conditional on a
signal:
1. (a) Prob(state= 1|signal= 1) = q∗0.5∗(1−p)
q∗0.5∗(1−p)+0.5∗(1−q)∗p
(b) Prob(state= 0|signal= 1) = 0.5∗(1−q)∗p
q∗0.5∗(1−p)+0.5∗(1−q)∗p
(c) Prob(state=−1|signal= 1) = 0
2. (a) Prob(state= 1|signal= 0) = (1−q)∗0.5∗(1−p)(1−q)∗0.5∗(1−p)+q∗p+(1−q)∗0.5∗(1−p)
(b) Prob(state= 0|signal= 0) = q∗p(1−q)∗0.5∗(1−p)+q∗p+(1−q)∗0.5∗(1−p)
(c) Prob(state=−1|signal= 0) = (1−q)∗0.5∗(1−p)(1−q)∗0.5∗(1−p)+q∗p+(1−q)∗0.5∗(1−p)
3. (a) Prob(state= 1|signal=−1) = 0
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(b) Prob(state= 0|signal=−1) = 0.5∗(1−q)∗p
q∗0.5∗(1−p)+0.5∗(1−q)∗p
(c) Prob(state=−1|signal=−1) = q∗0.5∗(1−p)
q∗0.5∗(1−p)+0.5∗(1−q)∗p
From these conditional probabilities, conditional expectations and variances can be com-
puted. And these, in turn, allow us to calculate 1) the variance of the conditional expecta-
tions over the change in business situations, which is a measure of disagreement; and 2) the
average conditional variance over the change in the business situation of a firm, which is a
measure of the average (subjective) uncertainty in the population of firms.
We begin with the case of perfectly informative signals: q = 1. In this case, obviously,
survey disagreement moves one for one with the variance of tomorrow’s state, but firms do
not experience any subjective uncertainty about the change in their business situation. With
q = 1 and in a two period set up disagreement and uncertainty do not comove. The fact
that we find substantial forecast errors in the IFO-BCS suggests that this extreme case may
not be realistic. But even if we assumed q = 1 and thus certainty for the immediate future,
higher disagreement today indicates a higher cross-sectional variance in business situations
tomorrow and thus higher uncertainty about business situations for periods beyond the
immediate future, as long as the variance of future innovations to the business situation
of firms has some persistence beyond the immediate period and signals are not perfectly
informative about this farther future. Figure A1 plots the autocorrelograms for General
Conditions-UncertaintyBOSt , Shipments-UncertaintyBOSt , Production-UncertaintyIFOt and
Production-Uncertaintyfet
IFO
, showing that uncertainty is very persistent.
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Figure A1: Autocorrelograms of Various Uncertainty Measures
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Notes: General Conditions-UncertaintyBOSt is based on Q 1. Shipments-UncertaintyBOSt is based on Q 6.
Production-UncertaintyIF Ot is based on Q 4. For the construction of Production-Uncertainty
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on Q 4 and Q 5, see Section 1.3.3.
Next, we look at the cases with imperfectly informative signals, i.e. q<1. We know
from the conditional variance decomposition formula that if the variance of tomorrow’s
state increases either the variance of the conditional expectations over tomorrow’s state
(disagreement) or the average conditional variance over tomorrow’s state (average subjective
uncertainty) has to increase, both may increase. The following Figure A2 shows for various
levels of the signal precision, q, that the latter is indeed the case in this model. The actual
cross-sectional variance of tomorrow’s state is given by the black solid line, the variance of
the conditional expectations over tomorrow’s state (disagreement) by the blue dashed line
and the average conditional variance over tomorrow’s state (subjective uncertainty) by the
red dotted line.
Finally, in order to translate the continuous disagreement measure – the variance of the
conditional expectations over the change in business situations – into discrete disagreement
in survey answers, where only [−1,0,1] as an answer are possible, we assume that if the firm
receives zero as a signal, it will answer zero, simply because the conditional expectation is
zero in this case (by the symmetry of the model). Furthermore, if it receives a signal equal
to 1, the probability of answering 1 in the survey equals the expectation conditional on the
signal being 1, which ranges from 1 (if p= 0) to 0 (if p= 1). This conditional expectation,
E[state|signal= 1], is computed from the conditional probabilities above. This means, the
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Figure A2: Cross-sectional Variance, Disagreement and Uncertainty
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closer the conditional expectation is to unity, the more likely firms are going to respond
with 1 in the survey. Symmetrically for the case of receiving a signal that equals −1. With
these assumptions, the variance of the survey answers is given by (E[answer] is computed
analogously):
V AR[answer] = (1−E[answer])2E[state|signal= 1] ∗ Prob(signal= 1) +
(0−E[answer])2(1−E[state|signal= 1]) ∗ Prob(signal= 1) +
(0−E[answer])2Prob(signal= 0) +
(0−E[answer])2(1−E[state|signal=−1]) ∗ Prob(signal=−1) +
(−1−E[answer])2(E[state|signal=−1]) ∗ Prob(signal=−1)
This discretized version of disagreement is also shown in Figure A2, by the green dashed-
dotted line. It follows closely the continuous disagreement measure. Notice that for inter-
mediate signal qualities, both disagreement and uncertainty move in the same direction as
the variance of the state tomorrow. In particular, for high values of p subjective uncertainty
varies significantly with the cross-sectional variance of the change in business situations. If
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the signal was such that it left everybody with the same conditional expectation (q = 0),
then of course disagreement would always be zero. Only the subjective uncertainty would
then be affected.
A2 Third FED District Business Outlook Survey (BOS)
A2.1 Additional BOS Questions
Q 6 “Company Business Indicators: Shipments six months from now vs. [CURRENT
MONTH]: decrease, no change, increase?”
Q 7 “Company Business Indicators: Number of Employees six months from now vs. [CUR-
RENT MONTH]: decrease, no change, increase?”
Q 8 “Company Business Indicators: Average Employee Workweek six months from now vs.
[CURRENT MONTH]: decrease, no change, increase?”
Q 9 “Company Business Indicators: Shipments [LAST MONTH] vs. [CURRENT MONTH]:
decrease, no change, increase?”
Q 10 “Company Business Indicators: Average Employee Workweek [LAST MONTH] vs.
[CURRENT MONTH]: decrease, no change, increase?”
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A2.2 Additional Information on BOS Variables
Table A2: Correlation between BOS-Activityt Variables and Official Statis-
tics
General Conditions Shipments Employment
BLS Monthly Sect. & Regio. Empl. 0.54 0.60 0.63
Philadelphia FED Coincident Index 0.71 0.68 0.60
NIPA Yearly Sect. & Regio. Prod. 0.39 0.41 -
Notes: This table displays the unconditional contemporaneous correlations of BOS-Activityt Variables,
based, in column order, on Q 2, Q 9 and Q 3, with log-differences of three different measures of sectoral
and regional activity measures from official statistics (in row order): ‘BLS Monthly Sect. & Regio. Empl.’
refers to the sum of the seasonally adjusted monthly manufacturing employment series for Pennsylvania,
Delaware and New Jersey, available from the BLS from 1990 on. ‘Philadelphia FED Coincident Index’ refers
to the GDP-weighted sum of the Philadelphia FED Coincident Indices for Pennsylvania, Delaware and New
Jersey (notice that this index is regionally, but not sectorally coinciding with the coverage of the BOS). It is
available from 1979 on. ‘NIPA Yearly Sect. & Regio. Prod.’ refers to the GDP-weighted sum of the yearly
NIPA quantity indices for the manufacturing sector for Pennsylvania, Delaware and New Jersey.
A2.3 Additional BOS Results
This appendix provides various robustness checks to the results in Section 1.4.1. Figure A3
shows that the ordering between uncertainty and activity variables is irrelevant for the result
that uncertainty innovations in two-variable SVARs trigger prolonged declines in sectoral
economic activity. Figures A4 and A5 vary the economic activity variable used in our baseline
two-variable SVAR, while keeping General Conditions-UncertaintyBOSt (based on Q 1) as
the uncertainty measure: the BOS shipments, employment and workhours based activity
indices, and labor productivity. Figures A6 to A8, in turn, vary the uncertainty measure
used: an indicator variable for high uncertainty, an entropy-based uncertainty measure and
uncertainty measures derived from other expectation questions in the BOS.
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Figure A3: Uncertainty Innovation on Manufacturing Production - Reverse Ordering
Months
Manufacturing Production
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
−0.02
−0.018
−0.016
−0.014
−0.012
−0.01
−0.008
−0.006
−0.004
−0.002
0
Notes: The IRF is based on a two-variable SVAR with General Conditions-UncertaintyBOSt (based on
Q 1 of the BOS) ordered second and 12 lags. Manufacturing production is the natural logarithm of the
(seasonally adjusted) monthly manufacturing production index from the OECD main economic indicators.
All confidence bands are at the 95% significance level using Kilian’s (1998) bias-corrected bootstrap.
Figure A4: Uncertainty Innovations on Various BOS Activity Indices
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Notes: see notes to Figure A3. Uncertainty is ordered first. The activity indices for the three panels are
based on Q 9, Q 3 and Q 10, respectively.
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Figure A5: Uncertainty Innovation on Manufacturing Labor Productivity
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Notes: see notes to Figure A3. Uncertainty is ordered first. Labor productivity is the log-difference between
the (seasonally adjusted) monthly manufacturing production index from the OECD main economic indica-
tors and the (seasonally adjusted) monthly manufacturing total hours series, which is itself based on the
manufacturing employment and weekly hours per worker series from the BLS-CES data base.
Figure A6: Uncertainty Innovation (Indicator Variable) on Manufacturing Production
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Notes: see notes to Figure A3. Uncertainty is ordered first. The uncertainty variable here is an indicator
variable that takes on a value of one, if General Conditions-UncertaintyBOSt , the measure of uncertainty
which is based on Q 1, is one standard deviation above its mean, and zero otherwise. There are 60 high-
uncertainty observations, or about 12% of the sample.
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Figure A7: Uncertainty Innovation on Manufacturing Production - Entropy
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Notes: see notes to Figure A3. Uncertainty is ordered first. It is measured as
UncertaintyEntropt ≡ Fract(Increase) log(1/Fract(Increase)) + Fract(Decrease) log(1/Fract(Decrease)) +
Fract(Neutral) log(1/Fract(Neutral)).
Figure A8: Uncertainty Innovations from Other BOS Activity Indices
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Notes: see notes to Figure A3. The uncertainty variables for the three panels are based on Q 6, Q 7 and
Q 8, respectively. The activity indices for the three panels are based on Q 9, Q 3 and Q 10. Uncertainty is
ordered first.
44 Chapter 1. Uncertainty and Business Activity
A3 IFO Business Climate Survey (IFO-BCS)
A3.1 Original German IFO-BCS Questions
Q 11 “Erwartungen für die nächsten 3 Monate: Unsere inländische Produktionstätigkeit
– ohne Berücksichtigung unterschiedlicher Monatslängen und saisonaler Schwankungen –
bezüglich XY wird voraussichtlich: steigen, etwa gleich bleiben, abnehmen.”
Q 12 “Tendenzen im vorangegangenen Monat: Unsere inländische Produktionstätigkeit –
ohne Berücksichtigung unterschiedlicher Monatslängen und saisonaler Schwankungen – bezüglich
XY ist: gestiegen, etwa gleich geblieben, gesunken.”
A3.2 Variance Decomposition of (UncertaintyIFOt )2
Figure A9: Variance Decomposition of (UncertaintyIFOt )2
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Notes: ‘Total Variance’ refers to (UncertaintyIF Ot )2. ‘Within-Variance’ is the cross-sectional average of
the industry analogs of (UncertaintyIF Ot )2 for the following 13 manufacturing industries: transportation
equipment (Fahrzeugbau), machinery and equipment (Maschinenbau), metal products (Metallerzeugung),
other non-metallic mineral products (Glas, Keramik, Verarbeitung von Steinen und Erden), rubber and
plastic products (Gummi und Kunststoff ), chemical products (Chemische Industrie), electrical and optical
equipment (Elektrotechnik, Feinmechanik und Optik), pulp, paper, publishing and printing (Papier, Verlage,
Druck), furniture and jewelery (Möbel und Schmuck), cork and wood products except furniture (Holz ohne
Möbel), leather (Leder), textiles and textile products (Textil und Bekleidung), food, beverages and tobacco
(Ernährung und Tabak). We leave out the oil industry, because it has only very few observations. ‘Between-
Variance’ refers to the cross-sectional variance of the industry-specific Frac+t − Frac
−
t -indicators.
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A3.3 Construction of Uncertaintyfet
IFO
In this section we describe the construction of the Uncertaintyfet
IFO
-index. To fix ideas,
we proceed at first as if the production expectation question in IFO-BCS, Q 4, was asked
only for the next month instead of the following three months. In this case, when comparing
the expectation in month t with the realization in month t+ 1, nine possibilities arise: the
company could have predicted an increase in production and realized one, in which case we
would count this as zero forecast error. It could have realized a no change, in which case,
we would quantify the expectation error as −1 and, finally, it could have realized a decrease,
which counts as −2.
Table A3: Possible Expectation Errors - One Month Case
Increaset+1 Unchangedt+1 Decreaset+1
Expected Increaset 0 -1 -2
Expected Unchangedt +1 0 -1
Expected Decreaset +2 +1 0
Notes: Rows refer to qualitative production expectations in month t. Columns refer to qualitative production
realizations in month t+ 1.
Table A3 summarizes the possible expectation errors. Of course, the production expec-
tation question in IFO-BCS is for three months ahead. Suppose that a firm stated in month
t that its production will increase in the next three months. Suppose that in the next three
months one observes the following sequence of outcomes: production increased in t+ 1, re-
mained unchanged in t+ 2 and finally decreased in t+ 3. Due to the qualitative nature
of the IFO-BCS we have to make some assumptions about the definition of the expectation
error at the micro level. As a baseline we adopt the following steps. First, we define for every
month t a firm-specific activity variable over the next three months, t+ 3, by the sum of the
Increase-instances minus the sum of the Decrease-instances over that time period.14 De-
note this variable by REALIZt. It can obviously range from [−3,3]. Then the expectation
errors are computed as:
14We also experiment with a weighted sum approach: we weight realizations in t+ 1 one half, realizations
in t + 2 one third and realizations in t + 3 one sixth. Naturally, when asked in t about the next three
months, the firm may bias its answer towards the immediate future. None of our results depends on the
precise weighting scheme.
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Table A4: Possible Expectation Errors - Three Month Case
Experrori,t
Expected Increaset−3 REALIZi,t>0 0
Expected Increaset−3 REALIZi,t ≤ 0 (REALIZi,t − 1)
Expected Unchangedt−3 REALIZi,t>0 REALIZi,t
Expected Unchangedt−3 REALIZi,t = 0 0
Expected Unchangedt−3 REALIZi,t<0 REALIZi,t
Expected Decreaset−3 REALIZi,t<0 0
Expected Decreaset−3 REALIZi,t ≥ 0 (REALIZi,t + 1)
Notes: Rows refer to the qualitative production expectations in IFO-BCS in month t (Q 4).
Notice that the procedure in Table 4.1 is analogous to the one month case. Dividing by
three is simply a normalization. Expectationerrort+3 ranges from [−43 ,
4
3 ], where for instance
−43 indicates a strongly negative forecast error: the company expected production to increase
over the next three months, yet every single subsequent month production actually declined.
Computing the cross-sectional standard deviations of the expectation errors at each
month, t, gives us a qualitative series of forecast error standard deviations. Specifically:
Uncertaintyfet ≡ STD(Expectationerrort+3).
Notice the timing in the definition of Uncertaintyfet , which is the same as in Bloom (2009)
for stock market volatility: the standard deviation of realized expectation errors in t+ 3 does
not constitute uncertainty in t+ 3. It is the knowledge (at time t) of this standard deviation
going up or down that makes decision makers more or less uncertain at time t. It should be
emphasized that this timing does not require decision makers to know anything about the
future, other than that it is more or less uncertain. Figure A10 depicts Uncertaintyfet
IFO
and UncertaintyIFOt , both at the monthly and the quarterly frequency, and shows that they
strongly comove.
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Figure A10: Comparison of UncertaintyIFOt and Uncertainty
fe
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Notes: The upper panel shows the monthly time series of UncertaintyIF Ot and Uncertainty
fe
t
IF O
, demeaned
and standardized by their standard deviation. Their correlation is 0.73. The lower panel shows the quarterly
averages of the monthly UncertaintyIF Ot and Uncertainty
fe
t
IF O
time series, demeaned and standardized by
their standard deviation. Their correlation is 0.77.
A4 Small Business Economics Trends Survey (SBETS)
The Small Business Economic Trends Survey (SBETS) is a monthly survey conducted by the
National Foundation of Independent Businesses (NFIB) which focuses on small companies
across the U.S. and across all sectors. Thus the SBETS is a good complement to the BOS
which focuses on larger manufacturing firms in the Third FED District. To the extent
that the SVAR results are similar this section lends additional support to our findings.
The SBETS’s monthly part starts in 1986. The survey on a quarterly basis is available
since the mid 1970s. We prefer the highest possible frequency to give the “wait-and-see”-
dynamics the best possible chance to appear in the data. None of our results depend on
that choice of frequency. In terms of participation, the October 2009 issue of the SBETS
(see Dunkelberg and Wade, 2009, for more detailed information) reports that from January
2004 to December 2006 roughly 500 business owners responded, and that the number has
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subsequently increased to approximately 750.15 Almost 25% of respondents are in the retail
sector, 20% in construction and 15% in manufacturing, followed by services, which ranges
well above 10%. All other one-digit sectors have a single digit representation fraction. In
terms of firm size, the sample contains much smaller enterprises than the BOS: the modal
bin for the number of employees is “three to five”, to which over 25% of respondents belong,
followed by the “six to nine”-category with roughly 20%. The highest category is “forty or
more”, which contains just under 10% of firms.
We use three questions from the SBETS. The uncertainty index is based on a question
about general business conditions just like in the BOS (the box and the bold font are also
used in the original):
Q 13 “About the economy in general, do you think that six months from now general
business conditions will be better than they are now, about the same, or worse?: 1 Much
better, 2 Somewhat better, 3 About the same, 4 Somewhat worse, 5 Much worse, 6
Don’t know.”
One advantage of this question over its BOS cousin is that it is slightly more nuanced
because it allows for two “increase”- and two “decrease”-categories. We quantify the extreme
categories with −2 and 2, respectively. To measure activity in the SBETS we use:
Q 14 “During the last calendar quarter, was your dollar sales volume higher, lower, or
about the same as it was for the quarter before? 1 Much higher 2 Higher 3 About the
same, 4 Lower 5 Much lower.”
And as with the BOS we construct a turnover index for employment from an actual
employment change question:
Q 15 “During the last three months, did the total number of employees in your firm
increase, decrease or stay about the same? 1 Increased 2 Decreased 3 Stayed the same.”
Figure A11 displays the analog of Figure 1.2 in Section 1.4.1. Positive business uncer-
tainty innovations lead to long and protracted negative reactions of the economic activity of
small firms. Similarly to the BOS, there is little or no high-frequency impact followed by a
strong rebound of economic activity.
Figure A12 is similar to Figure 1.4 in Section 1.4.1. It shows the impulse response of the
job turnover measure to an innovation to uncertainty. As before, to the extent to which job
turnover reacts to business uncertainty at all, it rises (at least the point estimate), which
appears to be inconsistent with the “wait-and-see”-theory of uncertainty shocks.
15The participation in the quarterly survey is higher, 1200 on average before January 2007 and 1750
thereafter.
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Figure A11: Uncertainty Innovations on SBETS Sales Activity Index
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Notes: The uncertainty index is based on Q 13. The activity variable is based on Q 14. The impulse response
is based on a two-variable SVAR with uncertainty ordered first, then activity, and 12 lags. It displays the
response of the SBETS Sales Activity Index to a positive uncertainty innovation. All confidence bands are
at the 95% significance level using Kilian’s (1998) bias-corrected bootstrap.
Figure A12: Uncertainty Innovation on SBETS Job Turnover Index
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Notes: see notes to Figure A11. The IRF is based on a two-variable SVAR with uncertainty ordered first
and then job turnover. Job turnover is based on Q 15.
Finally, Figure A13 and Table A5 display the analogs of Figure 1.7 and Table 1.3 in
Section 1.4.1. There is little, albeit compared to the BOS somewhat larger impact of uncer-
tainty innovations to either sectoral economic activity or the economy-wide unemployment
rate. There is again some impact of the long-run innovations on the uncertainty index.
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Figure A13: A Three-Variable Blanchard-Quah-Type SVAR - SBETS
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Notes: see notes to Figure A11. The unemployment rate is the (seasonally adjusted) monthly civilian
unemployment rate from the BLS. The uncertainty innovation and the conventional short-run shock are
identified as shocks that do not impact manufacturing production in the long-run. The conventional short-
run shock is identified as the innovation that does not affect the uncertainty index on impact.
Table A5: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition - SBETS
Shock 1M 3M 6M 1Y 2Y 5Y
Long-run 54% 45% 36% 34% 35% 46%
Activity Uncertainty 5% 1% 5% 12% 26% 30%
Short-run 41% 54% 60% 54% 39% 24%
Long-run 28% 30% 34% 32% 28% 24%
Uncertainty Uncertainty 72% 69% 65% 65% 63% 61%
Short-run 0% 2% 1% 3% 10% 15%
Long-run 17% 8% 3% 3% 7% 9%
Unemployment Rate Uncertainty 11% 17% 25% 40% 51% 54%
Short-run 72% 75% 72% 58% 42% 37%
Notes: see notes to Figure A13.
Chapter 2
How Strongly Did the 2007/08 Oil
Price Hike Contribute to the
Subsequent Recession
Abstract1
What have been the economic consequences of the 2007/08 oil price hike for Germany? In this
paper we implement a structural vector autoregression framework that distinguishes between
supply shock and demand shock driven oil price changes. We find that the direct negative
effects of oil price surges play a less important role for German manufacturing primarily
producing investment and export goods. However, higher oil prices always considerably
stifle private consumption expenditures. In a counterfactual analysis we show that the world
demand driven 2007/08 oil price hike triggered a reduction of German GDP of 2.3 percent in
the year 2009 and, therefore, notably contributed to the subsequent recession in Germany.
1This chapter is based on joint work with Kai Carstensen and Georg Paula. It is based on our paper
“How Strongly Did the 2007/08 Oil Price Hike Contribute to the Subsequent Recession,” mimeo, 2011. This
is a revised version of our working paper that circulated under CESifo-WP 3357.
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2.1 Introduction
What have been the economic consequences of the 2007/08 oil price hike for Germany? This
question is particularly interesting since in the year 2009 Germany experienced with minus
5.1 percent its largest decline in GDP since 1949. While there exists much agreement that
this global recession was caused by the worldwide financial crisis, Hamilton (2009) and Kilian
(2009a) argue that the preceding oil price hike reaching 145 US dollars per barrel2 at the
beginning of July 2008 also significantly contributed to this recession. In this paper we take
up this point and provide a comprehensive analysis concerning the effects of oil price shocks
on the Germany economy. To do so, we implement the structural vector autoregression
(SVAR) framework proposed by Kilian (2009b) that distinguishes between supply shock and
demand shock driven oil price changes.
Since the worldwide stagflation period in the early 1970s oil price hikes have often been
stated as reasons for subsequent recessions. Hamilton (1983) and Hamilton (2011) document
that all U.S. postwar recessions except of the economic downturn in 1960/61 were preceded
by oil price hikes. Therefore, extensive research has been carried out to analyze the effects of
oil price shocks on aggregate activity. Recently, several studies have concluded that the oil
price has lost its strong effect on the production level since 1984. Blanchard and Gali (2009)
explain this finding with more flexible labor markets, more credible monetary policy and a
smaller share of oil in the production process.3 However, these studies typically assume that
oil price innovations are homogenous over time. In a seminal contribution Kilian (2009b)
highlights that the oil price is affected by structural demand and supply shocks which may
have different effects on aggregate production as shown in Kilian (2009a) and Kilian (2009b).
According to this view, the oft-cited structural break in the oil price-macroeconomy relation-
ship only reflects shifts in the composition of oil demand and oil supply shocks that occurred
over time.4 This finding is important against the background that the oil price hike during
the years 2002 to 2008 was mainly driven by increasing world demand as pointed out by
Kilian (2009b), Hicks and Kilian (2011) and Hamilton (2009). It is even more important
in the case of Germany, for which, as an export economy, the positive indirect effects on
domestic production of a booming world economy can far overcompensate for the negative
direct effects of an oil price increase. Thus, focussing on one structural oil price shock can
be misleading for our analysis.
2See U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA).
3Other studies discussing this point are e.g. Davis and Haltiwanger (2001), Hooker (1996), Kilian (2008b)
and Kilian and Edelstein (2009).
4Ramey and Vine (2011) also provide evidence that no structural break in the oil price-macroeconomy
relationship exists. However, their analysis focuses more on institutional settings like price controls and a
complex system of entitlements that led to some rationing and shortages.
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Our paper contributes to the literature in three ways: first, it studies the different effects
of oil supply and oil demand shocks on the German economy at the aggregate level for the
time period from 1973 until the beginning of 2011. While Germany is currently the largest
European economy and fourth largest economy of the world, it has to be considered as a
small open economy. According to the WTO Germany’s share in world merchandise exports
was in 2010 with 8.3 percent only slightly lower than the corresponding number for the
United States (8.4 percent).5 This number is noteworthy, since Germany’s economic value
added is less than one fourth of the production in the United States.6 Therefore, one has to
accentuate the German dependence with respect to the global business cycle. Second, this
study provides additional disaggregate evidence for German manufacturing. A key feature
of this sector is the great importance of the automobile industry. Bresnahan and Ramey
(1993), Lee and Ni (2002) and Ramey and Vine (2011) stress the importance of this sector
for the U.S. in explaining the consequences of oil price shocks. Interestingly, we observed a
dramatic production decline in the German automobile sector since the middle of 2008 that
ultimately lead to the introduction of a “Cash for Clunkers” program. Thus, it seems worth-
while to implement an analysis on the industrial level to understand the effects of oil price
hikes. Finally, we provide an estimate by how much the 2007/08 oil price hike contributed
the subsequent recession.
Even though there exists a large literature concerning the effects of oil price shocks on
the United States, the evidence for Germany is scarce: Cunado and de Gracia (2003) and
Jiménez-Rodríguez and Sánchez (2005) provide evidence of negative non-linear effects of oil
price increases on German production. Blanchard and Gali (2009) show for the period since
1983 that an oil price increase leads to a rise in German GDP. They use a linear specification
of oil price changes. Kilian (2008a) uses unexpected movements in global oil production to
identify oil supply shocks. In his baseline results he finds that German GDP declines a few
quarters after an oil supply shock. Peersman and van Robays (2009) use sign restrictions to
identify oil demand and oil supply shocks. They find for Germany that an oil supply shock
triggers an increase in German GDP.7 Our analysis on the industrial level is motivated by
Davis and Haltiwanger (2001), Herrera et al. (2011) and Lee and Ni (2002) who present re-
sults for the United States. For Germany Jiménez-Rodríguez (2008, 2011) studies the effects
of oil price changes on industry sectors. However, she only analyzes the period between 1975
and 1998.
5In the year 2010 China was the biggest merchandise export nation with a share in world exports of 10.4
followed by the United States and Germany.
6This fraction is computed with nominal GDP numbers in U.S. dollar of the year 2010. Data source is
the World Economic Outlook of the International Monetary Fund.
7More recently, Kilian and Murphy (2012) show that using only sign restrictions for identification of oil
supply and demand shock leads to distorted results.
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With the exception of Peersman and van Robays (2009), all studies of the German case
assume there is only one structural oil price shock. This is a central difference to our analysis
because we use the currently dominating approach proposed by Kilian (2009b), Kilian and
Park (2009) and Kilian et al. (2009) that distinguishes between different sorts of oil price
shocks. Furthermore, former studies often rely on nonlinear transformations of the oil price
variable or assume asymmetric effects of oil price increases versus decreases. While we are
aware of potential nonlinearities, it is beyond the scope of this paper to add to the ongoing
debate on this topic that has attracted much attention in recent times (see among others
Kilian and Vigfusson (2011a), Kilian and Vigfusson (2011b), Hamilton (2011) and Herrera
et al. (2011)). Thus, we apply a linear framework.
Our results show that aggregate production in Germany significantly declines after an
oil supply shock. For the aggregate demand shock we find an significant increase in GDP
during the first year. Afterwards, however, the negative direct effects of the oil price increase
prevail and German GDP falls considerably. While these two results are broadly in line with
those presented by Kilian (2009b) for the United States, the dynamic response of German
GDP following an oil-specific demand shock exhibits a completely different picture. German
production rises persistently after an oil-specific demand shock. We explain this finding
by favorable international price movements and shifts in global demand that favor German
exports. To support these explanations we show at the industrial level that in particular
German exporting firms experience production increases after aggregate and oil-specific de-
mand shocks. We further show by means of a counterfactual analysis that the oil price hike
in 2007/08 triggered a 2.3 percent reduction of German GDP in the year 2009 and, therefore,
made a notable contribution to the subsequent recession in Germany.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides statistics con-
cerning German oil consumption and manufacturing. In Section 2.3 we outline our empirical
framework that is used throughout the whole analysis. The subsequent Sections 2.4 and 2.5
present empirical results at the aggregate and disaggregate level of Germany. In Section 2.6
we ask whether the German economy would have experienced the recent recession without
the preceding oil price hike. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Statistics on German Oil Consumption
In 2008 Germany imported 105 million tons of crude oil and increased its oil imports by more
than 17 million tons since 1991.8 Petroleum is the single most important energy source in
Germany. In 2010 it contributed roughly 34 percent to the primary energy consumption in
8Due to the recession crude oil imports declined to 98 millions tons in 2009. These data are taken from
the national working group “Energiebilanzen” and are available at www.ag-energiebilanzen.de.
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Germany. This figure has not considerably changed during the last 20 years. The following
most important energy sources are natural gas (22 percent), coal (12 percent) and nuclear
energy (11 percent). The pattern of oil consumption, however, differs remarkably across
sectors. While petroleum is very important for households (23 percent of energy consumption
in 2009), transportation (93 percent) and the trade and services sector (15 percent), its
contribution to energy consumption in German manufacturing amounted to 6 percent.
Similar to countries such as the U.S. or the U.K. manufacturing in Germany has become
less important over the last 40 years. Its share in gross value added declined from 37 percent
in 1970 to 21 percent in 2010. Nonetheless the collapse of manufacturing production has
contributed to a great extent to the recession in 2009. For our analysis we choose six
industrial sectors that feature two characteristics: first, they account for a large share in
German manufacturing and, second, energy is a crucial input in their production process.
The chosen sectors are displayed in Table 2.1.9
Table 2.1: Statistics concerning German Manufacturing
Share in Energy intensity Export ratio
manufacturing (cost of energy of production
Industrial sector in percent in euro cent for in percent
(volume of sales) each euro of sale) (volume of sales)
Refined petroleum 7.5 0.6 7.2
Chemicals and chemical products 7.7 5.0 58.5
Basic metals 6.5 6.0 38.5
Fabricated metal products 5.9 1.9 32.1
Machinery 13.0 0.9 61.1
Automobile & transport equipment 19.2 0.8 62.9
Other industrial sectors 40.1 2.1 39.0
Manufacturing 100 2.1 46.3
Notes: We use sales and energy cost data from the year 2008 to compute the numbers in the first two
columns. The last column presents numbers of establishments with at least 50 employees for 2010.
The largest German industrial sector is automobile & transport equipment with a production
share of almost 20 percent. Machinery and the chemical industry follow on the second
and third place. In total, the six selected industrial sectors represent almost 60 percent of
total manufacturing production. Compared to the other sectors, “chemicals and chemical
products” and “basic metals” have the highest energy intensities.
9The data source is the German Federal Statistical Agency. To compute the shares in manufacturing
and energy intensities we use data from 2008. Using instead the latest available data from 2009 would not
considerably change the results.
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One distinctive feature of German manufacturing is its high export share. Establishments
with at least 50 employees exported 46 percent of their production in 2010. The major export
industries are automobile & transport equipment, machinery and the chemical industry,
which export considerably more than half of their production.
2.3 Empirical Framework
2.3.1 The Structural VAR Model
Our empirical approach is based on the structural VAR model of Kilian (2009b) that de-
scribes the global crude oil market. This model accounts for the simultaneity between crude
oil supply and demand, and it allows to decompose unexpected oil price changes into shocks
to world oil supply, to global demand, and to oil-specific demand. The latter captures shifts
in market concerns about the availability of future oil supply and may therefore also be
called precautionary demand for oil. The VAR model has the form
yt = c+A(L)yt−1 + ut, (2.1)
where c is a vector of constants and A(L) denotes a lag polynomial. The vector yt includes
the percent change in world crude oil production, a measure of global real activity, and the
real price of oil. A more detailed description of the data is given below.
To estimate the effects the shocks to the global oil market have on the German economy,
we follow the approach outlined in Kilian and Park (2009) and add one German variable at
a time to the oil market model (2.1). This yields
yt
zt
= c̃+ Ã(L)
yt−1
zt−1
+ ũt, (2.2)
where zt is the additional German variable.10 We estimate the VAR models using monthly
data over the period from January 1973 to March 2011. We include 24 lags to allow for
delayed effects of up to two years. To account for conditional heteroskedasticity in the
monthly data we construct our confidence bands using the recursive design wild bootstrap
proposed by Gonçalves and Kilian (2004). The structural shocks are identified using the
10One might argue that e.g. German manufacturing production is not able to influence the global oil
market at all as its share of world production is rather small. However, our results do not change if we would
use instead a subset VAR that does not allow the lags of the German variable zt to affect the oil market
variables summarized in yt.
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recursiveness assumption proposed by Kilian (2009b) and Kilian and Park (2009):
ũt ≡

ũoil production1,t
ũreal activity2,t
ũreal oil price3,t
ũGerman variable4,t
=

a11 0 0 0
a21 a22 0 0
a31 a32 a33 0
a41 a42 a43 a44


eoil supply shock1,t
eaggregate demand shock2,t
eoil-specific demand shock3,t
eGerman shock4,t
 . (2.3)
Specifically, we assume that the short-run global oil supply curve is vertical. Hence, only oil
supply shocks may lead to instantaneous changes in global oil production. The aggregate
demand shock (for industrial commodities) is defined as the innovation in the global real
activity index that is not explained by oil supply shocks. This implies that oil-specific
demand shocks do not affect the global business cycle within the month. Therefore, oil-
specific demand shocks are defined as the part of the surprise changes in the real oil price
that is not explained by oil supply and world demand shocks. Finally, we assume that shocks
originating in the German economy do not affect the global oil market block within a month.
To analyze the effects of the structural shocks on the quarterly macroeconomic variables
qt, we again follow Kilian (2009b) who calculates quarterly averages of the shocks, say, ēj,t,
j = 1,2,3, and estimates regressions of the form
qt = αj +
12∑
i=0
φjiēj,t−i + εj,t, j = 1,2,3. (2.4)
The number of lags is set to 12 quarters. Including the contemporaneous value of ēj,t
amounts to assuming that the global shocks are predetermined to German variables which
seems plausible.11
2.3.2 The Data
For the global oil market we use an updated version of the data analyzed by Kilian (2009b).
World crude oil production is provided by the U.S. Energy Information Administration. The
global real activity index is constructed from single voyage bulk dry cargo ocean shipping
freight rates. Assuming that the supply of shipping capacity is fixed in the short run, changes
in freight rates reflect the development in world demand for industrial commodities such as
grain, coal, and scrap metal. Kilian (2009b) shows that this real activity index is superior
to the industrial production index of the OECD countries.12 Finally, for the real price of
11As a robustness check, we aggregated monthly German variables such as industrial production to the
quarterly frequency and ran both the monthly oil market VAR (2.2) and the quarterly regression (2.4). The
resulting impulse response functions were—up to the frequency—largely the same.
12The index is made available by Lutz Kilian at www-personal.umich.edu/∼lkilian/paperlinks.html.
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oil we use the U.S. refiner’s acquisition cost of crude oil deflated by the U.S. CPI.13 To
analyze the impact of the various shocks on the German macroeconomy, we include five real
quarterly national accounts variables, namely GDP, private consumption expenditures, gross
investment, exports, and imports. All variables are seasonally adjusted and used in percent
changes.14 To avoid a break in the time series due to German reunification in 1991, post-
1991 data (which refer to reunited Germany) are extended backwards by using the growth
rates of the pre-1991 data (which refer to Western Germany only).
The monthly German variables are manufacturing production, several price and exchange
rate indices. Further, we link currently available real production data at the industry level
with discontinued earlier series that are available back to 1970.15 We chain these time series
for those sectors for which we can ensure that their definition has not changed since 1970.
Finally, we adjust all these variables for seasonal and calendar effects and use them as percent
changes.
A major strike by the union of metal workers to reduce the weekly workload to 35 hours
affected the German automobile industry in May and June 1984. Production went down by
16 and 51 percent, respectively, just to recover with rates of 170 and 18 percent in July and
August. To preclude that this exogenous event contaminates any of the estimation results,
we replace the four monthly observations with forecasts of an autoregressive model with 12
lags that is fitted to the remaining sample.16
2.4 Empirical Results at the Aggregate Level
2.4.1 Results of the Structural Oil Market Model
In this section we briefly present the results of the structural oil market model (2.1). As
already mentioned we update the data set of Kilian (2009b) until March 2011. Therefore,
it is not surprising that our results are similar. Figure 2.1 summarizes the responses of the
oil market variables to the structural shocks. An adverse oil supply shock leads to a sizeable
and permanent decline in oil production. The real price of oil goes up slightly but without
13The data sources are the U.S. Energy Information Administration and FRED. The oil price series
has been extended backwards by using the original time series of Kilian (2009b) that is available at
www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.99.3.1053. The real oil price series is expressed as deviations
from the mean.
14The percent changes are not annualized so a cumulative impulse response can directly be interpreted as
the percent difference between the initial level and the level that is triggered by the shock.
15All these time series are available at the German Federal Statistical Agency.
16Our estimation results reported below are robust to different lag orders for the autoregressive adjustment
model or to using average growth rates instead. The effect of the strike is also visible in total manufacturing
production as well as in GDP and exports. However, replacing the respective observations with autoregressive
forecasts yields only negligible changes in our results. Therefore, we prefer to use the original data.
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Figure 2.1: Responses to Structural Shocks to the Global Oil Market
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Notes: The impulse response functions are estimated with model (2.1). The time dimension (horizontal axis)
is measured in months. The confidence bands (one and two standard deviations) are constructed using the
recursive design wild bootstrap of Gonçalves and Kilian (2004).
statistical significance. Real activity shows almost no reaction. An expansionary aggregate
demand shock immediately triggers a strong and long-lasting increase in real activity. As
a consequence, the real oil price significantly increases for a sustained period of time. In
contrast, the rise in oil production comes with a delay of seven months and is only marginally
significant. An unanticipated increase in oil-specific demand causes a strong hike in the real
price of oil while oil production does not react significantly. The shock also triggers a
statistically significant short-lived increase in economic activity.
Figure 2.2 shows the cumulative contributions of the structural shocks to the historical
evolution of the real oil price. We concentrate on the oil price developments since 2002.
Between 2002 and 2008 the oil price hike was fueled almost exclusively by expansionary
aggregate demand shocks. The cumulative effects coming from changes in oil supply or in
precautionary oil demand played only a minor role in this episode. However, the rapid fall
in the oil price witnessed during the recent recession was only partly due to reduced global
demand for industrial commodities but mainly caused by negative oil-market specific shocks.
Probably market participants were concerned about how quickly the world economy would
recover and the world demand for oil would pick up again. Therefore, the precautionary
demand for oil fell considerably. By the end of the sample, confidence seems to have returned
as oil-market specific shocks contributed positively to the real oil price.
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Figure 2.2: Historical Decomposition of the Real Price of Oil 2002:1 to 2011:3
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Notes: Estimates are based on model (2.1). The dot-dashed lines denote the real price of oil. The solid
lines show the fluctuations in the real price of oil that are explained by the respective structural shock. The
shaded grey areas define the last U.S. recession dated by the NBER. The red vertical bar represents the date
of the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The time dimension (horizontal axis) is measured in years.
2.4.2 The Reaction of German Macroeconomic Aggregates
The reaction of German macroeconomic aggregates to the three structural shocks are dis-
played in Figure 2.3. To help interpret our results, we show in addition the responses of
exchange rates and prices in Figure 2.4.
An oil supply disruption lowers GDP instantaneously.17 However, this decline becomes
statistically significant only after seven quarters. Three years after the shock, GDP is roughly
1.5 percent below the initial level which accords well with the finding of Kilian (2008a) for
Germany. However, the effect is much more persistent than in the U.S. see Kilian (2009b).
The decline in German GDP significantly extends to all demand aggregates.18 Within three
years, private consumption falls by 1 percent, gross investment by 4.4 percent, imports by
4 percent, and exports by 2.7 percent. Initially, however, only gross investment declines
17This stands in contrast to findings by Kilian (2008a) who reports an immediate increase in German
GDP after a contractionary oil supply shock. He argues that this finding might be caused by a “spurious
sample correlation between economic expansions in Germany and exogenous oil supply disruptions” and
should disappear as more observations are added. Our result is based on an extended sample and seems to
confirm this view.
18Using a VAR model with sign restrictions, Peersman and van Robays (2009) find that Germany—unlike
all other euro area countries—experiences a persistent increase in GDP, consumption and investment after
an oil supply disruption.
Chapter 2. Oil Price Hike in 2007/08 61
significantly as measured by the one-standard-error bands. Imports follow closely behind,
while consumption and particularly exports react with a considerable delay.
To put these results into perspective, it is informative to consider the responses of ex-
change rates and prices. As also documented by Kilian (2008a), the nominal exchange rate
of the euro against the U.S. dollar depreciates quickly after the shock, see Figure 2.4. The
real effective exchange rate shows the same reaction suggesting that the euro prices of oil
and of imported goods in general increase. This exchange rate effect may explain the swift
decline in imports and the lagged reaction of exports and could account for a major difference
between the responses within the U.S. and Germany. While there is an immediate drop in
U.S. GDP as reported by Kilian (2009b), German GDP declines more sluggishly. As one
factor behind this difference, after an adverse oil supply shock U.S. exports suffer from the
immediate appreciation of the U.S. dollar while German exports are temporarily shielded
by an external devaluation. Consistent with this interpretation, there does not seem to be a
need for an internal devaluation in Germany as the CPI remains largely unaffected. Given
the hike in import prices however, this implies that domestic prices fall, probably triggered
by the reduction in consumption demand.
A positive aggregate demand shock leads to an increase in GDP within the first year
that is statistically significant in terms of one-standard-error bands. This suggests that the
primary effect of higher world demand initially outweighs the contractionary effect of higher
oil prices. Two years after the shock, however, the price effects begin to dominate and GDP
turns significantly negative. This interpretation is supported by the observation that export
and investment demand show a significant positive reaction within the first seven quarters,
while private consumption falls steadily and all prices climb up persistently and highly sig-
nificantly. Three years after the shock, consumption is 1.3 percent below the initial level,
while consumer prices have gone up by 0.5 percent.
These findings are similar to those obtained by Kilian (2009b) for the U.S. economy.19
However, the initially positive GDP response is somewhat more pronounced for Germany
which might reflect the greater export dependency of the German economy. Additionally,
we find that German exports benefit from international price movements. The expansionary
world demand shock leads to a deterioration of the German terms of trade, i.e., import
prices increase faster than export prices. This, in turn, improves the price competitiveness
of German firms.
19Note that the difference in magnitude is mainly caused by Kilian’s approach to cumulate annualized
quarter-on-quarter growth rates while we cumulate raw growth rates which seems a more natural way when
one is interested in comparing levels.
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Figure 2.3: Responses of GDP and its Components to the Structural Shocks
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Notes: Impulse response functions are estimated with model (2.4). The time dimension (horizontal axis)
is measured in quarters. The confidence bands (one and two standard deviations) are constructed using a
block bootstrap method with block size 4 and 20,000 bootstrap replications.
An unexpected increase in oil-market specific demand initially raises GDP which is con-
sistent with the previous result that world activity accelerates within the first few months.
This response is mirrored by a quick and long-lasting rise in exports which is supported by a
real devaluation as export prices rise by less than import prices. On the flip side, the strong
hike in real oil prices significantly feeds through to consumer prices. The corresponding loss
in purchasing power lowers private consumption demand and eventually pulls down GDP.
The result of a temporary rise in German GDP after an oil-specific demand shock con-
trasts with the U.S. experience reported by Kilian (2009b) that GDP declines steadily. Three
observations may help explain this difference. First, German exporters do not completely
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Figure 2.4: Responses of Exchange Rates and Prices to the Structural Shocks
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Notes: Impulse response functions are estimated with model (2.2). REER denotes the real effective
exchange rate against the main trading partners, CPI is the headline consumer price index. The time
dimension (horizontal axis) is measured in months. The confidence bands (one and two standard deviations)
are constructed using the recursive design wild bootstrap of Gonçalves and Kilian (2004).
pass the higher oil price into their export prices. This leads to a gain in their price com-
petitiveness and, therefore, a relatively higher demand for their products. This argument is
supported by the reactions of import and export prices shown in Figure 2.4. Second, the
immediate increase in the real oil price after an oil-specific demand shock triggers shifts in
global demand. The most prominent example of such demand shifts is the U.S. automobile
market. Kilian and Edelstein (2009) document that after energy price shocks the demand
for U.S. automobiles falls, whereas the demand for foreign more energy-efficient cars evolves
much more positively. Third, the German export portfolio mainly consisting of a broad
range of investment goods seems to fit well the demands of many oil-exporting countries,
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i.e., Germany benefits from petrodollar recycling. For all these reasons, German exports
react positively to an oil-specific demand shock which temporarily outweighs the negative
consumption effect of higher oil prices.
Taken together we conclude that it matters which of the three shocks hits the German
economy. While we find that consumption declines markedly in all cases, the reactions of
exports and gross investment—and finally GDP—depend on the type of the structural shock.
Not surprisingly, the primary effect of an expansionary world demand shock on GDP is pos-
itive until the oil price effect weighs in and the boom loses momentum. Somewhat more
unexpectedly, however, after an oil-market specific demand shock a redirection of world de-
mand towards German export goods seems to counteract the contractionary effect of higher
oil prices on consumers’ demand. This implies that the consumption demand effects stressed
by Kilian and Edelstein (2009) and Kilian (2008b) could be much less important for, and thus
less harmful to, the German compared to the U.S. manufacturing sector. In the following
section, we analyze this interpretation in more detail.
2.5 Results at the Industrial Level
One of the leading explanations why oil price hikes have harmed the U.S. economy more
than the cost share of oil suggests, is that households not only cut back on consumption
due to a loss in purchasing power and an increase in precautionary savings but also shift
their demand for automobiles away from U.S. products, see Kilian and Edelstein (2009). To
the extent that this demand is targeted to automobiles produced in Germany, the German
automobile industry should be less affected than its U.S. counterpart. Since, in addition,
German production of investment goods in general may benefit from petrodollar recycling,
in a next step we examine several important industrial sectors in more detail. Subsequently,
we analyze whether exporting and non-exporting firms react differently as our interpretation
suggests that exporters which benefit directly from the redirection effect do better after an
oil price shock than non-exporters which might be more strongly exposed to the slump in
domestic consumption demand.
2.5.1 The Reaction of Industrial Production
After an oil supply shock industrial production declines within a few months and persis-
tently remains below the initial level, see Figure 2.5. This decline is statistically significant
according to the one-standard-deviation band but economically moderate.
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Figure 2.5: Responses of Total Manufacturing and Industry-Level Production to the Struc-
tural Shocks
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Notes: see notes to Figure 2.4. The time dimension (horizontal axis) is measured in months.
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Petroleum refinery is the industrial sector which suffers most from reduced oil supply. How-
ever, compared to the GDP response even this effect is moderate, with a minimum at -1
percent after 10 months. The production of more primary goods such as chemicals and basic
metals also persistently declines, even though the reactions are at most significant according
to the one-standard-deviation band. In contrast, output in the machinery and automobile
sectors remains largely unaffected. The visual impression that oil supply shocks seem to
play no important role for German manufacturing is further supported by considering the
forecast error variance in Table 2.2. Oil supply shocks are not able to explain a noticeable
fraction of the forecast error variance at all horizons with the only exception being petroleum
refinery. All in all, we conclude that oil supply disruptions have not been a relevant source
of gross industrial output fluctuations in Germany. This implies that the transmission of oil
supply shocks works mainly through changes in the exchange rate and in private demand
rather than through industrial production.
An expansionary world demand shock triggers a swift and statistically significant increase
of industrial production that peaks at 1 percent after eight months and subsequently phases
out. In contrast to GDP, we observe no medium-term decline below the initial level. The
production of chemicals, basic metals and fabricated metal products rises quickly while the
automobile and particularly the machinery sector lag somewhat behind which is a typical
characteristic of the German business cycle. Interestingly, after 18 months the production of
more primary goods such as refined oil, chemicals and basic metals undershoots the initial
output level which indicates that rising prices for oil and presumably other commodities tend
to reduce the demand for these goods considerably. In contrast, machinery production is less
affected by these price effects and remains persistently positive. In terms of the forecast error
variance decomposition, the aggregate demand shock is much more important in explaining
output fluctuations than the oil supply shock. At the one-year horizon it explains almost 17
percent of the forecast error in total manufacturing production. This share varies between
0.8 percent for petroleum refinery and 21.5 percent for fabricated metal products.
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Table 2.2: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of Manufacturing and
Industry-Level Output
Shock 1M 3M 6M 1Y 2Y 5Y
Oil supply shock 0.01% 0.15% 2.07% 2.76% 4.24% 4.56%
Manufacturing Aggregate demand shock 0.65% 2.16% 11.47% 16.64% 14.13% 7.99%
Oil-specific demand shock 1.92% 7.25% 13.21% 11.35% 11.36% 10.17%
Other shocks 97.42% 90.44% 73.24% 69.26% 70.27% 77.28%
Oil supply shock 2.41% 3.44% 5.74% 12.76% 16.44% 18.60%
Refined petroleum Aggregate demand shock 0.16% 0.12% 0.33% 0.79% 2.70% 8.87%
Oil-specific demand shock 0.19% 1.39% 1.43% 1.51% 4.55% 21.11%
Other shocks 97.24% 95.06% 92.51% 84.95% 76.31% 51.42%
Oil supply shock 0.03% 0.26% 1.04% 0.81% 1.88% 2.46%
Chemical products Aggregate demand shock 1.00% 8.46% 15.12% 13.55% 11.23% 6.84%
Oil-specific demand shock 0.46% 4.68% 9.57% 8.51% 6.72% 4.17%
Other shocks 98.52% 86.60% 74.27% 77.13% 80.17% 86.53%
Oil supply shock 0.02% 0.12% 0.72% 0.82% 1.18% 2.14%
Basic metals Aggregate demand shock 2.50% 5.58% 12.87% 15.09% 13.41% 8.16%
Oil-specific demand shock 0.52% 3.67% 8.38% 12.84% 15.08% 17.87%
Other shocks 96.96% 90.62% 78.03% 71.25% 70.33% 71.83%
Oil supply shock 0.02% 0.35% 1.31% 1.81% 2.06% 1.62%
Fabricated metal products Aggregate demand shock 0.26% 5.42% 13.97% 21.55% 19.71% 11.14%
Oil-specific demand shock 0.18% 2.87% 5.45% 6.76% 4.81% 2.70%
Other shocks 99.54% 91.36% 79.28% 69.88% 73.43% 84.54%
Oil supply shock 0.24% 0.21% 0.46% 0.51% 0.43% 0.34%
Machinery Aggregate demand shock 0.02% 0.67% 2.41% 9.64% 16.42% 12.92%
Oil-specific demand shock 0.38% 1.38% 7.23% 7.75% 6.74% 4.23%
Other shocks 99.37% 97.74% 89.90% 82.10% 76.42% 82.51%
Oil supply shock 0.12% 0.11% 0.40% 0.47% 2.09% 1.78%
Automobile and transport Aggregate demand shock 0.15% 0.11% 0.76% 1.92% 2.41% 2.78%
Oil-specific demand shock 0.65% 4.95% 6.55% 6.60% 8.04% 7.44%
Other shocks 99.08% 94.84% 92.29% 91.01% 87.46% 87.99%
Notes: see notes to Figure 2.4.
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A positive oil-specific demand shocks leads to a statistically significant and persistent
increase in industrial production. Even after three years, production is 0.3 percent above
the initial level. This is consistent with our previous discussion of favorable international
price movements and, in particular, shifts in global demand towards German products.
These effects do not apply to the refinery sector which exports less than 10 percent of its
production and is most directly affected by the oil price hike. Therefore, it not surprising
that this is the only sector that exhibits a decline in output while all other sectors show
a positive response. Most striking is the impact response of the automobile sector which,
unlike all other sectors, already on impact increases production by almost 1 percent. Using
the forecast error variance decompositions, it turns out that a noticeable fraction of the gross
industrial output fluctuations can be explained by the oil-market specific demand shock. For
total manufacturing production the maximum share is 13 percent at the six-month horizon,
again with considerable variation between individual sectors.
The automobile sector receives particular attention in the discussion of the effects of
oil price changes on the U.S. economy (see, e.g., Bresnahan and Ramey, 1993, as well as
Ramey and Vine, 2011). Kilian (2008b) and Kilian and Edelstein (2009) document that
oil price hikes do not only depress automobile demand on average but also shift demand
towards foreign cars with the consequence that non-U.S. carmakers temporarily increase
their U.S. sales. This is consistent with the view that European and Japanese producers
have a comparative advantage with respect to smaller and more energy-efficient cars, as
argued, e.g., by Lee and Ni (2002). Thus, the net effect on German automobile production
is unclear. Our analysis reveals in the bottom panel of Figure 2.5 that demand driven oil
price hikes go hand in hand with increases in German automobile production. However,
Table 2.2 shows that all three structural oil price shocks together do not explain a sizeable
part of the observed variation in production. In short, oil price shocks seem to have only a
rather limited effect on German automobile production.
Altogether, we conclude that German manufacturing benefits from positive shocks to the
real oil price: on the one hand, the energy cost share of most German industry sectors is small
(see Section 2.2). On the other hand, the effects of favorable international price movements
and shifts in global demand towards German products seem to dominate a general slump
in private consumption. However, this result does not mean that the German economy as a
whole is better off after an oil price shock. Our findings indicate that the reaction of German
households is not much different from that documented for the U.S. This may have adverse
consequences for the service sector. An analysis along these lines is left for future research.
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2.5.2 The Reaction of Exporters and Non-Exporters
So far we have seen that German manufacturing is positively affected by aggregate and
oil-specific demand shocks. The above explanations for this finding imply that exporting
firms are affected by oil price shocks in a different way than non-exporting firms. Using
data of IFO Business Climate Survey (IFO-BCS) of German manufacturing firms allows
us to check this conjecture. The IFO-BCS index is a much-followed leading indicator for
economic activity in Germany. It is based on a firm survey which has been conducted since
1949 and, therefore, is one of the oldest and broadest monthly business confidence surveys
available (see Becker and Wohlrabe, 2008, for details). One of its main advantages is the
broad coverage including approximately 5,000 respondents at the beginning of our sample
and still about 2,500 towards the end.20 Firms are asked about their business situation as
well as their expectations and actual realizations for a broad set of firm-specific variables
such as production, prices, demand and export situation.
In our analysis we focus on the following two questions concerning expected and current
business situation:
Q 1 “Expectations for the next six months: Our business situation with respect to XY will
in a cyclical view: improve, remain about the same, develop unfavourably.”
Q 2 “Current situation: We evaluate our business situation with respect to product XY as:
good, satisfactory, unsatisfactory.”
It is noteworthy to mention that question Q1 refers to a change in the future business
situation whereas the question Q2 concerns the actual business state of a firm. The IFO-BCS
enables us to distinguish between exporting and non-exporting firms.21 Therefore, we are
able to compute and compare aggregate survey results for these two groups of firms in each
month. Specifically, we calculate for each group balance statistics that are defined by the
difference between the percentage shares of positive and negative responses for the respective
question (Q1 or Q2). After seasonal adjustment, we add one of these time series at a time
as fourth variable, zt, to the structural oil market model (2.2). Due to data availability, the
sample of this exercise starts in January 1980. Figure 2.6 presents the results.
20The IFO-BCS is a survey at the product level, so that these numbers do not exactly correspond to firms.
The reduced number at the end of the sample reflects the declining weight of the manufacturing sector for
the aggregate economy.
21We use the monthly IFO-BCS question concerning expected development of export trade. If a firm
states that it does not export, then we regard this firm as a non-exporter in this month.
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Figure 2.6: Responses of Exporting and Non-exporting Firms to Structural Oil Shocks
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Notes: see notes to Figure 2.4. The time dimension (horizontal axis) is measured in months. The upper two
panels show the reactions for the exporting firms and the lower two panels provide evidence for the non-
exporting firms. We consider balances of the questions concerning expected and current business situation
(Q1 and Q2). Balances are defined as the difference between the fraction of positive responses and the
negative responses for the respective question. We use accumulated impulse responses for the expected
business situation (Q1) as it defines a change in business situtation.
The upper two panels show the reactions of the current and expected business situation
for the exporting firms. The lower two panels display the same for the non-exporting firms.
There are two main results: first, the business situation of exporting firms increases signifi-
cantly after both an expansionary aggregate demand shock and a positive oil-specific demand
shock, while non-exporting firms report almost no change. Second, the business expectation
of non-exporting firms deteriorates significantly at the one-standard-error band after an oil-
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specific supply shock, whereas exporting firms are rather optimistic. This suggests that only
firms serving the domestic market anticipate a weakening in demand. In summary, these
results support our view that it is the export industry which makes a difference. Export
firms benefit from the effects of favorable international price movements and shifts in global
demand towards German products.
2.5.3 Robustness Checks
In this section we provide three robustness checks: first, we include an indicator of German
price competitiveness in our baseline model. This variable ensures that the structural oil
price shocks are orthogonal to independent movements in the real exchange rate which could
distort our results. Second, we replace in our baseline specification the real price of oil by
the nominal WTI oil price in US dollars and the indicator of global activity by the industrial
production index of the OECD countries plus the six major non-member economies. The
use of different global activity and oil price variables serves as a sensitivity analysis. Third,
we question the identification assumption concerning the oil-specific demand shock. Specif-
ically, we replace the zero restriction of aggregate activity with respect to an oil-specific
demand shock by a plausible impact elasticity. This elasticity is derived by employing a
structural VAR model that is identified with sign restrictions and further inequality assump-
tions as proposed by Kilian and Murphy (2012). For all three exercises we obtain the same
set of results: a partially significant decline in German manufacturing production after a
contractionary oil supply shock and a highly significant increase of production after both an
aggregate demand and an oil-specific demand shock.
The upper panel of Figure 2.7 depicts the impulse response of German manufacturing to
the structural oil price shocks orthogonalized with respect to terms of trade movements.22
Evidently, the dynamic responses are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar to our
baseline findings. Thus, our results are robust with respect to controlling for independent
real exchange rate movements.
The second check addresses the variable selection concerning the oil market block. We
replace in our baseline specification the real price of oil by the nominal WTI oil price in US
dollars and the indicator of global activity by the industrial production index of the OECD
countries plus the six major non-member economies. By using these two variables we follow
Fukunaga et al. (2010).
While there is no disagreement that in most economic theories the real price of oil is the
preferred specification, one could motivate the use of the nominal oil price by the argument
22Using instead an indicator of price competitiveness does not change our results.
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Figure 2.7: Robustness Checks
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Notes: see notes to Figure 2.4. The time dimension (horizontal axis) is measured in months. In Robustness
check 1 we extend our baseline model with the German terms of trade. In Robustness check 2 we use the
WTI oil price and an industrial production index as proxy for aggregate activity. In Robustness check 3 we
assume an impact response of real activity to an oil-specific demand shock of -0.87.
that German economic agents presumably respond more to changes in the more visible WTI
oil price rather than the U.S. refiner’s acquisition cost of crude oil deflated by the U.S.
CPI.23 In addition, using the aggregate industrial production of the OECD countries plus
the six major non-member economies, including China and India, we provide another proxy
for aggregate activity. Kilian (2009b) names three reasons why his proposed dry cargo single
voyage ocean freight rate index is superior to this industrial production index: first, it is
difficult to measure each country’s contribution to global real economic activity. Second,
technological change could break the link between industrial production and the demand for
industrial commodities. Third, there exists a lack of suitable monthly data for real economic
23Kilian and Vigfusson (2011a) cast doubts on this behavioral argument that relies heavily on Hamilton
(2011). Note, however, that our aim is not to contribute to the recent debate between Kilian and Vigfusson
(2011a) and Hamilton (2011) whether the use of the nominal price is completely inappropriate.
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activity in many countries. The dry cargo single voyage ocean freight rate index addresses all
these issues and is therefore used in our baseline analysis. Nonetheless, it seems instructive
to replace this index by the aggregate industrial production index in a robustness check.
The middle panel of Figure 2.7 shows the results for German manufacturing. In com-
parison to our baseline results we observe a more pronounced production increase after
an aggregate demand shock and a less pronounced production increase after an oil-specific
demand shock. It seems that the global demand shock identified within this VAR setup
includes components of the oil-specific demand shock identified in our baseline specification.
But overall, our main statements remain unaltered.
As a final check, we review the identification of the oil-specific demand shock. As men-
tioned by Kilian and Murphy (2012) it is surprising that the immediate oil price hike after
an oil-specific demand shock induces an expansion rather than a contraction in real activ-
ity. To address this issue we reconsider the assumption that oil-specific shocks do not affect
real activity within the same month. Specifically, we derive a plausible estimate for the
impact elasticity of aggregate activity to an oil-specific demand shock by proceeding in three
steps: first, we identify a structural VAR model with sign restrictions and further inequality
assumptions proposed by Kilian and Murphy (2012). Then, we derive the median impact
response of real activity with respect to an oil-specific demand shock. Finally, we use this
number as the impact elasticity of aggregate activity to an oil-specific demand shock and
impose otherwise the same identification assumptions as described (2.3).
Table 2.3 summarizes the sign restrictions that are used to identify the structural oil
market model (2.1).24
Table 2.3: Sign Restrictions (Restriction Period of 1 Month)
Oil supply Aggregate demand Oil-specific
shock shock demand shock
Oil production ≤0 ≥0 ≥0
Real activity ≤0 ≥0 ≤0
Real oil price ≥0 ≥0 ≥0
These restrictions imply that a contractionary oil supply shock raises the price of oil
and reduces real activity and oil production. A positive oil-specific demand shock induces a
contraction of real activity while the price and the supply of oil increase. A positive global
demand shock raises oil production, real activity and the real oil price. We impose that the
sign restrictions need to hold for the impact period. We further assume that after an oil
24The sign restrictions are the same as in the analyzes of Baumeister and Peersman (2008, 2009) and
Peersman and van Robays (2009).
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price hike the short-run elasticity of oil production with respect to the real oil price is not
larger than 0.0258. This upper bound is imposed for the aggregate demand and oil-specific
demand shock. The last restriction concerns the impact response of aggregate activity after
an oil-specific demand shock. This response is not allowed to be lower than -1.5. With
these assumptions we employ the sign restriction procedure outlined in Uhlig (2005). Our
results are based on 200 accepted draws. Figure A1 and Table A1 in Appendix A1 provide
the results of this exercise. But more importantly, the median impact response of real
activity with respect to an oil-specific demand shock is -0.87. This number replaces the zero
restriction imposed in our baseline specification.
The lower panel of Figure 2.7 depicts the resulting impulse responses to this identification
scheme. Somewhat surprisingly, the restriction that real activity contracts after an oil-
specific demand shock does not change the response of German manufacturing with respect
to an oil-specific demand shock. Therefore this check supports our main findings.
2.6 How Strongly Did the 2007/08 Oil Price Hike Con-
tribute to the Recession in Germany?
In this section we analyze the economic consequences of the 2007/08 oil price hike for Ger-
many. To do so, we use quarterly regression (2.4) described above to study the cumulative
effects of the structural oil price shocks on German GDP during the years 2007 until 2010.
Figure 2.8 shows the historical contributions of all three structural shocks to the observed
variation in German GDP growth. We also depict the total effects of all structural shocks on
GDP in the bottom right panel. The dashed lines display the actual demeaned GDP quar-
terly growth rates and the solid lines show the cumulative effects of the respective structural
shock.
German GDP growth was largely unaffected by oil supply shocks in this time period.
Oil-specific demand shocks contributed slightly positively to German GDP growth in the
first three quarters 2008. However, these positive effects were not able to offset the negative
effects originating from the aggregate demand shocks, which had a negative effect on GDP
growth well before Lehman Brothers collapsed in September 2008. To assess how much of
the observed GDP decline after September 2008 is due to the rapid drop in global demand
we implement a counterfactual analysis. Specifically, we set all structural oil price shocks
since July 2008, the month of the oil price peak, equal to zero. Note that in this case the
real oil price would have been fallen from July 2008 to July 2009 by slightly more than 10
percent which is much less than actually observed. The dotted lines display the resulting
cumulative effects. Clearly, the effect consisting only of structural oil shocks that occurred
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Figure 2.8: Cumulative Effect of the Structural Oil Shocks on German GDP Growth
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Notes: Estimates are based on model (2.4). The time dimension (horizontal axis) is measured in quarters.
The dashed lines denote the actual demeaned GDP growth rates. The solid lines show the cumulative effects
of the respective structural shock. The dotted lines display the cumulative effects of the counterfactual
analysis in which all structural oil price shocks from July 2008 are set equal to zero. The grey vertical lines
represent the date of the collapse of Lehman Brothers.
before July 2008 had a sizeable negative effect on GDP growth at the beginning of 2009.
But the sequence of negative aggregate demand shocks that have shown up at the end of
2008 explain a larger part of this sharp drop.
In total, the oil price hike in 2007/08 had sizeable negative effects on GDP. We draw
this conclusion by considering the counterfactual response of all shocks in the bottom right
panel. In our counterfactual analysis we estimate a cumulative reduction of German GDP
of 2.3 percent in the year 2009 as a result of the structural shocks that triggered the oil price
hike in 2007/08. This effect alone suffices to produce a recession. Therefore, we show that
this oil price hike notably contributed to the subsequent recession in Germany. Even though
the main explanations for the dramatic fall in German production can be rather found in the
collapse of global demand and other factors, presumably negative shocks originating from
the finance sector, that are not captured by our structural oil price shocks.
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2.7 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that demand and supply shock driven oil price hikes have
different impacts on the German economy. While we find that consumption always reacts
negatively, the dynamic responses of exports and gross investment depend on the type of the
structural oil price shock. In the cases of the oil-specific and the aggregate demand shock we
observe that favorable international price movements and shifts in global demand towards
German export goods initially outweigh the contractionary effects on consumers’ expenditure
and, therefore, lead to an increase in GDP. Even though strong oil price surges do not burden
German manufacturing, that primarily produces investment and export goods, we find that
their effects on domestic demand become rather negative over time.
Concerning the economic consequences of the 2007/08 oil price we find that the sustained
sequence of positive aggregate demand shocks, that triggered the oil price hike in 2007/08,
led to a 2.3 percent reduction in German GDP in 2009. This finding resembles the U.S.
result discussed by Hamilton (2009) and Kilian (2009a) and is somewhat surprising, as the
German economy is much more export orientated than the U.S. economy. However, at the
end the negative effects on consumption played also in Germany the most dominant role. We
thus provide evidence that this oil price hike made a notable contribution to the subsequent
recession in Germany. At the same time, this result is not in conflict with the view that the
oil price was not the major driver of the 2009 recession.
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Appendix
A1 Model with Sign Restrictions and Additional Restrictions Im-
posed
Figure A1: Responses to Structural Shocks to the Global Oil Market Model Using Sign
Restrictions and Additional Restrictions Imposed
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Notes: This figure is a replication of Figure 10 in Kilian and Murphy (2012) with an updated data set.
The time dimension (horizontal axis) is measured in months. Results are based on 200 accepted draws of
the model with sign restrictions and additional restrictions imposed. The solid lines refer to the median
of the accepted draws at each horizon. The 68- and 95 percent confidence bands are the 16th/84th and
2.5th/97.5th percentiles of the accepted draws for each horizon.
Table A1: Impact Matrix—Sign Restrictions Combined with Additional Restrictions Im-
posed
Oil supply Aggregate demand Oil-specific
shock shock demand shock
Oil production -1.3994 0.0246 0.0687
Real activity -0.1563 4.9735 -0.8713
Real oil price 0.5514 2.2677 5.3249
Notes: see notes to Figure A1.
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Chapter 3
Firms’ Optimism and Pessimism:
Evidence From the IFO Survey
Abstract1
Are firms’ expectations biased? Does it matter? We use micro data on firms’ production
and investment expectations from the German IFO Business Climate Survey and the IFO
Investment Survey and compare them to realization data from the same surveys. We then
construct series of quantitative firm-specific expectation errors. We find that depending on
the exact definition at least 6 percent and at most 34 percent of firms consistently over-
or underpredict their one-quarter-ahead upcoming production. Almost 15 percent of firms
over- or underpredict their upcoming yearly investment. In a simple frictionless neoclassical
heterogeneous firm model these expectational biases lead to factor misallocations that cause
welfare losses that in the worst case are comparable to conventional estimates of the welfare
costs of business cycles fluctuations. In more conservative calibrations the welfare losses are
even smaller.
1This chapter is based on joint work with Rüdiger Bachmann. It is based on our paper “Firms’ Optimism
and Pessimism: Evidence From the IFO Survey,” mimeo, 2011.
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3.1 Introduction
Are firms’ expectations biased? Firms, based on expectations about their future business sit-
uation, decide about the allocation of an economy’s capital stock and labor supply. If firms’
expectations are biased, an economy’s factor allocation is likely to be suboptimal compared
to a case with only rational firms.
How large are the welfare losses from the resulting factor misallocations? This paper,
using business survey data from Germany, is an attempt to provide quantitative answers to
these questions. We find welfare losses are likely to be small, given the extent of expecta-
tional biases in the data.
Little is known empirically about firms’ expectation formation.2 There is an accounting
literature (e.g. McDonald, 1973, Firth and Smith, 1992, Brown et al., 2000), which finds
that managers tend to bias their public earnings and dividend forecasts upward, presumably
for strategic reasons to attract investors. Malmedier and Tate (2005, 2008) using data on
risk exposure in firms’ investment strategies to measure CEO overconfidence, investigate the
relationship between CEO overconfidence and corporate investment. These literatures rely
on either publicly announced expectations or ex-post behavior to measure firms’ expecta-
tions. Business survey data on expectations and realizations are less likely to suffer from
strategic forecasting behavior, as they are highly confidential micro data and can only be
accessed under strict non-disclosure agreements, if at all. These survey data have been used
in the literature to study rationality and unbiasedness of firms’ expectations: Anderson et
al. (1954) conduct a very early study on qualitative expectation errors using the first few
installments of the IFO Business Climate Survey. Nerlove (1983) uses German (from IFO)
and French data on firms’ expectations about idiosyncratic firm variables (such as prices, de-
mand, etc.). Tompkinson and Common (1983) study expectations about idiosyncratic firm
variables in the U.K. manufacturing sector and Zimmermann and Kawasaki (1986), using
IFO price expectation and realization data, test whether firms are rational about the devel-
opment of the market prices of their own commodities. All these studies have in common
that they usually find some degree of deviation from rationality.
Progress in the empirical literature on firms’ expectation formation has been slow be-
2Expectation formation of households is somewhat better understood: for instance, Souleles (2004),
using data from the Michigan Survey of Consumers, and Bovi (2009), using the harmonized European
consumer surveys, present evidence that household expectations are not rational. Agents systematically
assess their current situation overcritically and form their expectations overoptimistically. On the theory
side, Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) present a model where agents optimally bias their expectations about
the future upwards to increase their expected life time utility. Jaimovich and Rebelo (2007) study a business
cycle model with overoptimism with respect to the realization of investment-specific shocks, without, however,
using micro data for calibration. Hassan and Mertens (2011) argue that small expectation errors of stock
market investors can have first order effects on welfare.
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cause of formidable data requirements. Ideally, researchers need high-frequency quantitative
expectation and realization data on firm-specific variables for a large (and representative)
cross-sections of firms, such as: “By how much do you expect your production to grow over
the next quarter? By how much did your production grow during the preceding quarter?”
These data need to be available over long time horizons to construct firm histories of ex-
pectation errors and to ensure that specific cyclical episodes do not bias results; after all, in
booms we should expect to see upward expectation errors.
However, high frequency business survey data about idiosyncratic expectations and real-
izations are usually qualitative,3 indeed trichotomous, in nature: “we expect our production
to increase, decrease, stay the same over the next three months”. While useful, qualitative
information has its limits, in particular when forecasting errors need to be aggregated over
time in order to measure the long-run average forecasting errors of firms and possible biases
therein. How does one aggregate a qualitative forecasting error of +1 (up) today and −1
(down) tomorrow?4 Therefore, Müller (2010) uses quantitative expectations about plants’
sales and employment development over a year from the annual IAB Establishment Panel
in Germany to measure whether firms are overoptimistic or overpessimistic. He finds strong
evidence for the existence of both types of firms. However, the IAB Establishment Panel is
still rather short (starting in 1993) and of low frequency.
In our analysis we use firm-level micro data from two IFO business surveys – the IFO
Business Climate Survey (IFO-BCS) and the IFO Investment Survey (IFO-IS) – that allow
us to construct quantitative expectation errors for firms’ production and investment. We
note that we still cannot measure surprises with respect to truly exogenous driving forces,
such as technology or demand shocks. However, to the best of our knowledge there is no
business survey in the world who would ask these questions directly. Nevertheless, surprises
with respect to endogenous variables, such as production and investment, can be informative
about truly exogenous surprises when viewed through the lens of a structural model of the
firm. We will make use of this insight in the second half of the paper.
The IFO-BCS is a monthly qualitative business survey that is supplemented on a quar-
terly basis with quantitative questions. Under certain assumptions, we can combine the
qualitative three-month ahead production outlook from the monthly survey with the quan-
titative change in percentage capacity utilization from the quarterly supplement to compute
3 De Leuuw and McKelvey (1981) study quantitative annual expectation data about aggregate prices
from a BEA survey of business expenditures on plant and equipment in the U.S. and find that firms do not
have rational expectations.
4This is a problem, even when qualitative expectation data predict quantitative ex-post data rather well,
which is what Lui et al. (2008) find, using survey data from the ’Confederacy of British Industry’ business
survey and ex-post administrative data.
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idiosyncratic quarterly, one-quarter-ahead production expectation errors. We do this for the
manufacturing part of the IFO-BCS from 1980 on and thus construct a panel of quarterly
production expectation errors over thirty years. The IFO-IS is a biannual quantitative busi-
ness survey across all sectors of the economy which asks firms in the spring and fall of every
year about their investment plans for the upcoming year and the actual investments under-
taken. Here the data goes back to 1970, so we can compute a panel of investment expectation
errors over forty years. These (unbalanced) panel data sets allow us to analyze firm histories
of expectation errors which is an unique advantage compared to previous studies.
Limiting our analysis to firms with at least eight years of observations we compute long-
run averages of firms’ expectation errors and study their distributions. To classify firms as
optimists or pessimists, we test for each firm whether its average expectation error is sig-
nificantly different from zero. Then we define optimistic firms as those firms which feature
a negative average expectation error that is significantly different from zero. Analogously,
pessimistic firms are defined as those firms with a positive average expectation error that
is significantly different from zero. At least 6 percent and at most 34 percent of firms con-
sistently over- or underpredict their one-quarter-ahead upcoming production. The optimist
firms, for example, overpredict their production by 3.4 percent (5.8 percent) on average.
Roughly 15 percent of firms over- or underpredict their upcoming yearly investment. Here
the optimists overpredict by 37.3 percent on average.
To gauge the implications of these expectational biases we perform a simple welfare calcu-
lation. We use a frictionless heterogeneous firm model where firms decide about their factor
demands before they know their idiosyncratic productivity levels. We calibrate the frac-
tions of optimistic and pessimistic firms and the extent of their expectational biases to the
distributional properties of production expectation errors in the IFO-BCS. Overoptimistic
firms hire too many workers and build up capital stocks that are too high. Overpessimistic
firms do not demand enough inputs. We then compare the welfare in an economy which is
populated by firms with a distribution of production expectation errors that approximates
the one in the data to a world that is only populated by firms with zero long-run expectation
errors. We robustly find that the welfare losses from expectational errors are small, probably
smaller even than conventional estimates of the welfare costs of business cycles. Firms seem
to be pretty good in predicting their business environment.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the IFO-
BCS and the construction of the production expectation errors from it. Section 3.3 performs
a similar analysis for investment expectation errors for the IFO-IS. Section 3.4 introduces
a simple heterogeneous firm model. Section 3.5 discusses the welfare results. Section 3.6
provides a series of robustness checks. Section 3.7 concludes.
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3.2 Evidence from the IFO Business Climate Survey
3.2.1 The IFO Business Climate Survey
The IFO Business Climate index is a much-followed leading indicator for economic activ-
ity in Germany. It is based on a firm survey which has been conducted since 1949 and,
therefore, is one of the oldest and broadest monthly business confidence surveys available
(see Becker and Wohlrabe, 2008, for details). Due to longitudinal consistency problems in
other sectors and the availability of micro data in a processable form we limit our analysis
to the manufacturing sector from 1980 until the present. From 1991 on, the sample includes
East–German firms.
One of the IFO-BCS’s main advantages is the high number of survey participants. The
average number of respondents at the beginning of our sample is approximately 5,000; to-
wards the end it is about 2,500.5 Participation in the survey is voluntary and confidential.
Thus, there is little incentive for firms to provide overoptimistic forecasts as a signal to
investors. There is some fraction of firms that are only one time participants. However,
conditional on staying two months in the survey, most firms continue on and this allows
us to construct an unbalanced panel data set of expectation errors. For our narrow, very
conservative definition of expectation errors the final baseline panel consists of 695 firms
with at least 32 quarterly observations each; for a broader definition we follow 3,859 firms
for again 8 years at least.
3.2.2 Construction of Quantitative Production Expectation Er-
rors
To construct firms’ quantitative production expectation errors we would ideally need the
following quantitative information about production expectations and realizations: “By how
much do you expect your production to grow over the next quarter? By how much did
your production grow in the preceding quarter?” To the best of our knowledge there is no
firm survey that asks these questions for a long time horizon and repeatedly at underyearly
frequencies. However, the quantitative quarterly supplement of the IFO survey allows us to
construct - under certain assumptions - quantitative production expectations and quantita-
tive production realizations. We are thus able to construct a panel of quarterly production
expectation errors for the last thirty years.
5The IFO-BCS is a survey at the product level, so that these numbers do not exactly correspond to firms.
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Specifically, we use the following supplementary question about capacity utilization to
compute production changes:6
Q 1 “Supplementary Question: The utilisation of our production equipment for producing
XY (customary full utilization = 100) currently amounts to..%.”
more than 100 %
30 40 50 60 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 namely
We start from the following production relationship of an individual firm i:
yacti,t = ui,ty
pot
i,t , (3.1)
where yacti,t denotes the firm’s actual output, y
pot
i,t its potential output level and ui,t the level
of capacity utilization. Only ui,t is directly observable in the IFO-BCS. Taking the natural
logarithm and the three-month difference, we get:7
∆logyacti,t = ∆logui,t + ∆logy
pot
i,t . (3.2)
Under the assumption that potential output remains constant, ∆logypoti,t = 0, percentage
changes in actual output can be recovered from percentage changes in capacity utilization.
To implement this idea we restrict the analysis to firms of which we can reasonably expect
that they did not change their production capacity in the preceding quarter, making use of
the following two questions in the IFO-BCS:
Q 2 “Expectations for the next three months: Employment related to the production of XY
in domestic production unit(s) will probably increase, roughly stay the same, decrease.”
Q 3 “Supplementary Question: We evaluate our technical production capacity with reference
to the backlog of orders on books and to orders expected in the next twelve months as more
than sufficient, sufficient, insufficient.”
6Here we provide a translation, for the German original see Appendix A1.
7Time intervals are months. For us to construct an expectation error in t, we need an observation for
capacity utilization in t and t− 3.
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Given hiring frictions in the labor market we view a firm’s expectation, stated in t− 3,
that its employment level will remain the same in the next three months as highly indicative
that its productive capacity did not change between t− 3 and t. Similarly, given capital
adjustment frictions a firm’s statement, again in t− 3, that its technical production capacity
is sufficient for the future incoming orders suggests that this firm has no reason to change
its production capacity in the near future. To be conservative we require a firm satisfy both
criteria in t− 3 for us to assume that its production capacity has not changed between t− 3
and t. In this case, we use the quarterly percentage change in capacity utilization in t as a
proxy for the quarterly percentage change in production in t. The existence of non-convex
or kinked adjustment costs for capital and labor adjustment as well as time to build (see
Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992, as well as Doms and Dunne, 1998) make this a reasonable
assumption.
To derive production expectation errors we also need information on firms’ production ex-
pectations. This allows us to compute production surprises out of mere production changes.
In the IFO-BCS firms report only qualitative production expectations:
Q 4 “Expectations for the next three months: Our domestic production activities with respect
to product XY will (without taking into account differences in the length of months or seasonal
fluctuations) increase, roughly stay the same, decrease.”
Qualitative expectations have a built-in asymmetry in the sense that the middle category
also constitutes a quantitative expectation, zero change, whereas the increase and decrease
category conveys no quantitative information. We therefore proceed in two steps. First, we
consider only firms whose answer to Q4 is that their production level, yacti,t , will not change
in the next three months. Under the assumption that ypoti,t remains constant over this time
period, all ∆logui,t are automatically expectation errors. In a second step we extend our
analysis to arbitrary qualitative production expectations. This will give us a broader picture
of expectation errors, albeit with the added cost of more assumptions.
We also clean our sample from firm-quarter observations with extreme capacity utilization
outliers, i.e. those that exceed 150%, and from firm-quarter observations with inconsistent
statements. To determine the latter we consider the following monthly qualitative IFO-BCS
question concerning actual production changes in the months t, t− 1, t− 2:
Q 5 “Trends in the last month: Our domestic production activities with respect to prod-
uct XY have (without taking into account differences in the length of months or seasonal
fluctuations) increased, roughly stayed the same, decreased.”
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We drop all observations as inconsistent in which firms report a strictly positive (negative)
change in ∆logui,t and no positive (negative) change in Q5 in the last 3 months. For firms
that report ∆logui,t = 0, we proceed as follows: Unless firms in Q5 either answer three
times in a row that production did not change, or they have at least one “Increase” and one
“Decrease” in their three answers, we drop them as inconsistent.
3.2.2.1 Quantitative Expectation Errors under Constant Production Expecta-
tions
If the production capacity can be assumed not to have changed in the preceding quarter,
and if no change in production was expected three months prior, a change in capacity
utilization, ∆logui,t, is also a production expectation error of firm i in month t. We first
restrict our analysis to the subset of firm-quarter observations that satisfy these assumptions.
For this case, Figure 3.1 illustrates the move from capacity utilization changes to production
expectation errors.
Figure 3.1: Link between Capacity Utilization and Production Expectation Errors
Prerequisite: Firm i passes the outlier and inconsistency test (Q1 and Q5)
Firm i has an observation for a change in capacity utilization ∆logui,t (Q1)
∆logui,t is a production change ∆logyacti,t
∆logui,t is a quantitative production expectation error
No change in potential output ∆logypoti,t
Firm i answers “Constant employment expectations” (Q2)
and “Technical production capacity is sufficient” (Q3) in t− 3
Qualitative production expectations in t− 3 are constant (Q4)
No expected production change
?
?
Notes: The time dimension t is measured in months.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the exact timing of the questions in the IFO-BCS that we use to
compute production expectation errors. As a first pass we consider only firms which state in
period t− 3 that their production level, employment level and technical production capacity
will remain the same in the next three months. Then we compute ∆logui,t three months
later in t. These ∆logui,t constitute our narrow definition of production expectation errors.
We denote them by FE_BCSnarrowi,t .
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Figure 3.2: Derivation of Production Expectation Errors under Constant Production Expec-
tations - Timing
Prerequisite: Firm i passes the outlier and inconsistency test (Q1 and Q5)
∆logui,t =FE_BCSnarrowi,t
-
Time (in months)t− 3 t
ui,t−3 ui,t
Firm i states in period t− 3:
Constant employment expectations (Q2)
Sufficient technical capacity (Q3)
Constant production expectations (Q4)
-
3.2.2.2 Quantitative Expectation Errors under General Production Expecta-
tions
The derivation of quantitative production expectation errors for firms with increasing or
decreasing qualitative production expectations in Q4 requires additional assumptions. We
admit at the outset that these assumptions may not be too palatable. However, we view
this as an attempt to measure firms’ quantitative production expectation errors as best
as we can, given the limited data available. We take the following four steps. First, we
define a qualitative index of production changes. Specifically, we compute a firm-specific
activity variable, REALIZi,t, as the sum of the increase-instances minus the sum of the
decrease-instances in question Q5 over the last three months going backward from t. In a
second step, we use these qualitative production changes to determine qualitative expectation
errors with question Q4. Then, using the conditions about employment expectations and
adequacy of technical capacity, we map qualitative production changes into quantitative
production changes. In a final step, we convert these quantitative production changes into
quantitative production expectation errors for all firms that pass the aformentioned outlier
and inconsistency tests.
The basic idea is to assign firms with large qualitative production expectation errors –
for example a firm expecting its production to go up over the next three months, but then
reporting only production declines – large quantitative production expectation errors, derived
from a mapping between qualitative and quantitative production changes. The expectation
errors for firms with constant production expectations remain the same as in the previous
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section. We denote this measure of quantitative production expectation errors under general
production expectations by FE_BCSbroadi,t . Details of the construction can be found in
Appendix A2.
3.2.3 Results
We next compute the average firm-specific production expectation error over all time periods
for which we have data. We restrict our sample to firms that have at least 32 observations
or eight years of expectation errors: FE_BCSnarrowi,t or FE_BCSbroadi,t . The average firm-
specific expectation errors are denoted by AFE_BCSnarrowi and AFE_BCSbroadi .
Table 3.1: Firm-Specific Average Production Expectation Errors (IFO-BCS)
Statistics AFE_BCSnarrowi AFE_BCSbroadi
Obs 695 3,859
Mean -0.0064 -0.0265
Std.Dev. 0.0161 0.0316
Percentiles
5th -0.0339 -0.0859
10th -0.0242 -0.0672
25th -0.0119 -0.0418
50th -0.0030 -0.0212
75th 0.0013 -0.0060
90th 0.0068 0.0063
95th 0.0119 0.0140
# Optimists 37 (5.3%) 1,370 (32.3%)
# Pessimists 5 (0.7%) 49 (1.3%)
# Realists 653 (94.0%) 2,564 (66.4%)
Notes: This table provides a summary of the distributions of AFE_BCSnarrowi and AFE_BCSbroadi . In
the last three rows we report the number of firms which are classified as optimists, pessimists and realists. We
define optimistic firms as those firms which feature a negative average expectation error that is significantly
different from zero. Pessimistic firms are defined as those firms with a positive average expectation error
that is significantly different from zero.
Table 3.1 displays the distributions of firms’ average expectation errors.8 Note that posi-
tive values of AFE_BCSnarrowi or AFE_BCSbroadi indicate that a firm was on average too
pessimistic in the sense that its predicted production changes were on average lower than
its actual production changes. Especially for AFE_BCSbroadi the distribution is skewed
towards negative values and at least 25 percent of all firms have long-run averages of expec-
tation errors which are too optimistic by 4 percent or more. These numbers alone, however,
8We show in Figure A3 of Appendix A3 the corresponding histograms of the distributions.
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are not sufficient to assess whether a firm has biased expectations. To provide persuasive
evidence for expectational biases we need to consider the second moment of firm-specific
shocks as well. Firms operate in different economic environments and face different sizes of
shocks. Therefore, analyzing only average expectation errors can be misleading.
The panel structure of the IFO-BCS allows us to address this issue. We test for each firm
whether its average expectation error is significantly different from zero. To this end, we
regress for each firm all its observations of FE_BCSnarrowi,t and FE_BCSbroadi,t on a con-
stant. Then we use two-sided t-tests in order to assess whether the individual firm-specific
average expectation error is significantly different from zero.9 We define optimistic firms as
those firms which feature a negative average expectation error that is significantly different
from zero. Pessimistic firms are defined as those firms with a positive average expectation
error that is significantly different from zero. In the case of AFE_BCSnarrowi this difference
from zero is only significant for 6 percent of all considered firms. For AFE_BCSbroadi we
classify more than 30 percent as optimists.
For both definitions of forecast errors we see that the distribution of average forecast
errors is skewed towards overoptimism. The optimist firms overpredict their production by
3.4 percent (5.8 percent for the broad definition) on average, which corresponds to 2.1 times
(1.8 times) the standard deviation of the distribution of firms’ production expectation errors.
The pessismist firms underpredict their production by 1.9 percent (3.5 percent) on average,
which corresponds to 1.1 times (1.2 times) the standard deviation of the distribution of firms’
production expectation errors.
3.3 Evidence from the IFO Investment Survey
In this section we use the IFO Investment Survey (IFO-IS) to compute quantitative invest-
ment expectation errors. One advantage of the IFO-IS is that it directly provides quantitative
information on expected and realized investment. A disadvantage, however, is that we can
only compute expectation errors at an annual frequency. The IFO-IS is carried out twice a
year and we have access to the micro data since 1970. The average number of respondents
is roughly 3,000 at the beginning of our sample and declines to 1,500 towards the end. The
participating firms provide quantitative information (in Euro) about their investment plans
for the current and upcoming year.
Specifically, firms are asked in the spring of each year about their investment plans for
the current year. In the fall, firms are asked about their investment plans for the current and
the upcoming year. Thus, we have for each firm and year three different investment fore-
9We use a 5 percent significance level.
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casts with different forecast horizons: the forecast from the fall preceding a given year, the
spring and the fall forecast in a given year. In addition, firms report their actual investment
expenditures of the preceding calendar year in the spring and in the fall surveys. Figure 3.3
illustrates the timing in the IFO-IS.
Figure 3.3: Firm Investment Plans and Realizations in the IFO-IS - Timing
Year t− 1 Year t Year t+ 1
Fall Spring Fall Spring Fall
Long Forecast Horizon
Firm i forecasts
investment for
year t
Medium Forecast Horizon
Firm i forecasts
investment for
year t
Short Forecast Horizon
Firm i forecasts
investment for
year t
Both in the spring and
in the fall survey firm i
states its realized investment
of the preceding calendar year t
-
Survey
-
Time (in years)
We compute the expectation error of firm i in period t as the log difference of the realized
investment expenditures in period t and the predicted investment expenditures for period
t.10 Given the three forecast horizons we get three types of expectation errors. We denote
the first one by FE_ISlongi,t . It uses as forecast the firms’ investment plans from the fall
of the previous year t− 1. The second series of investment expectation errors, denoted by
FE_ISmedi,t , uses the firm forecast given in the spring of the current year t. The last forecast
error type uses the fall prediction of the current year t. It is denoted by FE_ISshorti,t .
For the final sample we perform two steps to eliminate outliers and inconsistent answers.
First, we compare the spring and the fall statements concerning investment developments in
the preceding calendar year. We drop all firm observations that have a 10 percent difference
10We use the realized investment expenditures from the fall survey in period t+ 1. Using instead the
investment numbers from the spring survey or the average of both surveys does not change our results. We
also compute percentage expectation errors by dividing the difference of the realized and predicted investment
expenditures through the mean of the realized and predicted investment expenditures without much change
to our results.
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in these statements. Second, we leave out those observations which are smaller than the
1th percentile and larger than the 99th percentile of the corresponding year. We then
compute for each firm the average firm-specific expectation error. Table 3.2 presents the
distributions for each average investment expectation error: AFE_ISlongi , AFE_ISmedi
and AFE_ISshorti .11 Again we only include firms for which we have at least 8 investment
expectation errors, i.e. 8 years of observations.
Table 3.2: Firm-Specific Average Investment Expectation Errors (IFO-IS)
Statistics AFE_ISlongi AFE_ISmedi AFE_ISshorti
Obs 1,843 1,904 2,169
Mean 0.0380 -0.0220 0.0072
Std.Dev. 0.2580 0.1844 0.1377
Percentiles
5th -0.3645 -0.3285 -0.2123
10th -0.2685 -0.2507 -0.1613
25th -0.1211 -0.1272 -0.0799
50th 0.0310 -0.0239 0.0006
75th 0.1933 0.0875 0.0875
90th 0.3538 0.2071 0.1816
95th 0.4512 0.2805 0.2332
# Optimists 131 (7.1%) 159 (8.3%) 166 (7.7%)
# Pessimists 138 (7.5%) 76 (4.0%) 130 (6.0%)
# Realists 1,574 (85.4%) 1,669 (87.7%) 1,873 (86.3%)
Notes: This table provides a summary of the distributions of the firm-specific means of FE_ISlongi,t (second
column) FE_ISmedi,t (third column) and FE_ISshorti,t (fourth column). Only those firms with at least eight
investment expectation errors in the sample are considered. We define optimistic firms as those firms which
feature a negative average expectation error that is significantly different from zero. Pessimistic firms are
defined as those firms with a positive average expectation error that is significantly different from zero.
The first feature of the investment expectation errors to note is that firms get better over
time in forecasting their annual investment: the standard deviation of the forecast error de-
clines from roughly 26 percent to approximately 14 percent between the two extreme forecast
horizons. The second feature is that unlike in production expectation errors, the distribution
is not skewed towards “optimism” or overprediction. For each type of expectation error we
observe that more than 20 percent of firms have average expectation errors that deviate at
least one standard deviation of the corresponding distribution from zero. For AFE_ISlongi
more than half of all firms have average expectation errors larger than 10 percent. However,
this bias is not significant for all of these firms. After using the same definitions for optimists
and pessimists as in the IFO-BCS we find only 14 percent of firms with expectational biases.
11Figure A4 in Appendix A4 provides the histograms of the distributions.
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For AFE_ISmedi and AFE_ISshorti this fraction becomes even smaller. But overall, for
each type we find that at least 12 percent of all firms feature an expectational bias.
3.4 A Model
3.4.1 Firms
The model economy is populated by a unit mass continuum of ex ante identical, but ex post
potentially heterogeneous firms. They produce a final generic good using a diminishing re-
turns to scale production function with capital and labor as inputs. In addition, production
is affected by idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Specifically, an individual firm i’s produc-
tion function is given by:
yi,t = zi,tk
θ
i,tn
ν
i,t, (3.1)
where zi,t denotes the idiosyncratic productivity level, and ki,t and ni,t denote the firm-
specific capital stock and employment level, respectively. We assume competitive factor
markets. Firms pay a real wage wt for one unit of labor input and a rental rate rt for one
unit of capital input.
To incorporate expectational biases, we assume that firms decide about their factor de-
mands in period t before knowing their productivity levels zi,t. Instead, firms form expec-
tations about zi,t on the basis of zi,t−1. We further assume that the natural logarithm of
zi,t follows a three-state Markov chain on the states [ε,0,−ε] with the following symmetric
transition matrix P obj :
P obj =

ρ1 ρ2 1− ρ1 − ρ2
ρ3 1− 2ρ3 ρ3
1− ρ1 − ρ2 ρ2 ρ1
 , (3.2)
where ρ1 + ρ2<1 and ρ3<0.5. P obj is the actual transition matrix of the idiosyncratic
productivity process. Rational firms would use this transition matrix to compute expecta-
tions about their idiosyncratic productivity levels. Some firms, however, which we call op-
timists and pessimists form their expectations with different transitions matrices, P subj,opt
and P subj,pess. Relative to P obj , P subj,opt and P subj,pess feature expectational biases which
we model parsimoniously with a parameter φ. This parameter is introduced additively into
the true transition matrix P obj . Specifically, the subjective transition matrix of an optimist
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looks as follows:
P subj,opt =

ρ1 ρ2 1− ρ1 − ρ2
ρ3 + φ 1− 2ρ3 ρ3 − φ
1− ρ1 − ρ2 + φ ρ2 + φ ρ1 − 2φ
 . (3.3)
The subjective transition matrix for a pessimist is just analogous:
P subj,pess =

ρ1 − 2φ ρ2 + φ 1− ρ1 − ρ2 + φ
ρ3 − φ 1− 2ρ3 ρ3 + φ
1− ρ1 − ρ2 ρ2 ρ1
 . (3.4)
With this expectation formation process the optimal factor demands are given by:
ni,t =
[(
νE[zi,t|zi,t−1]
wt
)(
θwt
νrt
)θ] 11−θ−ν
(3.5)
ki,t =
θwt
νrt
ni,t. (3.6)
Note that if a firm expects a higher expected value of its productivity level E[zi,t|zi,t−1], it
will demand more capital and labor. This implies that overoptimistic firms hire too many
workers and build up capital stocks that are too high. In the other direction overpessimistic
firms do not demand enough inputs. This leads to factor misallocation and welfare losses.
3.4.2 Households
We assume a representative household with time separable preferences who maximizes the
following instantaneous utility function:
Ut = logCt −
A
1 + ηNt
1+η, (3.7)
where Ct is aggregate consumption and Nt denotes aggregate employment. η is the inverse
of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. The budget constraint of the household is given by:
wtNt + (1− δ + rt)Kt + Πt =Kt+1 +Ct, (3.8)
where δ is the depreciation rate, Kt the aggregate capital stock and Πt denotes aggregate
profits. We assume that all firms are owned by the representative household who does not
know the types of the firms, for instance whether they are realists, optimists or pessimists.
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After solving the intertemporal optimization problem of the household we get the usual first-
order conditions:
wt =ACtN
η
t , (3.9)
1
Ct
= βEt
[1 + rt+1 − δ
Ct+1
]
. (3.10)
3.4.3 Equilibrium
Given an initial capital stock, K0, and a sequence of shocks {{zi,t}∞i=0}
∞
t=0 an equilibrium of
this economy is defined as a time path of quantities {{yi,t}∞i=0,{ki,t}∞i=0,{ni,t}∞i=0,Ct,Kt,Nt}
∞
t=0
and a time path of prices {wt,rt}∞t=0 that satisfy:
1. Firm optimality: Taking {wt,rt}∞t=0 as given, the optimal factor demands for ni,t and
ki,t are determined according to equations (3.5) and (3.6).
2. Household optimality: Taking {wt,rt}∞t=0 and K0 as given, the household’s consump-
tion and labor supply satisfy (3.9) and (3.10).
3. Commodity market clearing:
Ct =
∫
zi,tk
θ
i,tn
ν
i,t di−
(
Kt+1 − (1− δ)
∫
ki,t di
)
4. Labor market clearing:
Nt =
∫
ni,t di
3.4.4 Calibration
The model period is a quarter. Table 3.3 gives an overview of the standard parameter
choices for calibration: Bachmann and Bayer (2011) compute from national accounting data
an average annual depreciation rate of 0.094 for Germany. They also estimate the median
factor shares of labor and capital in the German manufacturing sector from firm-level micro
data. The discount factor generates an annual real interest rate of 2 percent. We fix the
Frisch elasticity of labor supply at unity. The disutility parameter of labor, A, is chosen to
ensure that the average time spent at work by the representative household is 0.33.
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Table 3.3: Standard Parameter Values
Baseline Calibration
Parameter Description Value
δ Depreciation rate 0.0235
θ Decreasing returns to capital 0.2075
ν Decreasing returns to labor 0.5565
β Discount factor 0.9950
η Inverse elasticity of labor supply 1.0000
A Disutility of labor 6.0000
The remaining parameters ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, φ and ε are calibrated using the IFO-BCS. As a
reminder, P obj , the true transition matrix for the idiosyncratic productivity shock process,
is given by:
P obj =

ρ1 ρ2 1− ρ1 − ρ2
ρ3 1− 2ρ3 ρ3
1− ρ1 − ρ2 ρ2 ρ1
 .
Note that ρ1, ρ2 and ρ3 define transition probabilities conditional on a certain economic
state. The IFO-BCS provides such information in a qualitative way with the following
question concerning the current business situation:
Q 6 “Current Situation: We evaluate our business situation with respect to product XY as
good, satisfactory, unsatisfactory.”
We start with the calibration of ρ3. These entries define situations in which the economic
states of the firms do not change. Suppose that a firm is in the medium economic state. This
state will not change with probability (1− 2ρ3). Therefore, we compute for each quarter
the fraction of firms with no upcoming production change, i.e. REALIZi,t+3 is equal to
zero, conditional on a normal current business situation. The time series average of these
fractions provides an estimate of (1− 2ρ3).12
The probability for firms to persist in either the good or bad economic state is given by
ρ1. We compute the fractions of firms that have no decrease in their production level over
the next three months, i.e. REALIZi,t+3 is greater or equal to zero, conditional on a good
current business situation. Similarly, we compute the fraction of firms that have no increase
in their production level over the next three months, i.e. REALIZi,t+3 is less or equal to
12As before we use only those firms that pass the outlier and consistency test (Q1 and Q5).
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zero, conditional on a bad current business situation. Finally, we take the average of the two
time-series averages to get ρ1.
To calibrate ρ2 we compute the unconditional quarterly fractions of firms which change
their production level over the upcoming quarter, i.e. REALIZi,t+3 is unequal to zero. The
time-series average of these fractions provides an empirical moment that has to be matched
by the model. Given ρ1 and ρ3 we find a value for ρ2 that yields the same fraction of firms
changing their economic state in the model. The first three rows of Table 3.4 summarize the
calibration results so far.
Table 3.4: Parameter Values of P obj, φ, ε
Baseline Calibration
Parameter Description FEnarrowi,t FEbroadi,t
ρ1 Parameter Transition Matrix 0.8626 0.8479
ρ2 Parameter Transition Matrix 0.1374 0.1521
ρ3 Parameter Transition Matrix 0.2072 0.2675
ε Parameter of Technology State 0.0975 0.1979
φ Expectational Bias Parameter 0.1122 0.1073
The calibration of ε and φ requires the simulation of the entire model and has to be done
jointly. In a first step we compute separately for the “realist” and “non realist” firms the
means of the absolute value of their expectation errors. The average absolute expectation
error for “realist” firms identifies ε, the same statistic for “non-realists” identifies φ. For a
given choice of the forecast error type in the data, each guess for ε and φ allows us to compute
the model average absolute forecast errors for “realist” and “non-realist” firms. We pick ε
and φ such that the model numbers correspond to their data counterparts. The calibrated
values of φ and ε are shown in the last two rows of Table 3.4.
To gauge how these Markov chains behave in terms of standard AR(1) modelling we sim-
ulate 100 times the Markov chain defined by P obj and ε with 20,000 time series observations
each. Then we estimate AR(1)-regressions on each of these time series. Table 3.5 displays
the average of the 100 AR(1)-coefficients and standard errors of the regressions.
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Table 3.5: AR(1)-Properties of the Idiosyncratic Shock Processes
AR(1)- Standard Error
coefficient of Regression
FEnarrowi,t 0.8626 0.0428
FEbroadi,t 0.8477 0.0926
Notes: This table shows in the first column the average of the estimated 100 AR(1)-coefficients for the
simulated Markov chains explained in the text for FEnarrowi,t and FEbroadi,t . The second column displays the
average of the standard errors of these regressions. Each Markov chain is simulated over 20,000 observations.
3.5 Welfare Calculations
To gauge - in a first pass - the economic significance of the observed expectational biases in
the IFO-BCS, we compare the lifetime utility of the representative agent in the steady state
of the actual economy with biased expectations, denoted by Welfareact, with her lifetime
utility in the following hypothetical scenario: suppose at some point in time t0 all optimist
and pessimist firms become “realists” and use P obj to form their expectations. Welfare is
determined by the discounted utility function of the representative household:
Welfare=
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
logCt −
A
1 + ηN
1+η
t
)
. (3.1)
At t0 this economy starts out at the steady state capital stock of the economy with
expectational biases and then transitions towards a new steady state. We can compute the
welfare of the representative household along this transition path, denoted by Welfarehypo,
according to equation (3.1). Then we determine the welfare loss as the percent deviation of
Welfareact and Welfarehypo. We also compute the consumption equivalent (in percent of
the steady state consumption of the actual economy with expectational biases). Formally,
we find a C, such that:
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
log(Cactt +C)−
A
1 + η
(
Nactt
)1+η)
=Welfarehypo (3.2)
The results are presented in Table 3.6. It is clear that the welfare losses from expec-
tational biases of firms in this simple model economy are small. The welfare losses range
from 0.01 percent to at most 0.1 percent. The welfare costs under the broad definition of
the production expectation error are higher than those under the narrow definition. The
main reason for this is that there are more optimist and pessimist firms under the broad
definition. But even then the welfare loss in terms of consumption amounts to only roughly
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Table 3.6: Welfare Losses Associated with Biased Expectations
Type of Welfare Loss Consumption
Expectation Error in % Equivalent
in %
FEnarrowi,t 0.0071 0.0054
FEbroadi,t 0.1124 0.0800
Notes: This table provides estimates of the welfare costs. The welfare loss is computed as the percent
deviation of Welfareact and Welfarehypo. The third column shows the welfare loss expressed in terms of
consumption. To compute this number we divide C by the steady state consumption level of the actual
economy with expectational biases.
0.1 percent, a number comparable to conventional estimates of the costs of business cycle
fluctuations (see Lucas, 1987, 2003).
Figure 3.4 presents the transition paths of major macroeconomic aggregates between the
steady state with expectational biases and the hypothetical steady state with only realist
firms for the broad definition of the production expectation errors.13 Notice first that the
hypothetical steady state with only realist firms features lower output, consumption, invest-
ment, employment and real wages, albeit higher average capital and labor productivity. It is
clear that resources, in particular capital, are more efficiently allocated in the hypothetical
steady state. In contrast, in the steady state with expectational biases optimist firms domi-
nate and the economy has too much capital accumulated and works too much. This is where
the transition analysis as opposed to mere steady state comparison is crucial. After the
elimination of all expectational biases at firms the economy enjoys a boom in consumption
and leisure on impact which ultimately leads to the welfare improvements documented in
Table 3.6.
13In Appendix A5 we also show the transition paths for the narrow definition of quantitative expectation
errors.
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Figure 3.4: Transition Paths for the Case of FEbroadi,t
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Notes: This figure shows the transition paths of selected variables for the case of FEbroadi,t . These dynamic
responses are expressed as percentage deviations from the steady state of the hypothetical economy.
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3.6 Robustness Checks
This section provides a series of robustness checks to our baseline welfare calculations. All
robustness checks change one feature of the calibration at a time, relative to the baseline
scenario. First, we reconsider the definition of optimistic and pessimistic firms. In the
baseline case we defined expectational biases by exploiting firm histories of expectation errors,
i.e. we defined expectational biased firms statistically as firms whose average production
expectation error was significantly different from zero, given their history of production
expectation errors. An alternative is to define optimists as having an average expectation
error below the 10th percentile of the average production error distribution and a pessimist
as having an average expectation error above the 90th percentile.14 As an alternative we
also use a 25/75th percentile threshold. The second and third panel in Table 3.7 show that
in this case welfare losses are somewhat higher, but their overall magnitude is comparable
to our baseline estimates.
The next robustness check concerns the calibration of ρ1, ρ2 and ρ3. In the baseline sce-
nario we calibrated those transition probabilities by using the qualitative production index
REALIZi,t. In particular, we were interested in the signs of this index for the respective
calibration exercises. To see whether our results are sensitive to this choice, we replace it by
sign(∆logui,t), which is derived from the quantitative production changes. This modification
in our calibration strategy delivers higher welfare costs for both types of expectation errors.
Nonetheless, these numbers are of the same order of magnitude as our baseline results.
We also check robustness with respect to the number of observations that we require a
firm to have in order to compute an average production forecast error. Instead of 32 observa-
tions we use a threshold of 16 observations or four years of quarterly quantitative production
errors. This gives us a larger cross section of firms at the cost of having more firms with
shorter histories in our sample. In the case of FEnarrowi,t the welfare losses get somewhat
higher, but they are still in line with our baseline estimates.
In the next robustness check we do not clean our sample from inconsistent statements
regarding quantitative and qualitative production changes. After all these inconsistent state-
ments might indicate some form of irrationality. Thus, the removal of these observations
could bias the welfare cost estimates downward. If we repeat our analysis without eliminat-
ing these observations, we, unsurprisingly, observe slight increases in all welfare losses. But
their order of magnitude remains unchanged.
14We provide the calibrated values of ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, ε and φ for these robustness checks in Appendix A6. For
some cases φ takes on corner solutions that cannot match the data moments perfectly.
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Table 3.7: Robustness Checks - Welfare Losses
Type of Welfare Loss Consumption
Expectation in % Equivalent
Error in %
Baseline Results
FEnarrowi,t 0.0071 0.0054
FEbroadi,t 0.1124 0.0800
10% and 90% Percentile
FEnarrowi,t 0.0562 0.0429
FEbroadi,t 0.1696 0.1199
25% and 75% Percentile
FEnarrowi,t 0.0938 0.0719
FEbroadi,t 0.1557 0.1109
Quantitative Production Changes: Sign(∆logui,t)
FEnarrowi,t 0.0089 0.0068
FEbroadi,t 0.2113 0.1556
16 Observations of Expectation Errors
FEnarrowi,t 0.0269 0.0201
FEbroadi,t 0.1076 0.0762
Including Inconsistent Statements
FEnarrowi,t 0.0185 0.0138
FEbroadi,t 0.1260 0.0898
Economy with φopt, φpess, εu and εl
FEnarrowi,t 0.0033 0.0026
FEbroadi,t 0.1170 0.0938
Notes: see notes to Table 3.6. This table shows the welfare costs estimates of expectational biases for the
baseline case and robustness checks.
In our final robustness check we relax the two symmetry assumptions built into the
stochastic environment of the firms. We allow for pessimistic and optimistic firms to have
different expectational biases. Also, ε, the parameter that governs the average absolute
expectation error, is now allowed to be different for upward and downward shocks.15 We
replace the symmetric technology state vector [ε,0,−ε] by an asymmetric one [εu,0,−εl]. As
a result we have to calibrate with φopt, φpess, εu and εl four instead of two parameters. We
again use the means of the absolute quantitative expectation errors for the calibration and
extend the analysis by considering particular subgroups. We calibrate εu using the absolute
values of the positive expectation errors of the realist firms. To compute εl we use the
absolute values of the negative expectation errors for the same type of firms. To determine
15The parameter of the transition matrix Popt are the same as in the baseline case.
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φopt and φpess we differentiate between expectation errors of optimistic and pessimistic firms.
Then we pick up those values for εu, εl, φopt and φpess such that the corresponding numbers
in the model correspond to the observed means in the data. Table 3.8 summarizes the
calibrated values of φopt, φpess, εu and εl.
Table 3.8: Calibration of the Asymmetric Case
Calibration of the Asymmetric Case
Parameter Description FEnarrowi,t FEbroadi,t
εu Parameter of high Technology State 0.0712 0.0767
εl Parameter of low Technology State 0.0691 0.1776
φopt Expectational Bias Parameter Optimists 0.0786 0.1500
φpess Expectational Bias Parameter Pessimists 0.1848 0.2675
Notes: This table shows the calibrated parameter values for εu, εl, φopt and φpess.
With these parameter values we obtain the following welfare losses summarized in the
last panel of Table 3.7. It turns out that these results do not considerably differ from our
baseline scenario. The economy experiences at most a welfare loss in consumption of about
0.1 percent.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper, using the micro data from the German IFO Business Climate Survey and the
IFO Investment survey, constructs panel data sets of firms’ quantitative expectation errors
with respect to their production and investment. With these data sets, we can gauge whether
firms errors are systematic and thus biased towards optimism or pessimism. We find some
degree of biased expectations, but for a large majority of firms realistic expectations in the
sense that zero average expectation errors cannot be rejected.
We then ask in the simplest possible neoclassical heterogeneous firm model, where ex-
pectation errors play a role, what the welfare implications of these expectational biases are.
Obviously, expectational biases lead to factor misallocations in an economy, and a welfare
analysis will allow us to gauge the economic significance of such a misallocation. We find
that even when expectational errors are very broadly defined, the welfare costs of these mis-
allocations are generally small, at the order of magnitude of conventional estimates for the
welfare costs of business cycles.
We do, however, note that our model is somewhat simplistic and expect future research
to compute welfare losses in more realistic environments. In this sense, we view the sec-
ond half of the paper only as a first pass. We speculate that in economies with physical
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adjustment frictions to capital, financial frictions or endogenous growth elements will lead
to larger welfare losses from expectational biases. Future research can then make use of our
distributional results for firms’ average production and investment errors to calibrate such
models.
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Appendix
A1 IFO Business Climate Survey (IFO-BCS)
Original German IFO-BCS Questions
Q 1 “Sonderfragen: Die Ausnutzung unserer Anlagen zur Herstellung von XY (betrieb-
sübliche Vollauslastung=100%) beträgt gegenwärtig bis zu ...%. ”
mehr als 100 %
30 40 50 60 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 und zwar
Q 2 “Erwartungen für die nächsten 3 Monate: Beschäftigte (nur inländische Betriebe) -
Die Zahl der mit der Herstellung von XY beschäftigten Arbeitnehmer wird: zunehmen, etwa
gleichbleiben, abnehmen.”
Q 3 “Sonderfragen: Unter Berücksichtigung unseres gegenwärtigen Auftragsbestandes und
des von uns in den nächsten 12 Monaten erwarteten Auftragseingangs halten wir unsere
derzeitige technische Kapazität für XY für: mehr als ausreichend, ausreichend, nicht
ausreichend. ”
Q 4 “Erwartungen für die nächsten 3 Monate: Unsere inländische Produktionstätigkeit
– ohne Berücksichtigung unterschiedlicher Monatslängen und saisonaler Schwankungen –
bezüglich XY wird voraussichtlich: steigen, etwa gleich bleiben, abnehmen.”
Q 5 “Tendenzen im vorangegangenen Monat: Unsere inländische Produktionstätigkeit
– ohne Berücksichtigung unterschiedlicher Monatslängen und saisonaler Schwankungen –
bezüglich XY ist: gestiegen, etwa gleich geblieben, gesunken.”
Q 6 “Aktuelle Situation: Wir beurteilen unsere Geschäftslage für XY als: gut, befriedi-
gend, schlecht.”
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A2 Derivation of Quantitative Expectation Errors under General
Production Expectations
We begin by defining the following firm-specific activity variable REALIZi,t as the sum of
the Increase-instances minus the sum of the Decrease-instances in question Q5 over the last
three months going backward from t. REALIZi,t can have seven possible values that live in
the interval [-3,3]. A qualitative production expectation error is then computed as follows:
Table A1: Possible Qualitative Expectation Errors
Experrori,t
Expected Increaset−3 REALIZi,t>0 0
Expected Increaset−3 REALIZi,t ≤ 0 (REALIZi,t − 1)
Expected Unchangedt−3 REALIZi,t>0 REALIZi,t
Expected Unchangedt−3 REALIZi,t = 0 0
Expected Unchangedt−3 REALIZi,t<0 REALIZi,t
Expected Decreaset−3 REALIZi,t<0 0
Expected Decreaset−3 REALIZi,t ≥ 0 (REALIZi,t + 1)
Notes: Rows refer to the qualitative expectations in month t− 3 (Q4).
Experrori,t ranges from [−4,4], where, for instance, −4 indicates a really negative fore-
cast error: the company expected production to increase over the next three months, yet
every single subsequent month production actually declined.
Next we compute for all firms with a given value of REALIZi,t in time t the average
∆logui,t, i.e. the cross-sectional average change in capacity utilization. Again, to ensure
that we can treat utilization changes as production changes only those firms are considered
that state three months before that their future employment levels remain the same and
that their technical production capacities are sufficient. We compute this mapping between
REALIZi,t and average production changes for each point in time.16 Figure A1 illustrates
the timing of survey questions that are used to compute this mapping. Figure A2 depicts
the results. For instance, it shows that firms with REALIZi,t = 1 in the first quarter of
1980 maps into an average change in production of approximately 5 percent.
We subject this mapping to a couple of plausibility tests.17 For firms with constant pro-
duction expectations we have a simple plausibility test for our procedure. Suppose we know
16We also considered a firm size specific and an industry specific mapping, without much changes to our
results.
17The pooled Spearman correlation coefficient between REALIZi,t and ∆logui,t for firms with constant
employment and technical capacity expectations is 0.72. The pooled Kendall’s tau between sign(REALIZi,t)
and sign(∆logui,t) is 0.67.
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Figure A1: Mapping between Qualitative and Quantitative Production Changes
Prerequisite: Firm i passes the outlier and inconsistency test (Q1 and Q5)
REALIZi,t = j −→ 1N
N∑
i=1
(∆logui,t|REALIZi,t = j), where j =−3, ...,3
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Figure A2: Mapping of REALIZt into Quantitative Production Changes
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with FE_BCSnarrowi,t the “true” forecast errors under constant production expectations.
We can also use the mapping strategy for the firms with constant qualitative production
expectations, in which case the average percentage change in capacity utilization for a given
REALIZi,t would be another estimate for their production expectation error. We can then
compare the “true” forecast errors with the forecast errors determined in the mapping pro-
cedure.
We do this by computing a quarterly time series of the cross-sectional means and standard
deviations for these two types of expectation errors. The time series correlation coefficients
between the two series are high: 0.97 for the average expectation errors and 0.84 for their
standard deviation. This means that over time the mapping strategy captures the first and
second moment of the expectation error distribution rather well. However, on average the
“true” expectation errors are much more disperse than those based on the mapping strategy.
Since the time series behavior of the cross-sectional standard deviation is very similar, we
view this as a scaling problem, resulting from the discretization of expectation errors in the
mapping strategy. As a consequence, we rescale the quantitative production change values
that REALIZi,t is mapped into by a constant.18
18This constant is calculated by dividing the time average of the cross-sectional standard deviations of
FE_BCSnarrowi,t by the corresponding value derived from the mapping procedure on the same subset of
observations. Its value is 1.7.
Chapter 3. Firms’ Expectational Biases 115
A3 Firm-Specific Average Production Expectation Errors (IFO-
BCS)
Figure A3: Histograms of the Firm-Specific Average Production Expectation
Errors (IFO-BCS)
-0.2 -0.15 -0.1 -0.05 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
0
50
100
150
200
250
AFE_BCS
i
narrow
Obs.       =    695
Mean       =  -0.0064
Std. Dev. =   0.0161
N
um
be
r o
f F
irm
s
-0.2 -0.15 -0.1 -0.05 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
0
50
100
150
200
250
AFE_BCS
i
broad
Obs.       =    3,859
Mean       =  -0.0265
Std. Dev. =   0.0316
N
um
be
r o
f F
irm
s
Notes: This figure shows the histograms of the distributions of the firm-specific means of FE_BCSnarrowi,t
and FE_BCSbroadi,t .
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A4 Firm-Specific Average Investment Expectation Errors (IFO-
IS)
Figure A4: Histograms of the Firm-Specific Average Investment Expectation
Errors (IFO-IS)
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Notes: This figure shows the histograms of the distributions of the firm-specific means of FE_ISlongi,t ,
FE_ISmedi,t and FE_ISshorti,t .
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A5 Transition Paths for the Case of FEnarrowi,t
Figure A5: Transition Paths for the Case of FEnarrowi,t
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Notes: This figure shows the transition paths of selected variables for the case of FEnarrowi,t . These dynamic
responses are expressed as percentage deviations from the steady state of the hypothetical economy.
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A6 Robustness Checks - Calibration
Table A2: Calibration Robustness Checks
Parameter Parameter Parameter Parameter Expectational S.E.
Transition Transition Transition Technology Bias AR(1)- of
Matrix Matrix Matrix State Parameter coefficient Regress.
ρ1 ρ2 ρ3 ε φ
Baseline Results
FEnarrowi,t 0.8626 0.1374 0.2072 0.0975 0.1122 0.8626 0.0428
FEbroadi,t 0.8479 0.1521 0.2675 0.1979 0.1073 0.8477 0.0926
Robustness Check - 10th and 90th Percentile
FEnarrowi,t 0.8626 0.1374 0.2072 0.0771 0.2071 0.8630 0.0338
FEbroadi,t 0.8479 0.1521 0.2675 0.2073 0.1370 0.8477 0.0970
Robustness Check - 25th and 75th Percentile
FEnarrowi,t 0.8626 0.1374 0.2072 0.0630 0.2071 0.8627 0.0276
FEbroadi,t 0.8479 0.1521 0.2675 0.1988 0.0867 0.8477 0.0930
Robustness Check - Quantitative Production Changes: Sign(∆logui,t)
FEnarrowi,t 0.8506 0.1404 0.2980 0.0830 0.1455 0.8411 0.0404
FEbroadi,t 0.8013 0.1987 0.3987 0.1544 0.1790 0.8008 0.0827
Robustness Check - At Least 16 Observations
FEnarrowi,t 0.8536 0.1463 0.2437 0.1202 0.1794 0.8607 0.0545
FEbroadi,t 0.8476 0.1524 0.2762 0.2037 0.1088 0.8498 0.0912
Robustness Check - Including Inconsistent Statements
FEnarrowi,t 0.8606 0.1394 0.2300 0.1223 0.2299 0.8533 0.0550
FEbroadi,t 0.8496 0.1504 0.2647 0.1959 0.1122 0.8477 0.0957
Notes: This table provides the calibrated values of ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, ε and φ for the robustness checks. The next
to last column displays the average of the estimated 100 AR(1)-coefficients for the simulated Markov chains
resulting from these parameter choices. The last column shows the average of the standard errors of these
regressions. Each Markov chain is simulated over 20,000 observations.
Chapter 4
Heterogeneous Expectation Errors of
Firms:
Evidence From The IFO Business
Climate Survey
Abstract
Are firms’ expectations rational? I use micro data from the IFO Business Climate Survey on
firms’ production expectations and compare them to realization data from the same survey.
I construct a unique quarterly panel data set of firms’ quantitative expectation errors for a
time horizon of 30 years. In a conservative estimate of expectation errors, I find that about
two-thirds of the firms in my sample have rational expectations, i.e. their expectations are
unbiased and the firms use all available information efficiently. When the expectation error
estimate is defined less conservatively, this number reduces substantially to 33.2 percent.
Thus, there is evidence that heterogeneous firms form their expectations in heterogeneous
ways, i.e. firms differ in regard to their beliefs and in their ability to process information.
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4.1 Introduction
Are firms’ expectations rational? This is an important question since expectation formation
plays a crucial role in macroeconomic models. Recent theoretical literature is critical of
the traditional rational expectation assumption. In this paper, I answer this question by
exploiting unique micro data from the IFO Business Climate Survey (IFO-BCS).
Ever since the seminal works of Muth (1961) and Lucas (1976) almost all business cy-
cle research has been conducted under the rational expectations assumption (see e.g. Gali,
2008). One key feature of the rational expectations hypothesis is that economic agents are
able to acquire and process all available information in a model-consistent way. Recently,
macroeconomic models using the rational expectations assumption have been questioned as
they fail to produce the sluggish adjustment behavior of macroeconomic variables such as
inflation and output that is usually found in empirical data. To incorporate sluggish adjust-
ment behavior, many studies (see e.g. Christiano et al., 2005, and Smets and Wouters, 2007)
rely on special kinds of adjustment costs and price indexation rules. These model assump-
tions, however, often lack proper microfoundations. Sims (2003) proposes an alternative way
of solving this problem. He shows that models can produce sluggish adjustment behavior if
they drop the traditional rational expectations assumption. The observed heterogeneity in
firms’ and households’ expectations with respect to aggregate variables such as inflation also
weakens the rational expectations assumption. Weale and Pesaran (2006) point out that
expectation heterogeneity arises due to differences in subjective probability densities (belief
disparity) and differences in individual-specific information sets (information disparity).
Concerning belief disparity, Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) show that it can be opti-
mal for an economic agent to bias his expectations concerning future outcomes upward to
increase expected life time utility. On the empirical side, Müller (2010), using quantitative
expectations about plants’ sales and employment development from the annual IAB Estab-
lishment Panel in Germany, and Bachmann and Elstner (2011), exploiting the IFO Business
Climate Survey and IFO Investment Survey, show that a sizeable proportion of firms can be
classified as either optimists or pessimists.1
There are two streams of literature relevant to the topic of information disparity: the first
points out that even though economic agents are able to efficiently acquire and process all
available information, they do not continuously update their information sets. Mankiw and
Reis (2002) analyze the implications for inflation of this sticky information approach. Reis
(2006) provides a model in which it is suboptimal for a single firm to acquire and process all
1There is an accounting literature (e.g. McDonald, 1973, Firth and Smith, 1992, Brown et al., 2000),
finding that managers tend to bias their public earnings and dividend forecasts upward, presumably as a
strategy to attract investors.
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available information due to information costs.2 Consequently, firms update their informa-
tion sets only at intervals. Cai (2010) shows that large firms update their information sets
more quickly than do smaller firms, with the consequence that macroeconomic shocks are
transmitted with more persistence throughout the economy. The second body of literature
dealing with information disparity (see e.g. Veldkamp and Wolfers, 2007) points out that
each individual information set consists of public and private information. Economic agents
do not acquire all information as they entail a cost. The main difference compared to the
sticky information approach is that people are able to continuously update their informa-
tion sets but they do not gather all information. Specifically, firms and households decide
whether public or private information is more beneficial to them.3
This study is motivated by the idea that firms may differ with respect to their beliefs
and their ability to process information. I am specifically interested in three things: first, I
want to discover whether firms have biased expectations (distorted beliefs) and, if so, if there
are certain characteristics specific to these firms. Second, I am interested in the proportion
of firms that omit private information from their expectation formation processes. Third, I
aim to provide an estimate of the fraction of firms that have “truly” rational expectations.
In pursuing answers to these questions, it is crucial to analyze individual response data.
One advantage of business surveys is that they ask firms directly about their expecta-
tions. However, empirical literature on firms’ expectation formation at the micro level is
scarce: Anderson et al. (1954) conduct a very early study on qualitative expectation errors
using the first few installments of the IFO Business Climate Survey. König et al. (1981)
test a number of different models of expectation formation and also use models that jointly
determine production and price expectations. Nerlove (1983) uses German (from IFO) and
French data to analyze firms’ expectations about idiosyncratic firm variables (such as prices,
demand, etc.). Flaig and Zimmermann (1983) provide evidence that the production expec-
tations of firms do not capture all available information. Zimmermann and Kawasaki (1986),
using IFO price expectation and realization data, test whether firms are rational about how
the market prices of their own commodities will develop. Zimmermann (1986) employs log-
linear probability models to test the rationality of German survey expectations. All these
studies have in common that they reject the strict rational expectations assumption.4
2According to Reis (2006) these costs include payments to outside consultants and/or the effort expended
in supervising the production and monitoring of sales figures.
3Veldkamp and Wolfers (2007) provide a model in which most firms prefer public information since it
is cheaper. Therefore, it can be rational for these firms not to include idiosyncratic information in their
expectation formation process. Heid and Larch (2011) stress the importance of social linkages across firms
in the expectation formation process.
4There are, of course, studies that use other survey data. A survey can be found in Weale and Pesaran
(2006).
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The chief reason for such slow progress of research into firms’ expectation formation has
to do with the qualitative nature of survey data.5 Typically, firms report qualitative an-
swers by choosing one of the following: “we expect our production to increase, decrease,
stay the same over the next three months.” While useful, in that more firms are inclined to
participate in a survey when the information demands are low, qualitative information has
limits, particularly when forecasting errors need to be aggregated over time in order to mea-
sure the long-run average forecasting errors of firms and possible biases therein. How does
one aggregate a qualitative forecasting error of +1 (up) today and −1 (down) tomorrow?6
Therefore, many studies rely on aggregate survey responses (for business survey data see e.g.
Tompkinson and Common, 1983; for consumer survey data see e.g. Bovi, 2009). However,
as highlighted by Souleles (2004) and Zimmermann and Kawasaki (1986), such an analysis
can be misleading due to aggregation problems and because different economic agents have
different information sets.
I overcome this problem in my analysis by using micro data from the manufacturing
part of the IFO-BCS from 1980 onward. I then combine the qualitative three-month ahead
production outlook from the monthly survey with the quantitative change in percentage ca-
pacity utilization as proposed by Bachmann and Elstner (2011). This procedure allows me to
construct a panel of quarterly production expectation errors for a 30-year period. With this
panel data set I can analyze firm histories of expectation errors, which is a unique advantage
compared to previous studies and investigations based on consumer confidence surveys (e.g.
Souleles, 2004).
To analyze distorted belief in firms’ expectations, I compute long-run averages of expec-
tation errors for those firms that have at least eight years of observations. I find that 25
percent of firms consistently overpredict their one-quarter ahead upcoming production by
at least 1.2 percent in a conservative estimate or by at least 4.2 percent in an upper bound
estimate. To investigate whether these firms really have a bias in their expectations, I test
for each firm whether its average expectation error is significantly different from zero. In
my conservative estimate only 1 percent of all firms have distorted beliefs which is good
news for the rational expectations hypothesis. However, extending the analysis to a broader
measure of quantitative expectation errors reveals that more than 18 percent of firms have
distorted beliefs. To see whether firms efficiently exploit their information sets I check for
5There also are quantitative business surveys. For example, de Leeuw and McKelvey (1981, 1984) use
a BEA survey of business expenditures on plant and equipment in the United States to study quantitative
annual expectation data about aggregate prices and find that firms do not have rational expectations.
6This is a problem, even when qualitative expectation data predict quantitative ex-post data rather well,
which is what Lui et al. (2008) find, using survey data from the ’Confederacy of British Industry’ business
survey and ex-post administrative data.
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correlation between their firm-specific expectation errors and their information sets. These
computations show that a considerable proportion of firms do not process their information
sets efficiently. In my conservative estimate of expectation errors about two-thirds of the
firms in my sample have rational expectations, i.e. their expectations are unbiased and the
firms use all available information efficiently. When the expectation error estimate is defined
less conservatively, this number reduces substantially to 33.2 percent. Thus, there is evidence
that heterogeneous firms form their expectations in heterogeneous ways.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the IFO-
BCS and the construction of the production expectation errors from it. Note that Section
4.2 is based on Bachmann and Elstner (2011). Readers already familiar with that work
will lose nothing by skipping this section and proceeding directly to Section 4.3. Section
4.3 deals with the business cycle properties of my production expectation errors. Section
4.4 describes the empirical analysis at the firm level. Section 4.5 sets out and discusses the
results. Section 4.6 provides a series of robustness checks. Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Evidence from the IFO Business Climate Survey
4.2.1 The IFO Business Climate Survey
The IFO Business Climate index is a much-followed leading indicator for economic activity in
Germany. It is based on a firm survey which has been conducted since 1949 and, therefore, is
one of the oldest and broadest monthly business confidence surveys available (see Becker and
Wohlrabe, 2008, for details). Due to longitudinal consistency problems in other sectors and
the availability of micro data in a processable form I limit my analysis to the manufacturing
sector from 1980 until the present. From 1991 on, the sample includes East–German firms.
One of the IFO-BCS’s main advantages is the high number of survey participants. The
average number of respondents at the beginning of my sample is approximately 5,000; to-
wards the end it is about 2,500.7 Participation in the survey is voluntary and confidential.
Thus, there is little incentive for firms to provide overoptimistic forecasts as a signal to
investors. There is some fraction of firms that are only one time participants. However,
conditional on staying two months in the survey, most firms continue on and this allows
me to construct an unbalanced panel data set of expectation errors. For my narrow, very
conservative definition of expectation errors the final baseline panel consists of 695 firms
with at least 32 quarterly observations each; for a broader definition I follow 3,859 firms for
again 8 years at least.
7The IFO-BCS is a survey at the product level, so that these numbers do not exactly correspond to firms.
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4.2.2 Construction of Quantitative Production Expectation Er-
rors
To construct firms’ quantitative production expectation errors I would ideally need the fol-
lowing quantitative information about production expectations and realizations: “By how
much do you expect your production to grow over the next quarter? By how much did
your production grow in the preceding quarter?” To the best of my knowledge there is no
firm survey that asks these questions for a long time horizon and repeatedly at underyearly
frequencies. However, the quantitative quarterly supplement of the IFO survey allows me
to construct - under certain assumptions - quantitative production expectations and quan-
titative production realizations. I am thus able to construct a panel of quarterly production
expectation errors for the last thirty years.
Specifically, I use the following supplementary question about capacity utilization to
compute production changes:8
Q 1 “Supplementary Question: The utilisation of our production equipment for producing
XY (customary full utilization = 100) currently amounts to..%.”
more than 100 %
30 40 50 60 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 namely
I start from the following production relationship of an individual firm i:
yacti,t = ui,ty
pot
i,t , (4.1)
where yacti,t denotes the firm’s actual output, y
pot
i,t its potential output level and ui,t the level
of capacity utilization. Only ui,t is directly observable in the IFO-BCS. Taking the natural
logarithm and the three-month difference, I get:9
∆logyacti,t = ∆logui,t + ∆logy
pot
i,t . (4.2)
Under the assumption that potential output remains constant, ∆logypoti,t = 0, percentage
changes in actual output can be recovered from percentage changes in capacity utilization.
8Here I provide a translation, for the German original see Appendix A1.
9Time intervals are months. For me to construct an expectation error in t, I need an observation for
capacity utilization in t and t− 3.
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To implement this idea I restrict the analysis to firms of which I can reasonably expect that
they did not change their production capacity in the preceding quarter, making use of the
following two questions in the IFO-BCS:
Q 2 “Expectations for the next three months: Employment related to the production of XY
in domestic production unit(s) will probably increase, roughly stay the same, decrease.”
Q 3 “Supplementary Question: We evaluate our technical production capacity with reference
to the backlog of orders on books and to orders expected in the next twelve months as more
than sufficient, sufficient, insufficient.”
Given hiring frictions in the labor market I view a firm’s expectation, stated in t− 3,
that its employment level will remain the same in the next three months as highly indicative
that its productive capacity did not change between t− 3 and t. Similarly, given capital
adjustment frictions a firm’s statement, again in t− 3, that its technical production capacity
is sufficient for the future incoming orders suggests that this firm has no reason to change
its production capacity in the near future. To be conservative I require a firm satisfy both
criteria in t− 3 for me to assume that its production capacity has not changed between t− 3
and t. In this case, I use the quarterly percentage change in capacity utilization in t as a
proxy for the quarterly percentage change in production in t. The existence of non-convex
or kinked adjustment costs for capital and labor adjustment as well as time to build (see
Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992, as well as Doms and Dunne, 1998) make this a reasonable
assumption.
To derive production expectation errors I also need information on firms’ production ex-
pectations. This allows me to compute production surprises out of mere production changes.
In the IFO-BCS firms report only qualitative production expectations:
Q 4 “Expectations for the next three months: Our domestic production activities with respect
to product XY will (without taking into account differences in the length of months or seasonal
fluctuations) increase, roughly stay the same, decrease.”
Qualitative expectations have a built-in asymmetry in the sense that the middle category
also constitutes a quantitative expectation, zero change, whereas the increase and decrease
category conveys no quantitative information. I therefore proceed in two steps. First, I
consider only firms whose answer to Q4 is that their production level, yacti,t , will not change
in the next three months. Under the assumption that ypoti,t remains constant over this time
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period, all ∆logui,t are automatically expectation errors. In a second step I extend my
analysis to arbitrary qualitative production expectations. This will give me a broader picture
of expectation errors, albeit with the added cost of more assumptions.
I also clean my sample from firm-quarter observations with extreme capacity utilization
outliers, i.e. those that exceed 150%, and from firm-quarter observations with inconsistent
statements. To determine the latter I consider the following monthly qualitative IFO-BCS
question concerning actual production changes in the months t, t− 1, t− 2:
Q 5 “Trends in the last month: Our domestic production activities with respect to prod-
uct XY have (without taking into account differences in the length of months or seasonal
fluctuations) increased, roughly stayed the same, decreased.”
I drop all observations as inconsistent in which firms report a strictly positive (negative)
change in ∆logui,t and no positive (negative) change in Q5 in the last 3 months. For firms
that report ∆logui,t = 0, I proceed as follows: Unless firms in Q5 either answer three times
in a row that production did not change, or they have at least one “Increase” and one
“Decrease” in their three answers, I drop them as inconsistent.
4.2.2.1 Quantitative Expectation Errors under Constant Production Expecta-
tions
If the production capacity can be assumed not to have changed in the preceding quarter, and
if no change in production was expected three months prior, a change in capacity utilization,
∆logui,t, is also a production expectation error of firm i in month t. I first restrict my analysis
to the subset of firm-quarter observations that satisfy these assumptions. For this case,
Figure 4.1 illustrates the move from capacity utilization changes to production expectation
errors.
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Figure 4.1: Link between Capacity Utilization and Production Expectation Errors
Prerequisite: Firm i passes the outlier and inconsistency test (Q1 and Q5)
Firm i has an observation for a change in capacity utilization ∆logui,t (Q1)
∆logui,t is a production change ∆logyacti,t
∆logui,t is a quantitative production expectation error
No change in potential output ∆logypoti,t
Firm i answers “Constant employment expectations” (Q2)
and “Technical production capacity is sufficient” (Q3) in t− 3
Qualitative production expectations in t− 3 are constant (Q4)
No expected production change
?
?
Notes: The time dimension t is measured in months.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the exact timing of the questions in the Ifo-BCS that I use to
compute production expectation errors. As a first pass I consider only firms which state in
period t− 3 that their production level, employment level and technical production capacity
will remain the same in the next three months. Then I compute ∆logui,t three months later
in t. These ∆logui,t constitute my narrow definition of production expectation errors. I
denote them by FE_BCSnarrowi,t .
Figure 4.2: Derivation of Production Expectation Errors under Constant Production Expec-
tations - Timing
Prerequisite: Firm i passes the outlier and inconsistency test (Q1 and Q5)
∆logui,t =FE_BCSnarrowi,t
-
Time (in months)t− 3 t
ui,t−3 ui,t
Firm i states in period t− 3:
Constant employment expectations (Q2)
Sufficient technical capacity (Q3)
Constant production expectations (Q4)
-
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4.2.2.2 Quantitative Expectation Errors under General Production Expecta-
tions
The derivation of quantitative production expectation errors for firms with increasing or
decreasing qualitative production expectations in Q4 requires additional assumptions. I
take the following three steps. First, I define qualitative indices of production changes and
expectations errors using questions Q4 and Q5. Then, changes in capacity utilization are
mapped into qualitative production changes. In a final step, I convert these quantitative
production changes into quantitative production expectation errors. The expectation errors
for firms with constant production expectations remain the same as in the previous section.
I begin by defining the following firm-specific activity variable REALIZi,t as the sum of
the Increase-instances minus the sum of the Decrease-instances in question Q5 over the last
three months going backward from t. REALIZi,t can have seven possible values that live in
the interval [-3,3]. A qualitative production expectation error is then computed as follows:
Table 4.1: Possible Qualitative Expectation Errors
Experrori,t
Expected Increaset−3 REALIZi,t>0 0
Expected Increaset−3 REALIZi,t ≤ 0 (REALIZi,t − 1)
Expected Unchangedt−3 REALIZi,t>0 REALIZi,t
Expected Unchangedt−3 REALIZi,t = 0 0
Expected Unchangedt−3 REALIZi,t<0 REALIZi,t
Expected Decreaset−3 REALIZi,t<0 0
Expected Decreaset−3 REALIZi,t ≥ 0 (REALIZi,t + 1)
Notes: Rows refer to the qualitative expectations in month t− 3 (Q4).
Experrori,t ranges from [−4,4], where, for instance, −4 indicates a really negative fore-
cast error: the company expected production to increase over the next three months, yet
every single subsequent month production actually declined.
Next I compute for all firms with a given value of REALIZi,t in time t the average
∆logui,t, i.e. the cross-sectional average change in capacity utilization. Again, to ensure that
I can treat utilization changes as production changes only those firms are considered that
state three months before that their future employment levels remain the same and that their
technical production capacities are sufficient. I compute this mapping between REALIZi,t
and average production changes for each point in time.10 Figure 4.3 illustrates the timing of
survey questions that are used to compute this mapping. Figure A1 in Appendix A2 depicts
10I also considered a firm size specific and an industry specific mapping, without much changes to my
results.
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the results. For instance, it shows that firms with REALIZi,t = 1 in the first quarter of
1980 maps into an average change in production of approximately 5 percent.
Figure 4.3: Mapping between Qualitative and Quantitative Production Changes
Prerequisite: Firm i passes the outlier and inconsistency test (Q1 and Q5)
REALIZi,t = j −→ 1N
N∑
i=1
(∆logui,t|REALIZi,t = j), where j =−3, ...,3
-
Time (in Months)t− 3 t
ui,t−3 ui,t
Firm i states in period t− 3:
Constant employment
expectations (Q2) and sufficient
technical production capacity (Q3)
Firm i states in the periods t− 2,
t− 1 and t its production change (Q4),
i.e. REALIZi,t
-
I subject this mapping to a couple of plausibility tests.11 For firms with constant pro-
duction expectations I have a simple plausibility test for my procedure. Suppose I know
with FE_BCSnarrowi,t the “true” forecast errors under constant production expectations. I
can also use the mapping strategy for the firms with constant qualitative production ex-
pectations, in which case the average percentage change in capacity utilization for a given
REALIZi,t would be another estimate for their production expectation error. I can then
compare the “true” forecast errors with the forecast errors determined in the mapping pro-
cedure.
I do this by computing a quarterly time series of the cross-sectional means and standard
deviations for these two types of expectation errors. The time series correlation coefficients
between the two series are high: 0.97 for the average expectation errors and 0.84 for their
standard deviation. This means that over time the mapping strategy captures the first and
second moment of the expectation error distribution rather well. However, on average the
“true” expectation errors are much more disperse than those based on the mapping strategy.
Since the time series behavior of the cross-sectional standard deviation is very similar, I
view this as a scaling problem, resulting from the discretization of expectation errors in the
mapping strategy. As a consequence, I rescale the quantitative production change values
that REALIZi,t is mapped into by a constant.12
11The pooled Spearman correlation coefficient between REALIZi,t and ∆logui,t for firms with constant
employment and technical capacity expectations is 0.72. The pooled Kendall’s tau between sign(REALIZi,t)
and sign(∆logui,t) is 0.67.
12This constant is calculated by dividing the time average of the cross-sectional standard deviations of
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In the last step the qualitative production expectation errors are converted into quan-
titative production expectation errors. This is simply done by assigning to each value of
Experrori,t the quantitative equivalent of REALIZi,t. The extreme cases of Experrori,t,
+4 and -4, are added by extrapolation.13 I denote my final measure of the quantitative
production expectation errors under general production expectations by FE_BCSbroadi,t .
4.3 Business Cycle Properties of Expectation Errors
To discover whether firms’ expectations are biased and to lend support to my measures of
quantitative expectation production errors, it will be useful to consider the business cycle
properties of FE_BCSnarrowi,t and FE_BCSbroadi,t . To this end, I compute quarterly time
series of the cross-sectional means and standard deviations for both measures and compare
them with the quarter-on-quarter percent changes in manufacturing production.
The upper two panels of Figure 4.4 show the quarterly cross-sectional means of FE_BCSnarrowi,t
and FE_BCSnarrowi,t together with the quarter-on-quarter percent changes in manufac-
turing production. The lower panels show the quarterly cross-sectional standard devia-
tions.14 At first glance, the cross-sectional means of FE_BCSnarrowi,t and FE_BCSbroadi,t
seem strongly procyclical. The very high contemporaneous correlation coefficients between
these expectation error time series and manufacturing production, which are shown in Ta-
ble 4.2, provide further evidence of strong comovement. However, the cross-sectional means
of FE_BCSnarrowi,t and FE_BCSbroadi,t are, on average, negative. This suggests that a large
proportion of firms tends toward too optimistic and, therefore, biased expectations, i.e. they
have negative expectation errors. To prove this conjecture, I perform two tests that are
outlined in Souleles (2004).
First, I test whether FE_BCSnarrowi,t and FE_BCSbroadi,t have significant time effects,
which is easily accomplished by regressing both expectation error time series on year dum-
mies. If firms are too optimistic, the time effects should be mostly negative and signifi-
cantly different from zero.15 Figure 4.5 depicts the point estimates together with the 95
percent confidence intervals. To construct the latter, I use robust standard errors that are
adjusted for cross-correlations of the expectation errors within a quarter. F tests for both
FE_BCSnarrowi,t by the corresponding value derived from the mapping procedure on the same subset of
observations. Its value is 1.7.
13The extrapolation procedure tries to capture the change in the differences of the quantitative equivalents
of REALIZi,t. It concerns only 860 of the 319,172 one-quarter-ahead production expectation errors. That
corresponds to 0.27 % of all observations. Neglecting these extreme values in our upcoming quantitative
analysis would not alter our results.
14All time series are seasonally adjusted using the Census X-12-ARIMA seasonal adjustment method.
15I obtain similar results for quarterly time dummies.
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FE_BCSnarrowi,t and FE_BCSbroadi,t suggest that significant time effects are present. Figure
4.5 also shows that these time effects have been significantly negative for almost all years.
Even during boom periods such as 2006 and 2007, a great many firms tend to overestimate
their upcoming production.
In the second test, I determine the mean µ of FE_BCSnarrowi,t and FE_BCSbroadi,t ,
respectively, by regressing all their observations on a constant. For both cases, I obtain
significant negative estimates, further confirming the initial conjecture that a large propor-
tion of firms tends towards too optimistic expectations. However, as highlighted by Souleles
(2004) and Zimmermann and Kawasaki (1986), the analysis at the macro level can be mis-
leading due to aggregation problems and because different economic agents have different
information sets. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the expectation errors directly at the
firm level in order to detect expectational biases.
As additional support for my quantitative production expectation errors I present results
for the cross-sectional standard deviations of FE_BCSnarrowi,t and FE_BCSbroadi,t . These
time series are countercyclical and have a lag of roughly two quarters. These negative cor-
relations are in line with the uncertainty literature (see e.g. Bachmann and Bayer, 2010,
Bloom, 2009, and Bloom et al., 2010). This result makes me confident that the proxies I use
for qualitative production errors are appropriate. In a next step, I shed more light on the
expectational biases of firms by analyzing firm-specific expectation errors at the firm level.
Table 4.2: Cyclical Properties of FE_BCSnarrowi,t and FE_BCSbroadi,t
Variable Manufacturing production in t
in t+ j -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Cross-sectional Leading Property of Lagging Property of
means of: Variable Variable
FE_BCSnarrowi,t+j -0.12 -0.02 0.10 0.48 0.74 0.53 0.35 0.14 -0.11
FE_BCSbroadi,t+j -0.08 0.17 0.30 0.42 0.61 0.38 0.12 -0.03 -0.14
Cross-sectional
standard deviations of:
FE_BCSnarrowi,t+j 0.25 0.27 0.12 -0.04 -0.22 -0.32 -0.37 -0.31 -0.24
FE_BCSbroadi,t+j 0.23 0.32 0.13 0.00 -0.08 -0.25 -0.39 -0.38 -0.25
Notes: This table provides the unconditional correlations between the quarter-on-quarter percent changes in
manufacturing production in period t and a variable in period t+ j. All time series are seasonally adjusted.
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Figure 4.4: Comparison of FE_BCSnarrowi,t and FE_BCSbroadi,t with Manufacturing Pro-
duction
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Notes: The upper panels show the quarterly cross-sectional means of FE_BCSnarrowi,t and FE_BCSbroadi,t
together with quarter-on-quarter percent changes in manufacturing production from the German Federal Sta-
tistical Agency. The lower panels show the quarterly cross-sectional standard deviations of FE_BCSnarrowi,t
and FE_BCSbroadi,t (left scale) together with the quarter-on-quarter percent changes in manufacturing pro-
duction (right scale). All time series are seasonally adjusted.
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Figure 4.5: Biasedness of FE_BCSnarrowi,t and FE_BCSbroadi,t on the Macro Level
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Notes: The upper panel shows the annual time effects of FE_BCSbroadi,t . The lower panel does the same for
FE_BCSnarrowi,t . The results are derived by a linear regression of either FE_BCSnarrowi,t or FE_BCSbroadi,t
on year dummies (no constant included in the regression). The solid lines represent the point estimates of
the year dummies and the dashed lines depict 95 percent confidence intervals. To test the joint significance of
the year dummies, an F test is employed. For each category of expectation error I determine the mean µ by
regressing respectively all observations on a constant (standard error of the point estimate in parentheses). I
use robust standard errors that are adjusted for cross-correlations of the expectation errors within a quarter.
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4.4 Firm-Level Heterogeneity in Expectation Errors
4.4.1 Statistics at the Firm-Level
In this section I provide summary statistics concerning the average firm-specific production
expectation errors. I restrict my sample to firms that have at least 32 observations or
eight years of expectation errors: FE_BCSnarrowi,t or FE_BCSbroadi,t . The average firm-
specific expectation errors are denoted by AFE_BCSnarrowi and AFE_BCSbroadi . Table
4.3 displays the distributions of firms’ average expectation errors; Figure 4.6 provides a
graphical illustration. Note that positive values of AFE_BCSnarrowi or AFE_BCSbroadi
indicate that a firm was on average too pessimistic in the sense that its predicted production
changes were on average lower than its actual production changes. The cross-sectional means
are based on numbers different from those reported in Figure 4.5, since there I computed the
average of all firms with expectation errors, not just for those with at least 32 observations.
Especially in the case of AFE_BCSbroadi the distribution is skewed toward negative values.
This observation is supported by the fact that at least 25 percent of all firms have long-run
averages of expectation errors that are too optimistic by 4 percent or more.
Table 4.3: Firm-Specific Average Production Expectation Errors (IFO-BCS)
Statistics AFE_BCSnarrowi AFE_BCSbroadi
Obs 695 3859
Mean -0.0064 -0.0265
Std.Dev. 0.0161 0.0316
Percentiles
5th -0.0339 -0.0859
10th -0.0242 -0.0672
25th -0.0119 -0.0418
50th -0.0030 -0.0212
75th 0.0013 -0.0060
90th 0.0068 0.0063
95th 0.0119 0.0140
Notes: This table provides a summary of the distributions of AFE_BCSnarrowi and AFE_BCSbroadi .
Chapter 4. Heterogeneous Expectation Errors 135
Figure 4.6: Firm-Specific Average Production Expectation Errors (IFO-BCS)
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Notes: This figure displays the distributions of AFE_BCSnarrowi and AFE_BCSbroadi .
4.4.2 Unbiasedness and Efficiency of Firms’ Expectations
According to Muth (1961) firms have rational expectations if their expectations are unbiased
and they use all available information efficiently. Firms’ expectations are unbiased if their
subjective probabilities with respect to future economic states are not distorted. This im-
plies that their long-run average expectation errors are not significantly different from zero.
However, even if a firm passes the test for unbiased expectations, it does not mean that this
firm has rational expectations; efficient information processing is also necessary. Efficiency
means that there is no correlation between firm-specific expectation errors and the firm’s
information set. In the following, I conduct three distinct tests to check for unbiasedness
and efficiency of firms’ expectations.
Other work follows the classical approach of Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969) to test for
unbiased expectations, using the following regression equation:
xt = b0 + b1x
e
t + ut,
where xt denotes the realized value of some variable, say, firm production in month t, and
xet denotes the expected value of this variable, say, expected firm production for month t.
In this setup, expectations are assumed to be unbiased, if the intercept coefficient b0 is zero
and the slope coefficient b1 is one.
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Due to a lack of quantitative expectation data, I use a different, but very similar, ap-
proach in testing for biased expectations: for each firm I determine AFE_BCSnarrowi,t and
AFE_BCSbroadi,t , respectively, by regressing all its observations of FE_BCSnarrowi,t and
FE_BCSbroadi,t on a constant. Then I use a two-sided t test to assess whether the firm-
specific average expectation error is significantly different from zero. If this is the case, I
conclude that this firm has distorted beliefs. For statistical reasons, the level of significance
is defined to be 1 percent. Under the assumption that all firms can be treated independently
from each other and in a world with perfect rational expectations, the test would wrongly
find that 1 percent of all firms have biased expectations. I want to ensure that my results
are not susceptible to this error.
The test is carried out on the restricted samples of FE_BCSnarrowi,t or FE_BCSbroadi,t ,
i.e. I consider only those firms with at least 32 observations of the respective category of
expectation error. The upper panel of Table 4.4 displays the results. For FE_BCSnarrowi,t ,
I identify distorted beliefs for only 9 out of 695 firms. This corresponds to 1.3 percent of
all firms and provides very little evidence of distorted beliefs at the firm level. This pic-
ture, however, changes dramatically when looking at the results of the broader measure
FE_BCSbroadi,t . In this case, the number of firms with biased expectations is considerably
larger and almost 20 percent of all considered firms have distorted beliefs.
Table 4.4: Firms with Rational Expectations - Results
Category of Expectation Error:
FEnarrowi,t FE
broad
i,t
Number Proportion Number Proportion
of Firms of Firms of Firms of Firms
Test of Unbiasedness
Unbiased expectations 686 98.7% 3,137 81.3%
Biased expectations 9 1.3% 722 18.7%
Tests of Efficiency
(1) Autocorrelation in Expectation Errors
No autocorrelation 650 93.5% 3,609 93.5%
Autocorrelation 45 6.5% 250 6.5%
(2) Correlation of Expectation Errors with Available Information Set
No correlation 505 72.7% 1,474 38.2%
Correlation 190 27.3% 2,385 61.8%
Firms with Rational Expectations
Rational expectations 475 68.3% 1,282 33.2%
No rational expectations 220 31.7% 2,577 66.8%
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Next, I use two tests to check for efficiency. The goal of the first is to discover whether the
expectation errors of a single firm are uncorrelated over time. I thus estimate autoregressive
time series models for FE_BCSnarrowi,t and FE_BCSbroadi,t , respectively, with two lags for
each firm. The decision to use a lag length of two is due to incomplete firm histories of
expectation errors. Especially in the case of FE_BCSnarrowi,t the number of observations
decreases dramatically the higher the number of lags. I use an F test to find out whether
the expectation errors of a single firm are autocorrelated.
The second test analyzes for each firm whether its expectation errors are uncorrelated
with its available information set at the time of its expectation report. I use the answers
to four survey questions to capture firm-specific information sets. The first two questions
concern expected production (Q4) and actual production compared to the last month (Q5).
Furthermore, answers to the following two questions are used to control for information
regarding the firm’s business situation:
Q 6 “Expectations for the next six months: Our business situation with respect to XY will
in a cyclical view: improve, remain about the same, develop unfavourably.”
Q 7 “Current situation: We evaluate our business situation with respect to product XY as:
good, satisfactory, unsatisfactory.”
The answers to all four questions are qualitative and have three possible outcomes. While
the answer categories are ordered, I split each of them into two dummy variables, which is
a standard procedure. I run regressions with FE_BCSnarrowi,t and FE_BCSbroadi,t , respec-
tively, as the dependent variable. The set of independent variables consists of a constant
and the firm’s answers to the four questions at the time of its expectation report. Again,
I use an F test to decide whether the explanatory variables are jointly significant. If this
is the case, I conclude that the firm does not process its available information efficiently. I
again impose a significance level of 1 percent.
The middle panel of Table 4.4 shows the test results. For both categories of expectation
errors, the proportion of firms that feature autocorrelated expectation errors is 6.5 percent.
Thus, it can be concluded that the majority of firms exploit their information efficiently.
However, the same conclusion cannot be made when looking at the results of the second
test. In the case of FE_BCSbroadi,t more than 60 percent of all firms show a significant cor-
relation between their expectation errors and their information sets. Thus, many firms do
not form expectations in an efficient and, therefore, rational way. This result is supported
by the figures in the last panel of Table 4.4, which show the proportions of firms that have
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rational expectations. I define firm expectations as strictly rational if they pass the tests for
unbiasedness and efficiency. I observe that in the case of FE_BCSnarrowi,t about two-thirds
of the firms in my sample have rational expectations. However, in the case of FE_BCSbroadi,t
this number decreases substantially to 31.7 percent. Thus, there is evidence that heteroge-
neous firms form their expectations in heterogeneous ways, i.e. firms differ with respect to
their beliefs and their ability to process information.
4.5 Systematic Relationships in Expectation Errors
4.5.1 Model Specifications
The aim of this section is to discover whether there are systematic relationships between
firm-specific characteristics and distorted beliefs or non-rationality of firms. The following
estimations are agnostic and provide stylized facts, e.g. whether smaller firms are more likely
to have distorted beliefs.
I first analyze the relationship between firm-specific characteristics and distorted beliefs.
In the first model specification, the independent variable yi denotes a dummy variable that
assigns to a single firm i the value +1 if it has no distorted beliefs and 0 otherwise. yi
is constructed for both FE_BCSnarrowi,t and FE_BCSbroadi,t . I assume that y∗i is a latent
quantitative variable that relates to the corresponding qualitative variable yi and takes the
following form:
y∗i =β0 + β1DEXPORTi + β2DSIZEi + β3DINDi + β4DSTATEi + ui, (4.1)
where DSTATEi defines a set of federal state dummies, DSIZEi denotes firm size dum-
mies, DINDi summarizes a set of dummies defining the sectoral classification of the single
firm and DEXPORTi is a dummy variable that takes the value of +1 for an exporting
firm; 0 otherwise.16 Concerning firm size, I know whether the number of employees in firm
production is less than 50, between 50 and 199, between 200 and 499, between 500 and
999, or equal to or more than 1,000. From this, five dummy variables are constructed. The
dummy variables summarized by DINDi allocate each firm to one of the following 14 manu-
facturing subsectors: food and tobacco; textiles and textile products; leather; cork and wood
products except furniture; pulp, paper, publishing and printing; refined petroleum products;
chemicals and chemical products; rubber and plastic products; other non-metallic mineral
16I use the monthly IFO-BCS question concerning expected export trade. If a single firm has stated in
more than half its answers that it does not export, that firm receives the value 0.
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products; basic and fabricated metal products; electrical and optical equipment; transport
equipment; furniture and jewelry and machinery and equipment. The last set of dummy
variables, represented by DSTATEi, indicates the German federal state in which the firm
operates.
In the second model specification, I focus on correlations between firm-specific character-
istics and non-rationality. I define firms with rational expectations as those firms that have
passed both the test for unbiasedness and the tests for efficiency. My independent variable
is again a dummy variable that assigns to a single firm i the value +1 if it has rational
expectations and 0 otherwise. The other assumptions concerning the estimation equation
are the same as in Equation (4.1).
For both model specifications I estimate probit models with robust standard errors. “Ba-
sic and fabricated metal products", the federal state “Bavaria” and firm size of 200 to 499
employees are the reference categories for both model specifications.17
4.5.2 Results
The left-hand side of Table 4.5 provides the estimation results for the relationships between
firm-specific characteristics and distorted beliefs. For the sake of brevity I do not show the
point estimates of the federal state dummies, DSTATEi. Several explanatory dummies
are not considered in the regressions since they do not contribute to the explanation of the
dependent variable. This problem is particularly evident in the case of FE_BCSnarrowi,t ,
for which only 9 out of 695 firms feature distorted beliefs. Hence, the information content
of this regression is limited and, therefore, in the following I discuss only the results for
FE_BCSbroadi,t .
To begin with, the χ2 tests reported in the last rows of Table 4.5 indicate that the ex-
planatory variables have a joint impact on the outcome of whether a firm has distorted
beliefs. I also report separate results of joint significance for firm size, industrial sector and
federal state dummies. For each of these groups I find good evidence that they can explain
what kinds of firms are more likely to feature distorted beliefs. Even though there are signif-
icant correlations between firms’ expectational biases and firm-specific characteristics, their
total impact is rather small, as can be inferred from the very low value for the “Pseudo R2”.
Looking at the individual coefficients reveals that smaller firms are more likely to have
distorted beliefs than are larger firms. A firm with less than 50 employees has a 7 per-
cent lower probability of having no distorted beliefs than the reference firm with 200 to 499
employees.
17The use of usual robust standard errors is problematic since I face a “generated regressand” problem.
However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to employ a suitable bootstrap method to account for this
issue. Thus, inferences based on these standard errors should be viewed with caution.
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In contrast, a firm with more than 1,000 employees has a 7 percent higher probability of
having no distorted beliefs compared to the reference firm. This result reflects the idea
that larger firms put more resources into analyzing their current and upcoming business
environment than do smaller firms. Concerning industrial sectors I also find significant re-
lationships, but it is difficult to interpret them. In summary, the first model specification
provides evidence that there are significant correlations between distorted beliefs and firm-
specific characteristics. It appears that it is especially differences in firm size that explain
these correlations.
The right-hand side of Table 4.5 shows the results for the relationships between firm-
specific characteristics and non-rationality. Briefly, there are almost no significant and eco-
nomically meaningful relationships for either FE_BCSnarrowi,t or FE_BCSbroadi,t .
4.6 Robustness Checks
To this point in the analysis, I find that for FE_BCSbroadi,t a substantial proportion of firms
have distorted beliefs and for both types of expectations errors at least 30 percent of all
firms have no rational expectations. In the following I present three distinct robustness
checks. As a first check, I retain inconsistent statements in my sample. It could be argued
that these inconsistent statements indicate some form of irrationality. Thus, removal of
these observations could exert a downward bias on the proportion of irrational firms and
firms with distorted beliefs. After repeating the whole analysis I indeed find in the case of
FE_BCSnarrowi,t that the proportion of firms with irrational expectations increases. The
results are shown on the left-hand side of Table 4.6. The figures for FE_BCSbroadi,t remain
roughly the same. In total, I find for both types of expectation errors that considerably less
than half of all firms have no rational expectations.
The next robustness check concerns the number of observations that I require a firm to
have in order to compute an average production forecast error. Instead of 32 observations,
I now use a threshold of 16 observations or four years of quarterly quantitative production
errors. This gives me a larger cross section of firms, but at the cost of including more firms
with shorter histories. For this test, for FE_BCSnarrowi,t the number of firms increases from
695 to 2,194 and for FE_BCSbroadi,t I now consider 5,980 firms instead of 3,859. However,
increasing the number of firms does not affect my results. The proportions of firms with
distorted and irrational expectations remain largely unchanged.
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As a last check, I review the concept of quantitative expectation errors. It may be that this
is the wrong approach entirely and that the qualitative expectation errors defined in Table 4.1
should be used instead. Therefore, I conduct the same analysis with Experrori,t and a
new variable Experrornari,t . The latter variable is constructed for qualitative expectation
errors with initially reported constant production expectations and allows a comparison
with the results of FE_BCSnarrowi,t . Appendix A3 contains summary statistics concerning
the business cycle properties of these qualitative expectation errors. However, even for these
measures, it is evident that many firms do not form their expectations in a rational way.
Again, I find that more than half of all the firms in my sample have no rational expectations
for either Experrornari,t or Experrori,t.
4.7 Conclusion
Are firms’ expectations rational? For a large number of firms the answer is “no”. To arrive
at this conclusion, I used business survey data and provided a comprehensive analysis of the
rationality of firms’ expectations. To overcome the problem of qualitative business survey
data, I employed a supplementary question about capacity utilization to construct measures
of quantitative production expectation errors.
I show that firms’ production expectations tend to be biased both at the macro and
at the micro level. At the macro level, I find that the cross-sectional means of expectation
errors are significantly negative at most points in time. This suggests that a large proportion
of firms tend to have too optimistic and, therefore, biased expectations. At the firm level,
I find in my conservative estimate that only 1 percent of all firms have distorted beliefs.
However, using a broader measure of quantitative expectation errors reveals that more than
18 percent of firms have distorted beliefs. Nevertheless, this analysis alone is not enough
to prove that a firm has rational expectations; it is necessary to also check whether firms
efficiently exploit their information sets. I find that a considerable proportion of firms does
not. Specifically, my conservative estimate of expectation errors demonstrates that about
two-thirds of all the firms in my sample have rational expectations, i.e. their expectations are
unbiased and they use all available information efficiently. For the broader definition, this
number decreases substantially to 33.2 percent. Thus, there is evidence that heterogeneous
firms form their expectations in heterogeneous ways, i.e. a large proportion of firms differ
with respect to their beliefs and their ability to process information. In addition, I provide
evidence that undistorted beliefs are correlated with firm-specific characteristics such as
firm size or affiliation with a specific industrial sector. Smaller firms are especially prone
to holding distorted beliefs. No systematic relationships are found between firm-specific
characteristics and non-rationality.
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The results provide evidence that a large fraction of firms does not form expectations
in a rational way. Thus, further research into firms’ expectation formation processes would
seem a fruitful line of inquiry. This topic is also highly relevant for the transmission of
macroeconomic shocks as shown in Cai (2010) and Bachmann and Sims (2011). Furthermore,
allowing for some deviation from the rational expectation assumption usually incorporated
in macroeconomic models has implications for the optimal conduct of economic policy (Ball
et al., 2005).
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Appendix
A1 IFO Business Climate Survey (IFO-BCS)
Original German IFO-BCS Questions
Q 1 “Sonderfragen: Die Ausnutzung unserer Anlagen zur Herstellung von XY (betrieb-
sübliche Vollauslastung=100%) beträgt gegenwärtig bis zu ...%. ”
mehr als 100 %
30 40 50 60 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 und zwar
Q 2 “Erwartungen für die nächsten 3 Monate: Beschäftigte (nur inländische Betriebe) -
Die Zahl der mit der Herstellung von XY beschäftigten Arbeitnehmer wird: zunehmen, etwa
gleichbleiben, abnehmen.”
Q 3 “Sonderfragen: Unter Berücksichtigung unseres gegenwärtigen Auftragsbestandes und
des von uns in den nächsten 12 Monaten erwarteten Auftragseingangs halten wir unsere
derzeitige technische Kapazität für XY für: mehr als ausreichend, ausreichend, nicht
ausreichend. ”
Q 4 “Erwartungen für die nächsten 3 Monate: Unsere inländische Produktionstätigkeit
– ohne Berücksichtigung unterschiedlicher Monatslängen und saisonaler Schwankungen –
bezüglich XY wird voraussichtlich: steigen, etwa gleich bleiben, abnehmen.”
Q 5 “Tendenzen im vorangegangenen Monat: Unsere inländische Produktionstätigkeit
– ohne Berücksichtigung unterschiedlicher Monatslängen und saisonaler Schwankungen –
bezüglich XY ist: gestiegen, etwa gleich geblieben, gesunken.”
Q 6 “Unsere Geschäftslage für XY wird in konjunktureller Hinsicht: eher günstiger, etwa
gleich bleiben, eher ungünstiger.”
Q 7 “Aktuelle Situation: Wir beurteilen unsere Geschäftslage für XY als: gut, befriedi-
gend, schlecht.”
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A2 Mapping of REALIZt into Quantitative Production Changes
Figure A1: Mapping of REALIZt into Quantitative Production Changes
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Notes: This figure shows for each possible value of REALIZt the average ∆logui,t of all firms with a given
value for REALIZt. To improve readability, the quarterly values of ∆logui,t have been averaged to obtain
annual numbers. The upper panel shows the results for positive outcomes of REALIZt and REALIZt equal
to zero. The lower panel displays the results for negative outcomes of REALIZt and REALIZt equal to
zero. The original average ∆logui,t of REALIZt = 0 has been subtracted from all time series shown in the
figure.
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A3 Robustness Check - Qualitative Expectation Errors (IFO-BCS)
Figure A2: Comparison of Experrornari,t and Experrori,t with Manufacturing Production
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Notes: The upper panels show the quarterly cross-sectional means of Experrornari,t and Experrori,t (left
scale) together with the quarter-on-quarter percent changes in manufacturing production (right scale). The
lower panels show the quarterly cross-sectional standard deviations of Experrornari,t and Experrori,t (left
scale) together with the quarter-on-quarter percent changes in manufacturing production (right scale). All
time series are seasonally adjusted.
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Table A1: Cyclical Properties of Experrornari,t and Experrori,t
Variable Manufacturing production in t
in t+ j -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Cross-sectional Leading Property of Lagging Property of
means of: Variable Variable
Experrornari,t+j 0.05 0.18 0.44 0.62 0.50 0.34 0.20 0.01 -0.12
Experrori,t+j -0.02 0.12 0.40 0.63 0.60 0.44 0.24 0.05 -0.08
Cross-sectional
standard deviations of:
Experrornari,t+j 0.22 0.24 0.05 -0.06 -0.20 -0.22 -0.25 -0.22 -0.20
Experrori,t+j 0.26 0.23 0.09 -0.03 -0.22 -0.30 -0.32 -0.26 -0.24
Notes: see notes to Table 4.2.
Figure A3: Biasedness of Experrornari,t and Experrori,t on the Macro Level
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
# obs = 319,172
R2 = 0.03
F(31,121) = 54.3, pval = 0.00
μ = -0.12 (0.014)
Pe
rc
en
t
Experror
it
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
# obs = 227,891
R2 = 0.05
F(31,121) = 37.1, pval = 0.00
μ = -0.15 (0.020)
Years
Pe
rc
en
t
Experrornar
it
Notes: see notes to Figure 4.5. The upper panel shows the annual time effects of Experrori,t. The lower
panel does the same for Experrornari,t .
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